









Knowledge Closure and Knowledge 
Openness  




©Levi Spectre, Stockholm 2009 
ISBN 978-91-7155-973-9 




Chapter 1: An Introduction to the Closure Debate in Epistemology............... 9 
1.1 The Closure Debate ...............................................................................................14 
1.2 Layout of the Argument ..........................................................................................17 
1.3 Closure and its Motivation ......................................................................................19 
1.4 What is the Closure Principle? ...............................................................................23 
1.5 Debating Closure....................................................................................................29 
1.5.1 Hawthorne’s Arguments.................................................................................29 
1.5.2 Nozick on Closure ..........................................................................................32 
1.5.3 Dretske on Closure and Heavyweight Propositions .......................................35 
1.5.4 Section Summary...........................................................................................37 
Chapter 2: Skepticisms and Closure............................................................ 38 
2.1 Skepticism and Closure..........................................................................................38 
2.1.1 Cartesian Skepticism, Moorianism, and what Comes In-Between.................41 
2.2. Cartesian Skepticism.............................................................................................43 
2.2.1 Immodest Skepticism .....................................................................................44 
2.2.2. Modest Skepticism ........................................................................................47 
2.3 Mundane Skepticism ..............................................................................................53 
2.4 Live Skepticism.......................................................................................................58 
Chapter Summary ........................................................................................................59 
Chapter 3: The Kripke Dogmatism Puzzle and Epistemic Ascent ............... 62 
Chapter Three Outline ..................................................................................................62 
3.1 The Threat of Dogmatism.......................................................................................63 
3.1.1 Junk Conditionals and Junk Knowledge ........................................................66 
3.1.2 Junks or Knowledge? Dogmatism Repuzzled................................................68 
3.1.2.1 A Short Excursion to the Bahamas........................................................77 
3.2 Epistemic Ascent ....................................................................................................79 
3.2.1. Dogmatism and Easy Knowledge and Bootstrapping ...................................81 
3.2.2 Epistemic Ascent and Knowledge of True Belief ...........................................83 
Chapter Summary ........................................................................................................87 
Chapter 4: Evidence and Open Knowledge................................................. 90 
Chapter outline .............................................................................................................90 
4.1 The Watch Case and its Probabilistic Analysis. .....................................................91 
 
4.1.1. Evidence and Probabilities............................................................................91 
4.2. Probabilistic Argument for Evidence and Knowledge Openness ..........................96 
4.3 Evidence Openness from Principles.......................................................................99 
4.3.1. Equivalence, Consistency and Addition ......................................................104 
4.3.2. Equivalence and Distribution.......................................................................109 
4.3.3. EAD, EDIS and the Logic of Evidence ........................................................110 
4.3.4. Carnap’s Matrix ...........................................................................................111 
Chapter Summary ......................................................................................................114 
Chapter 5: Open Knowledge – Costs and Benefits ................................... 119 
5.1. From Evidence to Knowledge..............................................................................119 
5.1.1. Premise (V) of the Open Knowledge Argument ..........................................124 
5.1.1.1. An Objection to the Use of (V) ............................................................127 
5.1.1.2. An Objection to (NED) ........................................................................132 
5.2. Knowledge Without Evidence..............................................................................137 
5.3. Knowledge as Evidence ......................................................................................140 
5.3.1. Knowledge as Evidence: Jeffrey Conditionalization....................................142 
5.3.2. Knowledge as Evidence: Standard Conditionalization................................144 
5.3.3. Knowledge as Evidence: Williamson's Account ..........................................148 
5.3.3.1. Safety and Chance .............................................................................149 
5.3.3.2. Lottery Propositions ............................................................................152 
5.3.3.3. The Principal Principle and Practical Deliberation ..............................158 
5.3.3.4. Fallibilism ............................................................................................162 
5.3.4. Knowledge as Evidence: Conclusion ..........................................................165 
5.4. Evidential Knowledge ..........................................................................................166 
5.4.1. The Benefits of Epistemic Openness ..........................................................166 
5.4.2. Denying Closure: Not as Bad as You Think................................................168 
Chapter Summary ......................................................................................................175 
Chapter 6: Concluding Remarks................................................................ 179 
Appendix: A Short Overview of Bayesianism............................................. 186 






Chapter 1: An Introduction to the Closure 
Debate in Epistemology 
Those are my principles, and if you don't like them... well, I have others. 
   Groucho Marx 
 
We know that Socrates was troubled if it is true that Socrates lived and true 
that, if he lived, he was troubled. We know this since we have excellent rea-
son to believe that basic deductive inferences patterns are truth-preserving. If 
the premises of valid inference patterns are true, we have a logical guarantee 
that the conclusion is true as well. Such is the case with the modus ponens 
inference pattern, a candidate as good as any for being valid. The study of 
logic deals, among other things, with the identification of such patterns as 
well as with proof of their validity. Yet, when propositional attitudes govern 
the scope of the premises of provably valid inferences, even with regard to 
factive attitudes1 such as knowledge, there is no logical guarantee that the 
conclusion will also fall within their scope (K(p)∧K(p→q)⊬K(q)). Regard-
less of the logical guarantee, however, the prevalent inclination is to think 
that these inferences actually do preserve truth from premises to conclusion. 
If I know that grass is green, and if I know that if something is green it has a 
color, I know that grass is colored. We cannot prove that I know this, but a 
denial would seem very odd. What else would it take for me to know that 
grass is colored? 
Not all cases inspire the same confidence as this grass example. My wife 
knows, since we have talked about this extensively, that if she gets extended 
time-off from her job, we will go to the Bahamas. She also knows, since her 
trusted boss has told her as much, that in the case of her husband's unfortu-
nate death, she will receive extended time-off. Does she then know that, if I 
die, we will go to the Bahamas?2 Perhaps she does, or perhaps when she 
thinks about this, knowledge no longer governs the scope of the premises of 
this valid inference. The point is that, even though the truth of the premises 
guarantees the truth of the consequence, knowledge (though tightly con-
                                                       
1 Factive propositional attitudes are those that entail the truth of the propositions they govern.  
2 The example is inspired by Sorensen’s tennis example (1988b: 405). He uses it to make a 
point about slippery-slope arguments.  
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nected with truth) is not obviously preserved. Yet something is irregular 
about my wife having these two items of knowledge, even before we placed 
them as premises of the inference. What seems odd, among other things, is 
precisely that, assuming she has no intention of taking her dead husband to 
the Bahamas but knows the two conditionals, it would seem that she should 
count as knowing that if I die, we are going to the Bahamas. The oddness, 
then, seems to count against the assumption that she could know the two 
conditionals to begin with. So, despite any trepidation evoked by my wife’s 
morbid inference, the idea that if one knows that p, and one knows that if p 
then q, one will know that q, seems rather basic. It seems that we would be 
better off denying she knows the premises than denying that she knows the 
conclusion (while knowing the premises).  
Even with regard to non-factive attitudes such as belief, we are inclined to 
think that valid inferences allow us to lend equal or greater credence to their 
conclusions as we lend to their premises. For good reason, I believe that you 
will soon be calling me. I also have good reason to believe that if you do, you 
are at home. Do I have reason to believe that you are at home? Even though 
we might have less confidence regarding this question as we have regarding 
truth or knowledge, the intuitive straightforward answer is affirmative. If this 
is true regarding attitudes that do not entail truth, then regarding knowledge, 
which does entail truth, our inclination seems to be on firm ground. The 
temptation is strong to think that this kind of knowledge preservation 
through valid inference always holds, that is, it should be considered to be a 
principle: For all propositions p and q and subjects S, if S knows that p and 
knows that p implies q, then S knows that q.3 This claim is commonly known 
as the principle of closure.4  
The view that I will defend throughout this manuscript is that there is 
good reason to question the validity of the closure principle, that is, that 
there is good reason to think it does not generally hold. In fact, though I do 
not deny that closure is intuitive, I will claim that the motivation I have 
given so far for the principle of closure is misguided. But motivation and 
intuition aside, the reason to suspect knowledge closure is that, unlike truth, 
knowledge involves properties that may not be preserved across logically 
                                                       
3 This is a rough statement of the principle. Many epistemologists reject it as stated but accept 
weaker variants.  
4 The principle of closure for knowledge has several other names: “Deductive closure,” 
“knowledge closure,” “principle of transmission of knowledge by deduction.” Most common, 
I think, it is simply “the principle of closure” which should be considered here to relate to 
knowledge unless stated otherwise. For instance, I might say that I am concerned with justifi-
cation closure, evidence closure, or rational belief closure, in a certain context. 
What it means for a claim to hold as a principle is that it holds with absolute generality. 
Usually its statement is given in terms of a conditional statement such that by necessity if the 
antecedent holds, the consequent will hold. I do not think that anything turns on whether the 
principle is stated as a universally quantified conditional or as a necessary, or strict, condi-
tional.        
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valid inferences. Though it may not seem apparent, I can have evidence for 
the truth of a proposition p, and know that p implies q, and yet my evidence 
for p will not count in favor of q. If knowing requires having good enough 
evidence, I may have evidence for the premise of a valid inference – enough 
to know it to be true – and yet fail to have the kind of evidence I need in 
order to count as knowing its conclusion. This, at least in rough outline, is 
the reason why I think we need to be suspicious of the claim that we always 
know the truth of conclusions of valid inferences if we know the truth of 
their premises.5 I question, then, the claim that when I infer a proposition 
from something I know and do this correctly, I know that the proposition I 
inferred is true. The thesis is that the failure of evidence to be preserved from 
premises to conclusion of valid inferences gives us good reason to think that 
closure fails.  
I must admit at the outset that the closure principle is highly intuitive, and  
why this is so will concern me in the current and later chapters. And yet, the 
main issue is to discern theoretical considerations that bear on the main 
question while steering away from intuitions. Before discussing these issues 
in detail, I would first like to ascertain what is at stake in determining 
whether closure is a valid principle. In this regard, at least five issues are 
worthy of mention.  
First, as the examples above suggest, inferences from known premises are 
central in everyday situations. When Sherlock Holmes investigates crime 
scenes and questions suspects and witnesses, his goal is to know the identity 
of the perpetrator(s) of a crime. He seldom, if ever, gains direct access to this 
knowledge (though after the identity of the criminal becomes known, the 
reader often receives more direct confirmation). Rather, his method is to 
extend his knowledge by inferring from knowledge he has gained through 
interview, inspection, and extensive background information. Though the 
character of Holmes is fictional, the method is real and has a central place in 
science and everyday reasoning. If closure is not valid, we might need to 
reevaluate the confidence we place in the knowledge we regularly take peo-
ple to posses. If knowledge is not always extendable by proper inference, 
what good is knowledge, and indeed, what good is proper inference? 
Second, a major challenge to the idea that we know many propositions to 
be true is presented in the form of Cartesian skepticism. Skeptics of this va-
riety typically argue that, if I know that q follows from p (theoretical knowl-
edge that not only do they not dispute but indeed rely on), if I don't know 
that q, I don't know that p either. This is the closure principle stated in a re-
                                                       
5 Though my reasons for making the distinction are different, like John Hawthorne (2004a) I 
will later claim that there is a major distinction that is important for the debate concerning 
closure, namely, the distinction between valid inferences with more than one premise, and 
valid inferences that have only one. But for my purposes the distinction does not matter since 
the reason I offer to suspect closure - the intransitivity of evidence - does not turn on this 
distinction. The account, then, offers the same response to both forms of closure principle.  
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ductio argument. Although they have no proof, they typically claim that we 
do not know that we are not being systematically deceived in such a way that 
our beliefs, which we typically take to be true, are really false. Such would 
be my predicament, for instance, if I were a brain in a vat being fed sensory 
input that made it appear to me that I had a body when, in reality, I am 
bodyless. Many other things that I currently believe would be false; as a 
matter of fact, I would hardly have any true beliefs about the environment I 
would falsely believe I occupy (though as Descartes famously argued, I 
would still know, since I would know that I am thinking, that I exist in some 
environment). If the closure principle is valid, the skeptic argues, I am igno-
rant of a vast body of beliefs I take to be part of my knowledge. This argu-
ment collapses if knowledge is not closed, provided, that is, that closure fails 
in the right way, i.e., it fails with regard to the cases that the skeptics utilize. 
If closure indeed fails in the right way, we can meet this skeptical challenge 
if we can say something about why and how it fails in this way.   
Third, the closure principle plays a vital role in many central issues and 
paradoxes of epistemology besides Cartesian skepticism, including the Lot-
tery and the Preface paradoxes, the Easy Knowledge problem (or bootstrap-
ping problem), the self knowledge and semantic externalism problem, some 
of the Gettier cases, the Surprise Examination paradox (or hangman para-
dox), the warrant transfer questions, the Knowability paradox, the Knower 
paradox, Kripke’s epistemic dogmatism puzzle, and Kripke's puzzle of be-
lief.6 These problems have closure of one type or another in full focus or at 
least as one of the premises necessary to generate them.7 Knowledge open-
ness8 - the idea that knowledge is not closed under proper inference - can 
both dissolve9 at least some of these problems as well as explain why they 
have such a strong grip on us (by appeal to closure’s intuitive tow). If clo-
sure is not valid, we might have been looking at the wrong issues trying to 
solve problems that are only apparent. 
                                                       
6 Additional issues include Live Skepticism, Mundane Skepticism (chapter 2) and Epistemic 
Ascent (chapter 3).  
7 The connection between closure and Cartesian skepticism is widely noted and will be con-
sidered in chapter 2. For the involvement of closure in Cohen's Easy Knowledge problem see 
his (2002), (2005), and Hawthorne's (2004a) as well as Chapter 3. For its involvement in the 
Bootstrapping problem see Vogel (2000, 2007) (and Chapter 3). For closure in Gettier cases 
see his (1963). For the Knowability paradox and closure Brogaard and Salerno (2006). Sur-
prise Exam and the Knowability paradoxes Kaplan and Montague (1960). The connection 
between the Semantic-externalism/self-knowledge problem and closure is noted in Brown 
(2004). Kripke's epistemic dogmatism and closure see Cargile (1995), Sharon and Spectre 
(forthcoming), and Chapter 3. For the involvement of closure in Kripke's belief puzzle, see 
Frances (1999).          
8 The term “open knowledge” was coined (as far as I know) by Nozick (1981: 208). 
9  More carefully, whether or not non-closure can dissolve a given paradox depends on how 
closure fails. It may very well be that many of the problems remain since knowledge is closed 
with regard to cases that bring about a given paradox. I will not explore all the problems I 
mention so I will simply say that I think the hangman paradox does not turn on closure fail-
ure, Kripke's puzzle of belief I am less certain about.   
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Fourth, the centrality of closure is also evident when we take a brief look 
at some of the main views advanced in recent (and less cent) epistemology. 
Advocates often take the validity of closure and the lack of tenability of 
skepticism as premises of arguments for their respective views. In other 
words, it is common to take a non-skeptical approach that allows knowledge 
to be closed as a dual objective, and this dual objective has become a central 
desideratum in contemporary epistemology. In this respect, these views are 
what we may call closure driven. Such are some of the main arguments for 
epistemic Contextualism (Stewart Cohen 1988, David Lewis: 1996); for 
Dogmatism (G. E. Moore: 1959, Jim Pryor: 2000); for epistemic Relativism 
(John McFarlane: 2005); for Contrastivism (Jonathan Schaffer: 2004); and 
for Subject Sensitive Invariantism (John Hawthorne: 2004a, Jason Stanley: 
2005).10 Skepticism, which has already been mentioned, is also closure-
driven but has only one theoretical objective, not two.  
The fifth and final key issue in which closure is involved concerns epis-
temic logic. Since any normal modal logic has K (=◻(α→β)→(◻α→◻β)) as 
an axiom,11 non-closure of knowledge means that no normal modal logic for 
knowledge is tenable. Trying to idealize epistemic agents (something we 
must do in any case, even if closure holds) will not result in a normal modal 
logic for knowledge unless we idealize along the lines on which closure 
fails.12 (Perhaps epistemic logic can be limited to sub-domains such as  
mathematical knowledge, which are normal even if normal epistemic modal 
logic is generally ill fitted for knowledge.) The issue at hand, therefore, is 
whether epistemic logic is even possible.  
                                                       
10 Note that these views can be combined with non-closure. In fact an open knowledge con-
textualist view has been advanced by Mark Heller (1999). I am inclined to think that a defen-
sible view can be offered along the lines of an open knowledge Subject Sensitive Invariantist 
view as well. This is to say that the practical environment of a thinker can determine what this 
thinker knows, but this shift does not have to vary systematically with what closure predicts. 
Some comments in this manuscript will be relevant for such a proposal.   
11 “One common way of presenting a particular normal modal system is by stipulating that it 
contains, in addition to the PC-tautologies, a certain specified collection of other formulae. 
These formulae, which must contain K but otherwise can be any collection we choose, are 
then said to be axioms of the system…” (G.E. Hughes and M. J. Cresswell, 1984: 5) 
In other words, an alternative label to this essay could be: “Does epistemic modal logic rest 
upon a mistake?” I prefer the present title since I do not discuss the matter of what logic ade-
quately captures central features of epistemic states and dynamics. Nevertheless, much of 
what will follow be relevant. I owe this point to Assaf Sharon and Daniel Rönnedal. 
12 If K is taken as an axiom of epistemic modal logic, the following is a corollary: if α⊢β, 
then (Kα→Kβ). Without idealization, most epistemologists will not accept K (I have Lewis in 
mind as a possible exception, see Hawthorne (2002) for a detailed argument). If we idealize 
along the lines of conclusive evidence (i.e. modal logic for all cases where knowledge is 
based on evidence that entails the known proposition), a weaker K-like axiom would be valid 
even by the open knowledge advocate’s lights. From this perspective, this is why there is no 
problem (as far as I can see) with mathematical epistemic logic. The evidence, which I take to 
be proofs in this case, entails the known mathematical propositions. 
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These are the reasons that make the closure of knowledge such a central 
question.13 Only some of these reasons have been fully acknowledged but the 
issue has been debated, though less extensively than one might expect. Be-
fore turning to consider what the closure principle is, its basic motivation, 
and what I take to be the issue on which the question turns, I wish to say a 
few things about how the debate has been conducted in the literature, to be 
followed by a statement of my aims in this manuscript and how I will try to 
achieve them.  
1.1 The Closure Debate  
What you know to follow from your knowledge is something you know is 
true. This is the basic and unquestionably intuitive idea that formulations of 
closure are meant to express. Indeed, an air of paradox beclouds a failure to 
know consequences you know to follow from your knowledge. Unsurpris-
ingly, then, a large majority of contemporary epistemologists consider one or 
another weak version of this principle to be valid. Some (e.g. Stewart Cohen) 
view it as “something like an axiom about knowledge,” (2005: 312) others, 
like Richard Feldman, think that doubting its validity is a very bad idea – 
“one of the least plausible ideas to come down the philosophical pike in re-
cent years” (1999: 95). Most, however, such as Anthony Brueckner (1985) 
and Jonathan Kvanvig (2006: Chapter 4), take a positive and more moderate 
line. Brueckner, although he sides with closure, thinks that it ultimately de-
pends on theoretically informed opinion. While believing that closure gov-
erns our use of the term knowledge, Kvanvig denies that it sounds paradoxi-
cal to say that one knows that one has hands but does not know that one is 
not a handless brain in a vat (or at least, he thinks it is not as bad as some 
theorists, e.g., DeRose (1995), make it out to be). 
Contemporary open knowledge advocates (explicit deniers of the knowl-
edge closure), are a slim minority. Notably, Fred Dretske (1970), Robert 
Nozick (1981), and Robert Audi (1991), who denies justification closure, 
have either advanced theories that entail open knowledge or have proposed 
(supposed) counterexamples to the principle.14 Among the examples pro-
                                                       
13 There is a danger that a subject such as the present one is too central. The danger is that in 
order to adequately respond to a question as the present one, one would have to consider too 
large a portion of epistemology. Indeed I have had to neglect many issues that relate less 
directly to the line of thought I found myself following. For instance, I have had to only 
briefly refer to central alternative responses to skepticism and to leave out much of the discus-
sion I planed to include regarding ampliative justification and knowledge, Bayesian episte-
mology (which I find congenial to open knowledge), epistemic compartmentalization, the 
weaknesses of other positions with regard to their attempts to leave knowledge closed, and 
more.      
14 Other theorists who are less known for their advocacy of open knowledge are Colin 
McGinn (1984); Gilbert Harman and Bret Sherman (2004); Stephan Yablo (MS); Mark Heller 
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posed as counterexamples to the principle of closure, Dretske (1970) has 
in/famously claimed that if, on the basis of looking at a zebra, one comes to 
know that there is a zebra in the zoo pen, and if one also knows that if there 
is a zebra in the pen one is not looking at a mule disguised to look like a 
zebra, it does not follow that one knows that the animal in the pen is not a 
disguised mule. The factivity of knowledge (the principle that knowledge 
entails truth), however, does of course entail the truth of the latter proposi-
tion.15 Knowing through memory that one's car is parked in the driveway 
might not allow one to know by inference alone that it has not since been 
stolen and taken away from the driveway (Jonathan Vogel, 1990).16 Nozick 
(1981) claims that his open knowledge account has the advantage of having 
a way to answer Cartesian skepticism.  
In general, the benefits of open knowledge originate in its ability to ac-
count for a conservation of knowledge in face of epistemically questionable 
consequences that are known to follow from it. Open knowledge, then, al-
lows for a detachment of unknown consequences from known premises, 
which would be destroyed by reductio if closure were valid. But since clo-
sure is intuitive, it would be theoretically better to account for the supposed 
counterexamples in some manner that leaves closure intact, provided one 
could also account for why, despite appearances, one would be wrong to 
think that the consequences are not known while the premises are.17 If we 
could not account for why we know consequences of propositions we know 
despite appearances to the contrary, closure would leave us exposed to radi-
cal skepticism.18  
                                                                                                                                
(1999); Krista Lowler (2005); Bryan Frances (1999); Alvin Goldman (1976); Stephan Main-
zen (1998), and James Cargile (1995). Some theorists who think knowledge is open have not 
written on the subject, and there are probably others of whom I am either unaware or fail to 
remember.  
Professor Martin Kusch has suggested to me that Ludwig Wittgenstein is committed to 
open knowledge at least as far as “hinge propositions” are concerned, and Mark Kaplan 
(forthcoming) claims that J. L. Austin also held an open knowledge view. Thanks to Martin 
Gustafsson for bringing this to my attention.  
15 Open knowledge advocates do not typically contest the validity of modus ponens. Vann 
McGee (1985) who does contest it would be a closure denier only on some variants of the 
principle. He need not deny closure on the principle I will claim is the one at the center of a 
proper debate.  
16 Vogel does not present this as a counterexample but rather as an improved version of the 
kind of example Dretske has proposed that is only a prima facie case against closure (he 
claims). Vogel himself is one of the prominent defenders of closed knowledge.   
17 Some closure advocates admit that intuitively and unreflectively, at least, premises of ar-
guments that conclude with the negation of skeptical propositions seem to be known while the 
consequences are not. In fact otherwise it would be hard to account for why skepticism is 
challenging.       
18 A central response to skeptical challenges, e.g. contextualism, has been to add some index 
relative to which the truth of knowledge ascriptions of the premises come and go together 
with the truth ascriptions of the knowledge of the conclusions. It is then a further question 
whether relative to this index knowledge is closed or open.  
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Those who agree that we know many propositions to be true—non-
skeptics—are left with the choice of trying to account for why, despite ap-
pearances to the contrary, one does know propositions of the sort that have 
caused controversy, or account for the loss of knowledge of the premises 
despite the initial judgment that they had been known, or alternatively, ac-
count for why closure, despite our intuition, is invalid. 
Unfortunately, despite the centrality of this issue, few have proposed di-
rect arguments for closed knowledge that go beyond intuitive considerations, 
although two arguments proposed by John Hawthorne against open knowl-
edge will be considered in a later section of this chapter. Most arguments 
proceed on the assumption that knowledge is closed. In fact, the understand-
ing that a theory entails open knowledge is commonly taken to be a decisive 
argument against it, regardless of its theoretical merits.19 Yet, as we saw in 
the last section, good reasons justify inspecting the question directly with the 
best tools at our disposal rather than simply settling for uninformed intui-
tions, unless we find we have no alternative.20 That investigation is the pur-
pose of most of the discussion in this manuscript.  
I will not attempt to fill all the theoretical lacunae in the direct arguments 
for closure or openness, but I will take steps in that direction. Posing some 
challenges to closed knowledge, challenges that give reason to believe that 
knowledge is open despite appearances to the contrary, is the course I will 
follow.  Specifically, the claim I will be defending is that solid reasons back 
the thesis that knowledge is not closed.21 
 
 
                                                       
19 Such is the way many theorists respond to Nozick's tracking account of knowledge.  
20 My view regarding the role of intuitions in epistemology is that they are indeed central. 
However, when appealing to intuitions, we have to be relatively confident that there is no 
further analysis that can clear the way to view things in light of more basic cases. As will 
become clear in this chapter as well as Chapter 4, there are appealing principles that must be 
rejected in light of considerations that show them to be uninformed and indeed false.   
21 Maitzen (1998) claims that knowledge has been shown by Kaplan and Montague (1960) to 
be open. The knower paradox, he claims, establishes that knowledge cannot be closed. Kaplan 
and Montague use a Gödel type diagonal sentence construction of the form K(¬p)↔p to 
derive a contradiction assuming closure, factivity, and knowledge of factivity. The details 
need not concern us here. If Maitzen were right the present discussion would be of substan-
tially diminished interest.  
Space precludes me from considering Maitzen's argument. A clue to the fact his conclu-
sion is questionable is the ongoing debate regarding which of the premises is to be given up. 
Specifically, see the debate between Cross (2001) and Uzquiano (2004). Professor Pagin has 
shown me that Maitzen's way of formulating his argument commits him to the unwelcome 
result that one can prove p and will be in no position to know that p is true. I do not believe 
that closure or non-closure can be proven.    
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1.2 Layout of the Argument  
The main argument of this manuscript takes the form of a challenge that 
includes several sub-arguments. These sub-arguments might seem at first 
isolated, but will seem less so in light of the argument in Chapters 4 and 5. 
By the end of Chapter 5, I believe that the formidable benefits of views that 
do not assume closed knowledge will have become evident. The overall ar-
gument, then, has two parts: the first poses challenges to closed knowledge, 
and the second is the appreciation of the theoretical benefits accruing from 
open knowledge.  
As for the sub-arguments, after locating and explaining which closure 
principle should stand at the center of a proper debate, I use two of John 
Hawthorne’s arguments against open knowledge to show that Fred Dretske's 
and Robert Nozick's open knowledge accounts are problematic. Nozick’s 
account, I claim, is inconsistent. The remainder of Chapter 1, then, is an 
attempt to state where the debate stands at present. In Chapter 2, I advance 
three types of skeptical challenge to closed knowledge: Cartesian Skepti-
cism, Mundane Skepticism, and a skeptical challenge that Bryan Frances 
(2004) has proposed, for which he coined the term Live Skepticism. In ar-
ticulating these challenges, I try to mark some of their advantages and short-
comings from a skeptical perspective, as well as note their relation to the 
principle of closure. However, I do not survey the responses that have been 
offered to skepticism, nor do I try to say anything about the potential ones. 
Instead, I use them as a guide for what I see to be the underpinning of the 
challenge to closed knowledge. This underpinning is further articulated 
through another set of problems for closed knowledge: Saul Kripke's Dog-
matism puzzle is the first, and the second is Epistemic Ascent, which covers 
the problem of Bootstrapping proposed by Jonathan Vogel (2000) and the 
Easy Knowledge problem introduced by Stewart Cohen (2002, 2005), as 
well as some other related challenges. I criticize the standard solution to the 
Dogmatism puzzle proposed by Gilbert Harman (1973), Roy Sorensen 
(1988), and John Hawthorne (2004a). My claim is that, contrary to the ac-
cepted wisdom, the Dogmatism puzzle remains unresolved, and is an in-
stance of the general conundrum of closure generating unwarranted Epis-
temic Ascent. This is the main line of my argument in Chapter 3.   
The underpinning of all these challenges, I argue next, is the openness of 
evidence, that is, that if one has evidence e for a proposition p, and one 
knows that q follows from p, one does not necessarily have evidence for q. 
To establish the openness of evidence, I set out two arguments on probabilis-
tic grounds as well as one on non-probabilistic grounds, that is, on basic 
principles of evidence. I reflect on the historical origins of open evidence, 
mainly through the work of Carnap and Hempel. Evidence openness is then 
advanced as the main argument against knowledge closure, leading to a  
better understanding of the challenges to knowledge closure set out previ-
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ously in the manuscript. In Chapter 5, I respond to rejoinders to the argument 
for open knowledge from open evidence.Some of these rejoinders help to 
refine the argument, including a response to Hawthorne’s arguments that,  in 
Chapter 1, had been found to be decisive against the most notable open 
knowledge views (Dretske’s and Nozick’s). Chapter 5 also critiques Timo-
thy Williamson’s knowledge account, which rejects one of the premises of 
the argument for open knowledge. The chapter also offers a preliminary 
defense of a certain form of justification closure that is compatible with open 
knowledge. I then claim that we can explain the oddness of open knowledge 
and solve all the previous challenges if we understand open knowledge on 
the basis of open evidence. This is the second part of the overall argument 
that states the benefits of open knowledge. I claim that, having solved these 
problems and understanding why knowledge could be open and why it might 
seem to be closed while respecting much of the intuition regarding closure 
through justification closure, we should take open knowledge as a serious 
theoretical contender.   
Obviously, some important issues are not considered in this manuscript. I 
provide no theory of knowledge, evidence, or justification, and I am not 
concerned here with how open knowledge can be combined with existing 
theories of knowledge, although I think open knowledge can be combined 
with many of them. Williamson’s theory is an exception. I discuss his view 
insofar as it pertains to the issues at hand, mainly because his view is almost 
diametrically apposed to the view of open knowledge that emerges here. As 
noted, I refrain from criticizing other replies to the different challenges I 
posed, though I doubt any one theory could deal with all of them. Most no-
tably, I do not criticize epistemological Contextualism or Subject Sensitive 
Invariantism, at least not in a systematic and substantial way. I leave those 
issues for another occasion.   
My thesis, as I said, is that open knowledge should be taken seriously. My 
own view is that knowledge is open, though I am not completely convinced 
of this. I am also inclined to view the entire situation as paradoxical. I see the 
intuitive force of closure, but also the import of the arguments that lead me 
to believe it to be invalid, as well as the theoretical benefits accruing from 
open knowledge. When and if it turns out that there is a need to revise our 
thinking about the arguments for open knowledge and also renounce its 
benefits, this itself will help to advance the understanding of these central 
issues.   
In order to proceed, we need a better understanding of what the closure 
principle is, what the surrounding debate and its proper terms are, and what 
might be its driving motivation. 
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1.3 Closure and its Motivation  
To gain a better understanding of the closure principle, I want to introduce a 
twist into the story about closure as articulated in my opening remarks, 
namely, that inferences of the basic modus ponens variety seem to preserve 
knowledge and give us reason to believe knowledge is closed. This formula-
tion is misleading. Even if this is how we tend to reason about closure, there 
is good reason to think that all of us, friends and foes of closure alike, should 
think that knowledge is open with respect to these basic inference patterns. If 
these patterns are open, they surely cannot support knowledge closure.    
When a subject knows that p, she might not be absolutely certain that p. 
This can be represented by some measure of probability in the unit interval, 
such that the probability of p is high but less than 1. As we will soon see, the 
basic idea does not have to be stated probabilistically. What matters is that, 
whatever measure of (epistemic) uncertainty we allow a subject to have 
while knowing that a proposition is true, this uncertainty can accumulate. 
Thus, one might know that p with some degree of uncertainty, and one might 
also know that if p then q with the same degree of uncertainty. The rational 
degree of uncertainty of the modus ponens conclusion, q, will be greater than 
the uncertainty one is required to have for either one of these two premises. 
Taking Pr(•) to be a rational credence function for a subject S, we might 
have the following case: Pr(p)=0.9, Pr(p→q)=0.9, and as the case may be, 
S's rational credence for q should be 0.81.22,23 Whether or not we want to 
place a threshold for knowledge, surely we do not want to commit ourselves 
to the possibility that one will know a proposition when the rational degree 
of confidence in that known proposition is lower than 0.5. Moreover, it 
seems highly questionable that it is rational for a subject to be very confident 
that ¬q is true while she knows that q.24 But if we take modus ponens to be 
closed with respect to knowledge, we will have to say something like this.25  
Like most subjects, I know many things. I know that I was born Decem-
ber 31st 1967, I know that my mother is married to my father, that I will eat 
lunch today, etcetera. If I list these things and then think of whether I know 
                                                       
22 Here I am appealing to the possibility of independence. Also the case can be dramatized a 
bit more if we take each premise to be 0.7 and with independence we would have Pr(q)=0.49. 
But as we will see nothing of substance will turn on the values we chose as long as they fall 
short of 1.   
23 Christensen advances similar arguments with respect to belief. See Christensen (2004: 
Chapters 1 and 2). For him the basic question with regard to rational belief closure is whether 
beliefs are binary or modeled on probabilities. The basic question, I think, is different. It is 
whether rational doubt is allowed to accumulate, or in the case of knowledge, the issue turns 
on whether known beliefs are allowed to be rationally/epistemically less than certain. Also, as 
will become clear, the same argument can be restated assuming that fallibilism is true. The 
discussion here is closer to Hawthorne (2004a:181-5).   
24 It is also epistemically questionable that one would know that q while being rationally 
required to be highly confident that ¬q.   
25 We might just have used modus tollens or some of the other basic inference patterns.  
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that the conjunction of the items on my list is true, I may realize that it is 
highly likely that at least one of the propositions on my list is false. Nothing 
seems strange or irrational about my doubt regarding this conjunction. In 
fact, I think something would probably be wrong with me if I had the same 
level of confidence in the conjunction as I have for each of the many con-
juncts on my list. This point has been reiterated as a lesson regarding rational 
belief at least since Kyburg presented his Lottery paradox (1961),26 and Mak-
inson (1965) presented the Preface paradox. If I believe that each of p1, … pn 
on my list is true, and assuming the number of items on the list, n, is suffi-
ciently large, I ought not believe the conjunction p1∧…∧pn. This Preface 
paradox type case suffices to show that the transition from a conjunction of 
many items of belief to a belief in the conjunction of those items is not inno-
cent. Innocence is somewhat of an understatement, since I may even realize 
that to believe that this conjunction is true is not rational for me because, say 
by induction, I know that I have very good reason to doubt its truth. Since 
the evidence for this conclusion is often at my disposal, my ability to know 
the conjunction appears dubious whether or not I have such a realization. 
One might suppose that the Preface non-closure and the modus ponens 
closure are epistemically compossible.27 That is, since the rational credence 
of a known proposition is high, and since the modus ponens case is one 
where I merely know p and know that if p then q, doubt will not accumulate, 
at least not to the point where the premises are known and the conclusion is 
not. Alas, this initially attractive view fails. If one accepts that, in the preface 
case, I can know that each of the items on my list p1, … pn is true, while fail-
ing to know (since even for me it is not rational to believe) that p1∧…∧pn is 
true, modus ponens is not closed. 
In a review of Roy Sorensen's Blindspots, Peter Pagin (1990) has shown 
why. We are assuming that I know that each of p1, … pn. Now suppose I 
reason as follows:28 
                                                       
26 Kyburg develops this argument further, among other places, in his (1970) paper, “Conjunc-
tivitis.” Hawthorne (2004a: 46-50) connects these considerations with closure but comes to 
different conclusions than those that are reached here.  
27 Roy Sorensen thought so, at least implicitly. See Peter Pagin (1990). This mistake is quite 
frequent, unfortunately.     
28 In this manuscript the double arrow “⇒” denotes a priori strict implication. I will use “⊢” 
as well as a standard underline to denote logical entailment (in the meta language) and “→” 
for material conditionals. Other symbols are either standard or will be introduced in due 
course.  
In the present context I focus on strict implication since although it is not a matter of logi-
cal entailment that I am thinking ⇒ I exist, if this implication is strict and true, it will have the 
same implications as a logically valid one. That is, it will be knowable a priori and will not 
add any new doubt or uncertainty that was not in the other premises of the argument. The 
demand that it be a priori knowable is to set this implication apart from propositions such as 
if this is water, it is H2O. Those will be strict implications which I can be less than certain of 
and that can add rational doubt when conjoined with other propositions. As the examples in 
the main text will make clear, a double arrow will not entail that the implication is known a 

























by modus ponens closure, I know that: 
 
(2)  p2 → (p1∧p2)  
 
and since I know that p2 is true (it’s on my list), I now know both prem-
ises of a modus ponens argument. So by a second application of modus po-

















Clearly, by going on in this manner I will know p1∧…∧pn, which we as-
sumed I do not know. Our problem is that accumulation of doubt, the re-
quirement that I cannot rationally be required to believe a proposition and 
know its negation, together with the idea that if I know that p implies q I will 
know that q if I know that p, form an inconsistent triad. Notice that no prob-
abilities were appealed to in the course of Pagin’s argument. The crucial step 
was already made when we assumed at the outset that rational uncertainty, 
doubt, or risk, can accumulate.29 
But if we do not restrict ourselves to non-probabilistic reasoning, we can 
verify that, although per hypothesis each of the propositions p1 through pn 
has a very high probability, the proposition p1∧…∧pn can have a very low 
probability. To locate the problematic step that I make in my reasoning, we 
may also verify that the step from (1) to (2) does not introduce any new 
doubt that was not in p1 to begin with. It is my bringing in p2 in (3) and plac-
ing it as premise, together with my knowledge that p2→(p1∧p2) (knowledge 
that inherited its level of uncertainty form p1) that brings in a new level of 
doubt. Hence, just like in the simple case above of two items of knowledge, 
it was the modus ponens inference that brought in a new level of uncertainty. 
Following this line of reasoning, we are bound to conclude that it is not the 
                                                       
29 A similar conclusion can be reached on a fallibilist assumption. I refrain from using falli-
bilism here since I think that the phenomena of rational uncertainty is wider. For the argument 
with regard to fallibilism see Chapter 5.3.3 pertaining to Williamson's view.  
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case that whenever I know that p and know that if p then q, I know that q, 
and this is the case even if I know that I performed a valid inference. Some-
where, I went from known premises of a modus ponens inference to an un-
known conclusion.     
Though other approaches to this problem might be possible, we have 
good reason to suspect that modus ponens closure is too strong a principle. 
Some theorists claim that we need to weaken the closure principle since I 
might know that p and know that p implies q, and yet might fail in putting 
my items of knowledge together.30 But as the accumulation of doubt argu-
ment would naturally lead us to believe, this is the wrong line along which 
closure should be weakened. Even if I put the items together and reason im-
peccably, I will fail to know the conclusion of some modus ponens argu-
ments. But if modus ponens is not closed with respect to knowledge, then 
modus ponens and other basic inference patterns do not give us motivation 
for closure (as I misleadingly suggested in the opening remarks).31 
To reject closure of knowledge more generally, however, would be pre-
mature. Let us consider more abstractly how we stumbled into the inconsis-
tency. On the one hand, the conjunction p∧q trivially follows from p and q. 
On the other hand, Pr(p)>Pr(p∧q)<Pr(q) (assuming independence and that 
0<Pr(p),Pr(q)<1). If my rational belief that p and q is less than certain, then 
basic inferences I know to be valid can carry me from rationally held prem-
ises to conclusions I should not believe. Two ways immediately suggest 
themselves as solutions to our problem. The first is to jettison the idea that 
rational doubt can accumulate. But regrettably, no non ad hoc reason is 
forthcoming, possibly leading us to think that, once doubt is present, it will 
not accumulate. A second way is to claim that  no epistemic doubt is present 
                                                       
30 Lewis (1996: 442-3) cashes out the phrase “putting items of knowledge together” in terms 
of epistemic compartments. We can be compartmentalized in such a way that we do not know 
that we have legs (since we are considering skeptical possibilities) but we know we are bush-
walking (and using our legs in so doing). He then suggests that a subject knows what is 
known in any of her compartments. I find that this suggestion is problematic since it places 
severe constraints on what we can know in different compartments about our ignorance, or 
alternatively, that our theoretical reasoning about knowledge is deemed uninteresting. Here is 
why. Assuming we know that we are ignorant of having legs in our philosophical compart-
ment and we know that we are bushwalking and in doing so using our legs in the bushwalking 
compartment, assuming Lewis' suggestion that we know what is known in any compartment, 
we would count simultaneously as knowing and not knowing we have legs (by factivity). So 
either we cannot know we do not know we have legs (in the philosophical compartment), or 
our knowledge pertains solely to what we know in a given compartment. The first option is 
the unreasonable restriction on knowledge of ignorance and the second is the unreasonable 
result that our knowledge of what we know or don't know pertains to what is known within a 
compartment. Surely more needs to be said here (and I have said more elsewhere - Spectre 
(unpublished manuscript a)), but to pursue it would take me too far away from the current 
discussion.       
31 This claim I think is well supported even if we do somehow manage to find a way to leave 
modus ponens closed. For the claim to be well supported I need not convince anyone that it is 
not closed. Suffice it that we have good reason to think so.    
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to begin with. Though his reasons are different, Timothy Williamson’s ac-
count amounts to something resembling this suggestion.32 I will argue that 
this view does not solve our problem in Chapter 5.  
An entirely different reaction to the inconsistency, which I believe to be 
preferable, is to leave modus ponens and the other valid inference patterns 
behind, that is, to admit that they are not closed. What we need are infer-
ences that do not allow doubt or uncertainty to accumulate. Besides the prob-
lem of finding the right way to weaken the principle of closure, the draw-
back of this strategy is that a central everyday intuitive motivation for the 
principle of closure is lost. As things stand, a subject may know that p, know 
that p implies q, put these items of knowledge together, reason impeccably, 
and fail to know that q.33  
With that said, it is time to locate a closure principle that can stand at the 
center of a proper debate. 
 
1.4 What is the Closure Principle?  
How should we weaken the closure principle? What got us into trouble in the 
previous section was the accumulation of rational uncertainty. What we 
want, then, is to ensure in some way that, in the course of an inference that is 
closed, doubt or uncertainty will not accumulate. In contrast to focusing on 
how to conjoin or “put together” items of knowledge, we need to be more 
vigilant about what kinds of items of knowledge can be unproblematically 
conjoined. Thus, in place of modus ponens closure, we may offer the follow-
ing principle:  
(CP1)  For all p and q, and subjects S, if S knows that p and knows that 
necessarily if p then q, and S puts these items of knowledge to-
gether, S knows that q                     
 
where “knows” relates to a single time throughout. The reason we might 
think that (CP1) will not fail where modus ponens did is that (CP1) guaran-
tees that, besides the doubt in p, no doubt will be added in the consequence q 
                                                       
32 I think that it is unfortunate that he does not highlight this aspect of his knowledge account. 
A significant benefit of his view is that it supports the closure of basic valid inference patterns 
such as modus ponens. 
33 The reason for this has been pointed out in different ways by Kyburg (1961, 1970) and 
Makinson (1965) and has had a great influence on theories of rational belief, but less so, I 
suspect, with regard to theorizing about knowledge. Although appreciating this neglect 
should, I think, influence our thinking about the motivation of knowledge closure, fortunately 
the main issues regarding its consequences vis-à-vis closure have been taken into account by 
some epistemologists. The reasons that have been given for restricting closure, restrictions 
that avoid these consequences, however, are different from those given here. 
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since one knows the consequent follows necessarily from the antecedent. 
Nevertheless, we are not in the clear since (CP1) neglects the doubt that 
might accumulate due to the fact that one might not be completely and ra-
tionally certain that, necessarily, if p then q is true. In other words, (CP1) 
will not solve our problem.  
An implication can be epistemically less than certain in two ways. First, 
the implication that figures in the modus ponens inference might not be a 
strict one and might, for instance, be a material implication. Second, even if 
the implication is strict, it might not be known with epistemic certainty, for 
instance, I might know that a strict implication is true on the basis of a logi-
cian’s testimony. (CP1) addresses the first kind of uncertainty, but not the 
second. And if in any of our modus ponens inferences we have an implica-
tion of one of these two sorts, doubt will have room to accumulate. To see 
this more clearly consider the following case. Suppose I know some proposi-
tion p1 is true, and that I learn from a logician we may call number 1 that p1 
logically entails p1∧p2. Also, from logician number 2 I learn that p1∧p2 logi-
cally entails p1∧p2∧p3, ... and from logician 99 that p1∧…∧pn-1 logically en-
tails p1∧…∧pn. Assuming that these testimonies are independent, I know by 
the same reasoning as before that the likelihood of at least one of the 99 lo-
gicians’ testimonies being erroneous is very high. (CP1) seems suspect since 
the same kind of reasoning that led us to suspect modus ponens closure can 
be emulated using the logician case. 
Suppose we impose a further restriction to overcome this difficulty: 
(CP2)  For all p and q, and subjects S, if S knows that p and knows a priori 
that necessarily if p then q, and S puts these items of knowledge to-
gether, S knows that q.   
  
(CP2) seems to solve the problem that the logician case raises, but still 
leaves much to be desired. First, it highly restricts the application of closure. 
Only when we know a priori that p strictly entails q will  (CP2)’s antecedent 
is satisfied. Hence, this leaves us with a principle that says nothing about 
many cases we might think are closed. Second, I may know that all 99 logi-
cians are better a priori reasoners than I am. To claim that I would know that 
p1∧…∧pn is true due to my own limited reasoning, but that I would fail to 
know it is true on reasoning I know to be superior to my own, appears sus-
pect.34  
The issues I will discuss do not turn on the kind of doubt, uncertainty, or 
risk that stems from possible failures in the reasoning process itself, though  
                                                       
34 Maria Lasonen-Aarnio raises similar concerns in her (2008) paper. She uses successive 
deductions to the conclusion that risk will accumulate using single-premise closure similarly 
to the way it mounts on its multi-premise version. Hence, she claims, single- and multi-
premise closure rise or fall together.       
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a good argument against closure along these lines is possible.35 Let us then 
bracket this last problem and focus on the first. Regarding the first problem, 
one useful course might be to look more closely at any motivation for clo-
sure we can find to see whether it fits the conclusion we have reached, and 
consider whether we can improve and close in on the principle that should 
stand at the centre of a proper closure debate. In other words, the closure 
principle we have reached might not capture the idea we set out to express.   
In set theory, a set D is said to be closed under a given operation C, pro-
vided that for every object x, if x is a member of D, and x is C-related to any 
object y, then y is a member of D. What is required, then, is an operation on 
knowledge that has a chance of leaving it closed without uncertainty accu-
mulation. In light of the previous section, a good candidate for closure can 
be formulated by taking D to be a set of propositions known by a subject, 
and stating that D will be closed, under knowledge that an operation of a 
priori necessary inference C has taken place on a given member of D:  
If C*∈D and p∈D, then q∈D 
 
where D={p: p is known by S at t}, C* is the proposition that S has carried 
out operation C (= inferring a priori q from p) and p and q are proposition 
variables. But notice that this kind of closure relates to members of the set D 
and not to subsets of D. Using “K” to denote the knowledge operator, i.e. 
K(q) (=q is known by S at t), we can set aside the sets in favor of a more 
conspicuous and familiar formulation: 
(CP3) K(p∧(p⇒q)) ⇒ K(q) 
 
This principle is a candidate for a correct closure principle. It evades the 
above problems associated with the Preface paradox essentially by assuming 
that knowledge of the premise survives conjunction of an item of knowledge 
and an item of knowledge of a necessary implication.  
With this point in mind, I wish to refer back to something mentioned ear-
lier. I said that if we put two items of knowledge together, say the two prem-
ises of a modus ponens inference, we have no guarantee (even according to 
                                                       
35 The argument should, it seems, take the form of a dilemma. One horn equates conjunction 
introduction closure (K(p)∧K(q)⇒K(p∧q)) with any other restricted closure principle on the 
grounds that there is an accumulation of doubt involved in both. This horn will lead to the 
Preface paradox for knowledge. The other horn upholds the distinction between the two kinds 
of closure principle by demanding that one knows that the inference is valid. But as Dag 
Prawitz argues, this demand would lead to an infinite regress since it amounts to the claim 
that in order to know the conclusion by inference one needs to know that it follows from the 
premises. Presumably one would have to make some deductions in demonstrating that the 
inference is right. But that would only allow for knowledge that the inference is valid if one 
knows that further inference is valid, etc. For an elaboration on this argument see Prawitz 
(2009). I take this opportunity to thank Professor Prawitz for bringing his argument to my 
attention and for several stimulating discussions.     
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many who accept closure) that one will know the conclusion. Now, however, 
we have apparently found a way to understand the phrase “putting together” 
so as to distinguish cases that are closed from cases that are not. If I can put 
my items of knowledge together and know them in conjunction, closure says 
that the conclusion will be known as well. If in putting the items of knowl-
edge together, knowledge does not survive, bets are off. In fact, we might as 
well strengthen the principle so that it can include cases where the implica-
tion is not strict and yet the items of knowledge continue (as a conjunction) 
to be known. In other words, what matters is that the inference is made from 
a proposition that falls in its entirety within the scope of a single knowledge 
operator. Thus, a better candidate for a closure principle is:  
(CP4) K(p∧(p→q)) ⇒ K(q) 
 
(CP4) might not appear to establish clearly that the necessary a priori im-
plication is known a priori or that the inference from the premise to the con-
clusion needs to be based on a priori and correct reasoning, but only the 
latter problem should be a matter of concern. The premise of (CP4) assumes 
that the implication and the (empirical) proposition are known, i.e., they fall 
within the scope of the same knowledge operator. We also have an explana-
tion now of why it seems that closure is supported by modus ponens. In 
thinking that modus ponens is closed, we might have missed an important 
distinction between a subject S who knows that p and knows that if p then q 
(K(p)∧K(p→q)), and a subject S’ who knows that p and that if p then q 
(K[(p)∧(p→q)]). Only subject S’ will know by closure that q. S has no such 
guarantee. 
But now we may realize that the implication does not do any real work 
here. The work is all done by the scope of the knowledge operator. So in 
order to have a clear idea about what closure principle is at issue and assum-
ing (as I will throughout) that there is no problem with the a priori reasoning 
itself, we can state the principle at issue:36  
(CP) For all propositions p and q and subjects S, if S knows that p and in-
fers q a priori from p (correctly), then S knows that q.   
 
Several writers, e.g. Hawthorne (2004)37 and Gettier (1963), have pro-
posed closure principles for knowledge and justification that amount to the 
                                                       
36 There are those who stipulate in formulating closure that a subject must believe that q on 
the basis of the inference. See, for instance, Hawthorne (2004a: 34).  
37 Hawthorne (2004a: 39) uses Lewis Carroll's argument regarding modus ponens to saddle 
the open knowledge advocate with the tortoise unreasonable position. But the single-premise 
closure leaves room for the same position. As I see it, his argument goes against single prem-
ise closure as much as it does with respect to closure deniers. Thus one might know that p and 
know that if p then q, but not know that p and that if p then q and thus will not know that q. If 
one would want to claim that one does know that q in all these cases one would be tacitly 
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same thing. What matters is that the reasoning is made from a single item of 
knowledge (or belief) to a new item of knowledge (or belief). And what 
“single” means here is that it is a proposition that is governed by the knowl-
edge (or belief) operator. While repudiating multi-premise closure, some 
theorists formulate closure with two premises (necessarily, if (Kp∧K(p→q)), 
then it follows that Kq)). Some even confusedly call it single-premise clo-
sure.38 However, this formulation is in fact an instance of multi-premise clo-
sure as one might verify by Pagin’s argument above. It would be true if the 
premises can always be known as a conjunction, i.e. if Kp∧K(p→q) entails 
K(p∧(p→q)). But this is to beg the question as the validity of multi-premise 
closure is already assumed. The relevant individuation conditions of ‘prem-
ise’ are determined by the range of the relevant operator (in this case knowl-
edge) since the degree of rational or epistemic uncertainty applies to the 
operator. Of course not everyone is guilty of this kind of conflation. Wil-
liamson (2000: 117) and Hawthorne (2004: 32-4), for instance, are careful to 
correctly distinguish single- from multi-premise closure. The crucial point I 
mean to stress is that the former does not entail closure of basic inferential 
modes such as modus ponens. We are thus left with a debate concerning 
(CP), which is a weaker principle than many have supposed.     
A general concern with restricting closure to single items of knowledge is 
that the question of whether knowledge is closed or open becomes uninter-
esting.  We have reached a weak principle that leaves out many of the every-
day inferences that regularly inform our reasoning and action. In a sense, 
deductive operations do not result in general extension of knowledge (an 
idea that several theorists—e.g. Williamson (2000: 117)—have claimed is 
the main motivation for closure) if multi-premise closure is rejected. This is 
the case if expansion of knowledge is understood to depend on combinations 
of known propositions to form new, logically stronger conclusions than any 
one of the previously known propositions. I must admit that this is a serious 
concern, though one that should trouble both sides in the single-premise 
closure debate.39  
To show how weak the principle is and how, on many matters, open and 
closed knowledge advocates will find themselves on the same side, let us 
                                                                                                                                
assuming multi-premise closure (that if one knows that p and that q one will know that p-and 
q by proper inference).     
38  For just one example see Fumerton (2006: 24-5).  
39 Together with the open knowledge advocate the closed knowledge advocate is bound to 
admit that one can know that p and know that q follows from p, one may consider these items 
of knowledge together and yet fail to know that q. This means that arguments that appeal to 
the intuition that one does know that q in the case of (CP) cannot be appealed to since it is just 
as intuitive that modus ponens closure is valid. In fact, many theorists state the closure princi-
ple as I have stated the modus ponens closure principle. Notice there is no forthcoming reason 
why a subject should lose her knowledge of premises as a result of failing to know the conclu-
sion of a proper modus ponens inference. Thus the move of trying to retain closure through 
denial of knowledge of the premises, does not seem promising here. 
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return to the troubling case of my wife going to the Bahamas with her de-
ceased husband. The weakened closure principle will allow my wife to know 
both that if she gets extended time-off we are going to the Bahamas, and that 
if I die, she will get an extended vacation. For this case to pose a challenge to 
(CP), she would have to know both conditionals in conjunction. This union 
could apparently easily fail and, therefore, she would not know (thankfully) 
that she will go to the Bahamas with her deceased spouse should I come to 
my demise. Perhaps one would like to claim that she does in fact know this 
since she knows that I will not die in the near future. I am sympathetic to this 
reply, but my sympathy is not of a theoretical nature (it is because it entails 
my survival). The point is that we should be doubtful about finding a reason 
why she would not know the pair of conditionals in isolation, and hopeful of 
finding a reason why she would not know them in conjunction, whether or 
not she needs to know that I will not die in order to know the first condi-
tional.40 A stronger closure principle than the one I have advocated would 
obviously be in direct conflict with this judgment about my wife’s knowl-
edge. But this should be considered a problem for the stronger closure prin-
ciple, not for the reply that both open knowledge advocates and (CP) advo-
cates have the resources to offer.41 
In appreciating how weak (CP)’s weakness (though not all agree that 
there is no stronger valid closure principle), we should not think that the 
question of its validity is insignificant. Admittedly, some issues (such as the 
one regarding my wife’s epistemic state) do not depend on the question of 
whether (CP) is valid, but the issues I listed earlier are highly significant and 
most of them do depend on its validity.42  
 
                                                       
40 An open knowledge advocate could also accept, though she need not, (something that a CP 
advocate would have to deny) that the conditionals can be known in conjunction with an 
inability to come to know the objectionable conclusion on the basis of a proper inference. 
Whether this is desirable is another question.     
41 Although knowing the conditionals in isolation does not mean that (CP) advocate must 
know them in conjunction, there is a different method by which my wife will know that if I 
die, we are going to the Bahamas. Assume that she knows that if she gets extended time-off, 
we will go to the Bahamas. She can infer from this knowledge that if (if I die, then she will get 
extended time off), then, (if she gets extended time off, we will go to the Bahamas) and by (CP) 
she will know this. But only by knowing the antecedent of this conditional in isolation and 
putting it together with her knowledge just gained by (CP), will she know the consequent by a 
second application of (CP) on the conjunction of these two items of knowledge. Only then 
will she know that if I die, we are going to the Bahamas. This knowledge will indeed require 
knowing that I will not die and yet it is still an option for the closed knowledge advocate to 
deny this on the basis of claiming that the conjunction is something she will fail to know. I 
consider this case more extensively in Chapter 3.1.2.1, p. 77.     
42 I am undecided regarding whether Kripke's belief puzzle can be stated in terms of (CP) (for 
rational belief). The same goes for the semantic externalism problem.  
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1.5 Debating Closure  
With a better understanding of the principle at issue, we may now turn to a 
characterization of the closure debate. Non-skeptics who accept CP—closure 
advocates—claim that, whenever a subject S knows that a proposition p is 
true, S infers a priori q from p, then even in cases where S’s evidence (or 
reasons) for believing that p are insufficient for knowing that q taken on their 
own, S can know that q without augmenting S’s evidence for q or revising 
S’s reasoning. The idea here is that knowledge is always expandable by 
competent inference from a single item of knowledge, provided that it can be 
maintained. Open knowledge advocates—deniers of (CP)—claim that this is 
not always the case. Turning things around, the open knowledge view can be 
seen as a commitment to the following claim: S may know that p, and a pri-
ori infer q from p, yet S may fail to know that q. Closure advocates deny that 
this is an epistemic possibility. If one fails to know q, closure advocates 
maintain, one cannot know that p once the a priori inference to q from p has 
been competently made.43 This, then, is the crux of the debate.   
To see the workings of this debate, I will first turn to Hawthorne’s argu-
ment targeting the idea that the epistemic states that open knowledge advo-
cates are committed to are not compossible, even according to their own 
lights. I will then show that, regarding Nozick and Dretske’s view, Haw-
thorne is right. 
1.5.1 Hawthorne’s Arguments      
Advocating knowledge openness, closure deniers stand in opposition to two 
kinds of closure endorsers – skeptics and optimists. Skeptics often argue 
that, since one does not know some proposition q that is known to follow 
from some other proposition p, one does not know p. Optimists claim that 
both p and q are known, either simpliciter (e.g. G.E. Moore), or with refer-
ence to different contexts of ascription (Contextualists), or to different prac-
tical environments the subject is in (Subject-Sensitive Invariantists).44 What 
both skeptics and optimists agree upon is that, if q is properly derived from a 
known proposition, q is known. This is the contention that advocates of the 
openness of knowledge reject, as reflected in the denial of (CP). 
To defend closure against examples advertised by its deniers, Hawthorne 
argues that, in the interpretation of their view that closure deniers would 
have us adopt, these examples conflict with other,  more basic and weaker 
                                                       
43 For further reference, where O(x,y) is the operation of an ideal reasoner inferring a priori y 
from x and t is a time earlier than t', we may characterize the debate with the following princi-
ple: ∀p∀q[((p∈D)t∧ O(p,q)t)→((q∈D)t'∨(p∉D)t')]. Open knowledge advocates deny it and 
closure advocates endorse it.  
44 This is not to say that Contextualism or Subject Sensitive Invariantism entail closure of 
knowledge.  
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epistemic principles. The advocate of knowledge openness, he claims, is 
forced to reject these highly compelling principles, so that denying closure 
on the basis of these examples is tantamount to denying weaker principles as 
well. Thus, if his arguments are cogent (as I will claim they are), Hawthorne 
manages to show that anyone who advocates the weaker and more basic 
principles is not an open knowledge advocate, at least not a consistent one. 
Nevertheless, the same reasons that motivate the denial of closure tell 
against the weaker principles Hawthorne puts to task. Thus, anyone rejecting 
closure for the right reasons will also reject the weaker principles on which 
Hawthorne’s argument relies. Or so I will argue bellow (Chapter 5.1). Let us 
look at Hawthorne’s arguments.45  
Exposing the deeper connections and further commitments of closure de-
nial, Hawthorne’s arguments helps articulate what I take to be the proper 
grounds for epistemic openness.  
The following are Hawthorne’s weaker principles (2004a: 41), which he 
would have the closure denier adhere to, at least initially:  
 
Equivalence (EQ): Necessarily, if S knows that p, and S knows that p is a 
priori equivalent (or logically equivalent) to q, then S knows that q. 
 
Addition (AD): Necessarily, if S knows that p, then by competently infer-
ring p or q from p, S thereby knows p or q.46 
 
Distribution (DIS): Necessarily, if S knows that p and q, S knows p and S 
knows q. 
 
Indeed, all three principles seem highly plausible. To see how they lead to 
the same conclusion as CP let us, following Hawthorne, get back to Fred 
Dretske’s well known zebra case (1970: 1015-6). Seeing a zebra-looking 
animal in the pen labeled “Zebra,” one knows that the animal in the pen is a 
zebra (call this proposition Z). But, presumably, one does not know that this 
animal is not a mule disguised to look like a zebra (¬DM for short). So, ac-
cording to the closure denier (in this case, Dretske) one knows Z, and knows 
that ¬DM follows from Z, but does not know ¬DM. And indeed, as I have 
claimed above, this is the heart of the debate. The open knowledge advocate 
is committed to the claim that some cases such Dretske’s zebra case are epis-
temically possible.  
Now Hawthorne’s first argument that such cases are epistemically impos-
sible runs as follows. We are assuming that S knows that:  
                                                       
45 Hawthorne (2004a) and (2005). I do not present or attempt to answer all of Hawthorne’s 
arguments in support of closure, only the ones that I take to be most forceful and to pose the 
greatest challenge for epistemic openness of the kind I think is best motivated. 
46 Further clauses can be added to these principles, see Hawthorne (2004a: 39), but for sim-
plicity we omit them here. Nothing in our argument turns on this simplification.  
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(4)  Z   [assumption] 
 
(5)  Z ⇒ ¬DM   [assumption] 
 
By AD, S can infer and come to know: 
 
(6)  Z ∨ ¬DM   [AD,(4)] 
 
Assuming that S is familiar with basic logical operations, she can know 
that:47 
 
(7)  (Z ∨ ¬DM) ⇔ ¬DM  [PL,(5)]48 
 
By EQ it now follows that S knows that 
 
(8)  ¬DM   [EQ,(6),(7)] 
 
Thus to avoid the implausible consequences of the example, closure den-
iers must also deny AD or EQ (or both). Since other counter-examples to 
closure share the form of this one, the same problem will arise for them as 
well.49 
Hawthorne also employs a parallel argument using DIS. Assuming that S 
knows that (4) and (5) are true and that familiarity with basic logical opera-
tions enables S to know that: 
 
(9) Z ⇔ (Z ∧ ¬DM)  [PL,(5)] 
 
By EQ, S knows:  
 
(12) Z ∧ ¬DM  [EQ,(4),(9)] 
 
DIS entails that, knowing (11), S is in a position to know: 
 
(13) ¬DM   [DIS,(12)] 
 
                                                       
47 Hawthorne (2004a: 41, note 99) notes that, strictly speaking, that a thing is a zebra does not 
logically imply that it is not a painted mule. I do not think it even follows a priori. This is a 
problem for the adequacy of the example and not so much for the issue at hand.  
48 “PL” will stand for basic operations of propositional logic. 
49 The examples considered here all contain only pairs of propositions since we are only 
dealing with cases concerning CP. Hawthorne thinks there are some prospects for maintaining 
“Multi Premise Closure” as well (2004a: 186). 
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Again, the conclusion that closure deniers aim to avoid is reached by 
principles weaker than closure. If these consequences mandate rejection of 
closure, they should also warrant rejection of these weaker principles. Haw-
thorne’s argument successfully shows that, to avoid the undesirable 
consequence of closure, either EQ or both AD and DIS are to be discarded. 
He concludes that closure is pretty much “non-negotiable,”50 in other words, 
the cases that open knowledge proponents are committed to are epistemic 
impossibilities.   
Hawthorne offers what is perhaps not only the cleverest but also the 
strongest argument in defense of epistemic closure. Nevertheless, exposing 
the deeper connections and further commitments of closure denial, Haw-
thorne’s argument helps articulate what I take to be the proper grounds for 
epistemic openness. Why this is will be the subject of Chapters 4 and 5 be-
low. At this stage, I will consider Nozick’s and Dretske’s open knowledge 
accounts to see how well they can cope with Hawthorne’s argument.  
 
1.5.2 Nozick on Closure 
According to Nozick’s “tracking” analysis of knowledge, S knows that p, iff, 
the following conditions are met:51 
 
(i)  S believes that p is true [By some method M]  
(ii) p is true 
(iii) not-p ≻ not-(S believes that p)  [by method M] 
(iv) p ≻ S believes that p   [by method M]52 
 
Nozick’s subjunctive conditionals are analyzed, for heuristic purposes at 
least, by considering the worlds closest to the one in which S’s purported 
knowledge is assessed, or what he terms its neighborhood. So, for instance, 
(iii) is true if in all the closest worlds in which not-p is clearly the case, S 
does not believes that p is true. On such an analysis, if p entails q and q en-
                                                       
50 Hawthorne, (2004a: 112). 
51 I am using “≻” as a symbol for subjunctive conditionals.  
52 The appeal to methods of beliefs is meant to circumvent cases such as the following. By 
seeing her grandson, a grandmother knows that he is healthy. Had her grandson been ill, 
however, her family would have prevented her from knowing this (perhaps they would claim 
that he is traveling abroad). Had the grandson not been healthy, then, she would still have 
believed he is. Intuitively, Nozick realizes, seeing that her grandson is healthy, the grand-
mother knows as much even though the unqualified subjective conditional (iii) is false. Only 
if she would believe it using the same method – seeing him – in the closest worlds where he is 
unhealthy, would she not count as knowing this in the actual world. Without appeal to meth-
ods condition (iv) would entail a skeptical commitment. Suppose I see a cow and believe it is 
a cow. Still there are neighboring possible worlds in which I do not form this belief, say be-
cause I am looking the other way, my eyes are closed or it is dark outside. Avishai Margalit 
using a different example made a similar point. Nozick discusses his example (1981: 180).   
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tails p, then S knows that p iff S knows that q. The reason this must hold is 
that if p and q logically (or conceptually) entail each other, then they are true 
in the same worlds (at least in the standard picture that Nozick appeals to). 
Realizing this, he explicitly endorses an equivalence principle (1981: 690, 
note 60). Now, since S knows that q is equivalent to p, S will not believe q if 
she does not believe p (Nozick does not contest the closure of rational be-
liefs). So, in a world in which q is true, S would believe that it is true, and in 
worlds (close ones at least) in which it is false, S does not believe that it is 
false. Thus, if S’s belief that p is truth-tracking (as it must be if S knows that 
p), then S’s belief in q is truth-tracking. So, if she knows p and knows that p 
and q are equivalent, S knows q. On Nozick's account, therefore, (EQ) is 
valid.  
At the same time, (DIS), according to Nozick, is false. He claims, for ex-
ample, to know that he works in Emerson Hall (at Harvard University) and 
is not a brain in a vat, but denies that he knows that he is not a brain in a vat 
(Nozick, 1981: 229). In all neighboring worlds in which Nozick does not 
work at Emerson Hall he does not believe that he works there (perhaps he is 
working someplace else or taking time off). Yet, in the neighboring worlds 
in which he is a brain in a vat, he still believes that he works in Emerson 
Hall. Hence, the belief in the conjunction is what Nozick calls “sensitive”. 
Taken in isolation, however, belief in the second conjunct is not sensitive. 
Hence, one may know p and q, yet fail to know q on Nozick’s account. It 
seems, therefore, that Nozick is not a target of Hawthorne’s second argu-
ment, an argument that he in fact anticipates (Nozick, 1981: 228) 
Nozick, however, is threatened by Hawthorne’s first argument, since on 
his account both (EQ) and (AD) (roughly, that one can add disjuncts to 
propositions one knows without loosing knowledge) are valid. The reason 
(AD) is valid according to the tracking theory is the following. If S knows p, 
then her belief in p must be sensitive (satisfies all conditions but, most im-
portantly for our purposes, (iii) and (iv)). Now since when p-or-q is false, 
both p and q are false, if p is believed sensitively then, in worlds in which p 
is false, S does not believe p and therefore does not believe p-or-q. In worlds 
where p is true, S believes p and therefore also that p-or-q. Thus, if p is be-
lieved sensitively, so is p-or-q.53 Hence, on Nozick’s account (AD) is valid 
(Nozick, 1981: 237).  
But if Nozick accepts (AD) and (EQ), then Hawthorne’s first argument 
can be advanced against him. Insofar as he considers it unintuitive and false 
to regard the conclusions of the problematic closure inferences as known, 
                                                       
53 This is a bit of a shortcut. One may argue that not in all worlds in which p-or-q is false, S 
does not believe that this disjunction is false. S might, in those worlds, believe q independ-
ently of p. But the point to notice is that in such counterfactual situations, S does not believe 
the disjunction on the basis of inferring it from p (since in those worlds S does not believe that 
p). Hence S’s belief in p-or-q is arrived at by a different method. So AD is a truth-tracking 
method for Nozick. Regarding methods see previous footnote. 
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while he accepts (AD) and (EQ), Nozick seems to embrace inconsistent 
commitments. For unless Hawthorne’s argument poses an unforeseen prob-
lem, the advocate of knowledge openness must either reject (EQ) or both 
(AD) and (DIS).54 Nozick’s failure to see the contradiction in his account is 
somewhat strange. On the one hand he claims: 
Also, it is possible for me to know p yet not know the denial of a conjunction, 
one of whose conjuncts is not-p. I can know p yet not know (for I may not be 
tracking) not-(not-p & SK).  (Nozick, 1981: 228) 
 
On the other hand, Nozick does accept both (AD) and (EQ), and a few 
pages later states: 
Knowledge, almost always,55 will be closed under existential generalization. 
Similar remarks apply to inferring a disjunction from a disjunct. (Nozick, 
1981: 236) 
 
But clearly, since from p one can deduce p∨¬SK, Nozick is committed to 
the claim that one would know this. However, just a few pages earlier he had 
denied that one could know a logically equivalent proposition while accept-
ing (EQ). Even without the aid of Hawthorne’s argument, then, Nozick’s 
account is inconsistent.56   
To make things clear, suppose Nozick knows p (= I am in Emerson Hall) 
and infers p-or-not-SK (= I am in Emerson Hall or I am not (in the tank on 
Alpha Centauri now and not in Emerson Hall)) from p. By the disjunction 
addition principle, he counts as knowing p-or-not-SK. But he also knows 
that p-or-not-SK is equivalent to not-(not-p and SK) and hence “the person 
who knows p will know” not-(not-p and SK), which is precisely what he 
denies: “I know I am in Emerson Hall now, yet I do not know that: it is not 
                                                       
54 One might suggest that to retain consistency Nozick could drop the possible world account 
of subjunctive conditionals that is inessential to his tracking account of knowledge. It would 
be surprising, however, if a different account of subjunctive conditionals would assign differ-
ent truth values to the relevant conditionals. But this question will have to await more direct 
consideration. In any event as noted in the text, Nozick explicitly endorses transmission of 
knowledge over disjunction introduction. It remains to be seen if this is just a mistake or an 
essential part of his account of knowledge. My suspicion is that it is the latter that is the case. 
55 From the counter-example to the closure of knowledge under existential generalization 
presented in note 68 on page 693 it is clear that that by saying “almost always” Nozick does 
not question the validity of this principle of addition in any respect pertaining to the present 
discussion.     
56 The first to make this point with regard to Nozick’s account was Saul Kripke. In correspon-
dence Kripke pointed out to me that in his unpublished manuscript on Nozick’s epistemology, 
he makes a similar point to the one made here. Yet he also says, “I never noticed the specific 
contradiction to what he says in page 228, nor the fact that I now see there is an argument for 
adding a disjunct based on Nozick’s concept of method, and even explicitly given by 
Nozick... It looks to me as if you are right, as far as I can see now, so this isn't a slip on 
Nozick’s part, as I had indeed thought.” I am grateful to Professor Kripke for this exchange.     
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the case that (I am in the tank on Alpha Centauri now and not in Emerson 
Hall).” (1981: 228).57 
 
1.5.3 Dretske on Closure and Heavyweight Propositions 
Dretske’s rejection of epistemic closure resembles Nozick’s.58 Like Nozick, 
Dretske considers the rejection of closure a consequence of the correct the-
ory of knowledge. Since knowledge depends on having a belief based on 
reliable procedure, and since a procedure may be reliable with respect to a 
belief and unreliable with respect to something entailed by that belief, clo-
sure must be denied. Thus, perception of a zebra normally allows one to 
know that an animal is a zebra, since in the closest possible worlds in which 
there is no zebra, one does not perceive a zebra. Yet, it does not allow 
knowledge that the animal is not a disguised mule, because in the closest 
worlds in which it is (unbeknownst to one) a disguised mule, one presuma-
bly believes that it is not. 
Dretske does not specify what his position is with regard to (AD), but he 
explicitly endorses (DIS).59 The considerations stemming from his theory of 
knowledge on which his rejection of closure is based seem to commit 
Dretske to (at least) (EQ) and (AD), so he too is vulnerable to Hawthorne’s 
cost-raising arguments. 
More recently, Dretske has advanced another line of defense for knowl-
edge openness. Our mundane everyday items of knowledge, he notes, entail 
a host of “heavyweight propositions” that, presumably, we are not able to 
know. That I drank wine last night implies that physical objects exist, that 
the world was not created five minutes ago and a wealth of similar heavy-
weight propositions. If closure were valid we would have to know that these 
propositions are true – knowledge, Dretske claims, we do not seem to be 
capable of acquiring.60  
                                                       
57 Since he knows that not-SK follows from p, he cannot accept the claim that he does know 
this sentence for he would then know (by the equivalence principle) that not-SK.    
58 Dretske precedes and to a great extent anticipates Nozick’s account of knowledge entailing 
epistemic openness. See Nozick in Sosa and Kim (2000: 100) for a summary of the relatively 
slight differences between his and Dretske’s account. 
59 At least he once did (see his 1970: 1009). In a recent exchange with Hawthorne, Dretske 
does not take this avenue replying to the latter’s arguments by rejecting its premises as I 
propose. Specifically, Dretske does not meet Hawthorne’s challenge to take a stand on (DIS) 
(see Hawthorne, 2005: note 10)), which suggests either that he does not fully endorse the line 
I will propose for the open knowledge advocate, or that he fails to see that it entails the rejec-
tion of both (DIS) and (AD). 
60 Interestingly, in the 2005 exchange, Hawthorne’s arguments target Dretske’s theory of 
knowledge (particularly the counterfactual condition on reliable belief-formation) and the 
reasons for rejecting closure that stem from this theory (the only exception is the argument 
employing (EQ) and (DIS) (Hawthorne, 2005: 31), to which, interestingly, Dretske does not 
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Unfortunately, Dretske does not clarify exactly what counts as a heavy-
weight proposition.61 It seems that this category is defined for him by his 
notion of ‘conclusive reason,’ which, in turn, runs into a host of counter-
examples that Hawthorne presents.62 Moreover, the arguments and cases we 
have been looking at, which will be analyzed more thoroughly in the coming 
chapters, suggest that whether a proposition can be known through inference 
from known premises independent of its weight63 does indeed not depend on 
any generalizable feature of the proposition in itself but on its relation to the 
evidence.64 Hawthorne’s arguments do not hinge on the example he employs. 
Without appealing to specific features of heavyweight proposition, subse-
quent arguments will show that the logic of evidence provides reasons for 
rejecting (AD) and (DIS). Though I will not be considering this claim di-
rectly, the best open knowledge account will apparently not rely on counter-
factual features of knowledge or evidence but on the nature of actual evi-
dence that supports known propositions. 
Although sensitive to the right intuitions regarding the central cases, both 
Nozick and Dretske seem to miss the centrality of actual evidence in their 
reflections on closure, although Nozick’s requirement regarding actual 
method does in some way move towards correctly reflecting complex epis-
temic situations. By focusing on the question of evidential support, the pre-
sent account of open knowledge will provide not only an argument against 
epistemic closure and a defense of epistemic openness, but also an explana-
tion of why closure fails, if it does.  
Without the pretense of offering an exhaustive account of evidential sup-
port, the basic idea will be the following: To get things right about knowl-
edge, at least about some knowledge (or even more modestly, about knowl-
                                                                                                                                
reply by suggesting rejection of (DIS)). As it is not founded on sensitivity conditions of 
knowledge, the account of open knowledge proposed here is not susceptible to such argu-
ments. Hawthorne’s only remark about the evidential considerations raised by Dretske (2005) 
(to which he is replying) is: “Better that we appreciate (with Dretske) the force of this prob-
lem than rush too quickly to try to solve it” (40). But, if the argument of chapter 4 and 5 are 
right, correctly understood, the problem of evidential transmission (or the lack of it) is any-
thing but peripheral to the question of closure.  
61 Heavyweight propositions, he says, are “out of range: we cannot see (hear smell, or feel) 
that they are true” (Ibid, 20, my emphasis). Hawthorne takes it that a proposition P is heavy-
weight “just in case we all have some strong inclination to think that P is not the sort of thing 
that one can know by the exercise of reason alone and also that P is not the sort of thing that 
one can know by use of one’s perceptual faculties (even aided by reason)” (Ibid, 33). 
62 See Hawthorne (2005).  
63 In a recent paper Dretske defends his rejection of closure by invoking the idea that informa-
tion is not closed under entailment. This forces him to make the unintuitive claim that a signal 
can raise the probability of some proposition to one and still the proposition might be not only 
unsupported by the signal, but might, moreover, be “not available to signaling” (2006: 412). 
64 Dretske invokes the idea of failures of transmission of warrant proposed by Wright and 
Davies (Dretske 2005: 15), curiously neglecting to specify if and how he intends to differ 
from their (at least in intent) closure-preserving account (Wright 2000: 157, for reasons to 
doubt the feasibility of preserving closure while acknowledging transmission failure see Silins 
2005: 89-95). 
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edge that is not based on conclusive evidence), we must focus on the evi-
dence and distinguish it from what it supports or, to put it in Dretske’s terms, 
from the information it conveys. Perception of a zebra-looking animal con-
veys the information that the thing is a zebra. It raises the probability that the 
proposition “this is a zebra” is true. And yet, it does not raise the probability 
that the proposition “this is not a disguised mule” is true. As a matter of fact, 
it raises the probability that this latter proposition is false. Given that some-
thing looks like a zebra, there is a greater probability on one’s evidence that 
it is a mule made to look like a zebra than if it looks to one like, e.g. a 
matchbox. That is why, if someone embarks on a mission to locate zebra-
look-alike mules, she ought to search among the zebra-looking animals. For 
similar considerations, if you suspect your car might have been stolen, the 
place to look is where you parked it, since if it was stolen, chances are it was 
stolen from there. While memory of parking the car in the driveway supports 
the belief that the car is in the driveway, it raises the probability that this 
belief is true, it does not support the belief that the car has not been stolen 
from your driveway. Given that you parked it there, the probability that the 
car has been stolen from the driveway is raised. The claim, then, is that both 
Dretske and Nozick (as reflected in the principles they support) failed to rest 
their own open knowledge account on firm ground and gave a problematic 
explanation of the cases that they proposed as reasons to doubt closure. If a 
reason may be stated for questioning the validity of closure, it is the open-
ness of evidence and not any necessary subjunctive condition on knowledge. 
Or so, at least, I will argue below.   
 
1.5.4 Section Summary  
We have seen that the most prominent open knowledge accounts – Dretske’s 
and Nozick’s – are in a dire state. Both accounts of open knowledge lack the 
necessary resources to respond to Hawthorne’s challenge. Open knowledge, 
then, does not seem to have much going for it.   
Nevertheless, I think it fair to say that even if one strongly objects to open 
knowledge, it is of some importance to understand what open knowledge is 
if it is not as Dretske or Nozick propose and, in the last two chapters below, 
much is devoted to such an account. Among other things, I hope to show that 
there is an open knowledge view that can respond to Hawthorne’s argument, 
and that understanding how this reply works makes clearer a fundamental 
challenge that closed knowledge faces (Chapters 4 and 5). 
In order to examine this view of open knowledge and see the challenge it 
poses to closed knowledge, we will first need to consider more customary 
challenges to closed knowledge. The first is skepticism of various sorts. 
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Chapter 2: Skepticisms and Closure  
In this chapter I shall start with describing a new type of gloss that has re-
cently been put on an old argument to generate different epistemological 
theories such as; Contextualism, Mooreianism, Subject Sensitive Invarian-
tism, Relativism, Open knowledge, Skepticism and Idealism. Though the 
theories themselves will not be a topic of the current discussion, what is of 
importance here is to see the central role that the principle of closure plays in 
different skeptical challenges. This will justify my direct focus on the princi-
ple as well as the idea that by rejecting it there is a way to avoid several 
skeptical challenges (which is not to say that other ways of meeting them are 
impossible). Once the argument can be put in a more general framework of 
open evidence (Chapter 4), we will not only have a unified way to respond to 
these different skeptical challenges but also have a better understanding of 
where skepticism goes wrong according to an open knowledge view.         
 
2.1 Skepticism and Closure 
You know you have hands. You know that if you have hands you are not a 
handless brain in vat. Do you know you are not a handless brain in a vat? 
Visiting the city zoo, you see a zebra in the pen. You know that if something 
is a zebra, it is not a mule. Do you know that the animal in the pen is not a 
mule disguised to look like a zebra? Having seen the report on CNN, you 
know that it snowed in New York yesterday. You also know that if it snowed 
in New York, then anything indicating that it hasn’t is misleading. Do you 
also know that if the Daily reports that it hasn’t snowed in New York yester-
day, it’s misleading? A first theoretically uninvolved answer to all these 
questions, it seems, is ‘no.’ In fact, if the typical answer were ‘yes,’ it would 
not be clear why the sort of skepticisms that are generated from these cases 
ever bothered anyone. Yet despite the initial inclination the principle of 
knowledge closure entails a positive answer. In each of the cases, if you 
know the first two propositions, you must know the third. But then again, 
how can you know that you are not a BIV (Brain In a Vat), that the animal 
you see is not a disguised mule, or that the Daily is misleading if its report 
conflicts with the one you heard on CNN?  
The cases above exemplify a tension between three common intuitions:  
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(i) What is known to follow from an item of knowledge is itself 
known. (Closure) 
(ii) For many propositions p (that you have a hand; that there is a ze-
bra before you; that it snowed in New York yesterday), you know 
that p. (Non-Skepticism) 
(iii) For some q that logically follows from p (that you are not a hand-
less brain in a vat; that the animal before you is not a mule clev-
erly disguised to look like a zebra, that the Daily made a mistaken 
report if it did not report as CNN), you do not know that q. (Skep-
ticism)  
 
Each of these three intuitions has a hold on us, yet their (simple) conjunc-
tion entails a contradiction: Closure (i) and Non-Skepticism (ii) entail the 
negation of Skepticism (iii). In each of the cases above the prevailing re-
sponse has been to deny Skepticism (which is the idea advocated most fa-
mously by G.E. Moore), while accepting Closure. More sophisticated re-
sponses offer some way of accepting (i), (ii) and (iii) but not all at once. The 
offer has been to contextualize, to relativize (to practical interests, to con-
texts of assessment), to idealize, etcetera.  In contrast to this widely accepted 
strategy, Drestke proposed to relevant-ize, i.e. to deny (i) by claiming that 
the unknown propositions of (iii) are indeed unknown (but irrelevant). Since 
(ii) conflicts with (iii) only given (i), consistency can be maintained if the 
skeptical cases can somehow be deemed irrelevant. We can mitigate the 
unintuitive cost of denying (i) by specifying which cases of knowledge fail-
ure would entail loss of knowledge of the propositions that are known to 
entail them (surely everyone would agree that some cases of knowledge are 
dependent on knowing some of the known consequence, e.g. since p follows 
from p, that if you don't know that p you don't know that p). Thus, we may 
hold on to intuitions (ii) and (iii) by denying the universality of (i) – viewing 
closure not as a principle that holds for knowledge generally, but only for 
some subset of known propositions. Yet with the help of Hawthorne’s argu-
ments we have seen that characterizing the subset in the way Nozick and 
Dretske have, can lead to inconsistencies. 
It is not these more recent problems, but primarily the closure intuition (i) 
that lead theorists in other directions. Most notably Stewart Cohen (1988) 
and David Lewis (1996) claim that (i) through (iii) hold, but only for fixed 
contexts of knowledge ascription. Along the same lines, a recent view pro-
posed by McFarlane (2005) is to relativize and keep (i) through (iii) for 
knowledge ascriptions within contexts of evaluation. Subject Sensitive 
(Moderate) Invariantists like Hawthorne (2004a) and Stanley (2005) propose 
that consistency be maintained not relative to contexts of knowledge ascrip-
tion, but relative to the practical environment of subjects to whom knowl-
edge is being ascribed. From this rough and incomplete characterization of 
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the current epistemological map, one thing surly stands out; knowledge clo-
sure and the avoidance of skepticism are theoretically central.  
And yet the kind of skepticism that needs to be avoided according to dif-
ferent accounts of knowledge has not always remained constant across the 
different suggestions. The skeptical cases above, for instance, are very dif-
ferent. The proposition that if the report in the Daily conflicts with the report 
on CNN, it is the Daily that is mistaken, does not seem like an alternative to 
the proposition that it snowed in New York yesterday. In contrast, that I am 
a handless BIV does seem like an alternative to my having hands. Another 
difference is that some skeptical challenges appeal to systematic error, some 
don’t. The current chapter spells out these challenges and marks some of the 
differences between them. The importance of this characterization for my 
own project is to be able to use it later within a wider context and provide a 
preliminary motivation for knowledge openness.  
I do not claim that the proposals advanced by, e.g., the Contextualist or 
Subject Sensitive Invariantist, do not in fact solve the skeptical problems 
they set out to respond to. By appeal to the salience of alternative possibili-
ties that make alternatives relevant in a context of ascription or in a subject’s 
practical environment, or some other way, much headway has been made. 
Nevertheless, I suspect that these solutions will work with regard to cases 
that somehow make the possibility of error relevant. Yet salience of error 
does not cover the entire spectrum of possible cases that might be used for 
skeptical purposes. Although some skeptics are bound to appeal to alterna-
tives, to contending incompatible propositions with what one knows that 
make error salient, they need make such an appeal. For a skeptical closure 
driven argument all that is needed are propositions that look to be unknown 
but follow from what is.65 The Daily/CNN case does not fit the standard 
skeptical mold. Later I will show that given some plausible assumptions 
about knowledge and its relation to evidence, many such propositions do in 
fact follow from propositions that are known. This suggests, as I will argue 
in Chapter 4 and 5, that there are deeper structural properties that need to be 
understood regarding knowledge and ignorance. I will claim that these struc-
tural properties have to do with the relation of known propositions to the 
                                                       
65 For example, Cohen (1988) defines relevance thus: “an alternative (to q) h is relevant (for 
S) =df S's epistemic position with respect to h precludes S from knowing q.” This definition 
gives Cohen the resources to solve the skeptical paradox he deals with: Cartesian Skepticism. 
Once an alternative is relevant in a context what it follows from becomes unknown by defini-
tion. But one point that is made in the present work is that we have no reason to suspect that 
one can know propositions that are not relevant even if they follow by closure from things we 
know. More specifically, propositions that are irrelevant (and hence known) need not be q-
alternatives (q = the proposition from which consequences are inferred). So although Carte-
sian Skepticism is properly answered by the method Cohen suggests, this does not mean that 
we are out of the woods with respect to similar challenges that invoke propositions that do not 
straightforwardly seem like relevant alternatives. Similar (perhaps even more straightforward) 
remarks hold with regard to Lewis’ definition of knowledge (1996).        
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evidence that supports them as well as logical relations that they have to 
other propositions. Some of the groundwork necessary for appreciating these 
features is laid out in this chapter in the form of a Cartesian Skeptical chal-
lenge. Besides this role, together with other skeptical challenges, Cartesian 
Skepticism will play a role in making clear the benefit open knowledge en-
joys by having a way to respond to them (as well as explaining their force). 
If open knowledge can respond to skeptical and other central challenges of 
epistemology, this major benefit can be part of a favorable evaluation of its 
tenability.66                            
 
2.1.1 Cartesian Skepticism, Moorianism, and what Comes In-
Between  
Let us start with familiar cases that have been used by skeptics, cases that 
make salient the possibility of error. We have seen that the principle of epis-
temic closure serves as premise in arguments for several positions on the 
epistemological map. At the opposite extremes of this map are Skepticism 
and Mooreanism: The former will give up (ii) (Non-Skepticism) the later 
rejects (iii) (Skepticism). Both positions seem problematic, but at the same 
time, the principle on which their arguments are founded, closure, is widely 
accepted as valid by all the aforementioned positions. It was also claimed 
that the intuitive plausibility of this principle induces most theorists to seek a 
way of avoiding the untenable extremes by means other than undermining 
closure. We have seen, though, some reason in the opening chapter to be 
cautious with how this intuition should be put to use.  
A familiar skeptical argument, Cartesian Skepticism, runs along the rough 
sketch outlined above: You claim to know that you have hands. But if you 
are a handless brain in vat, you do not have hands, and you do not know that 
you’re not a handless brain in a vat. Therefore, you do not know that you 
have hands.  The way this argument is regularly represented is as follows:  
 
(1) I know I have hands. 
(2) I know that if I have hands then there are external objects.  
Therefore, 
(3) I know there are external objects. 
 
Moore takes (3) to follow from (1) and (2) since closure is valid, while 
Cartesian skeptics take the falsity of (3) to be a conclusion of a reductio ar-
gument. As the attempts forged by Contextualists and Subject Sensitive In-
                                                       
66 As I claimed earlier if knowledge is open it does not follow that Contextualism or Subject 
Sensitive Invariantism are false. 
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variantists indicate, both the skeptical and the Mooreian responses do not 
seem satisfactory. But though the natural reaction would be to deny the prin-
ciple that both unsatisfactory positions share (see Ramesy’s maxim below), 
closure is not often questioned. And yet, in the context of the skeptical ar-
gument this seems surprising. Theoretically it does not seem right to say that 
if I know I have hands and know that if I have hands I am not a handless 
BIV, then I know I am not a BIV. This, of course, is not to say that closure 
does not hold nor that it is not intuitive, but only that it is not in the context 
of the skeptical argument that closure is present in its most favorable intui-
tive light. 
Contrary to what both Moore and some of the early skeptics may have 
thought, it seems that both drift from commonsense and are motivated by the 
intuitive pull of epistemic closure.67 One who denies closure could explain 
why the two opposing views drift from commonsense and yet enjoy a certain 
theoretical appeal - an appeal that comes from a shared false assumption. 
P.F. Ramesy once claimed that regarding longstanding disputes between two 
opposing views that seem less than satisfactory “it is a heuristic maxim that 
the truth lies not in one of the two disputed views but in some third possibil-
ity which has not yet been thought of, which we can only discover by reject-
ing something assumed as obvious by both the disputants.” (Ramsey, 1960: 
115-6)  
As the wealth of the theories above indicates, substantial improvements in 
epistemology have stemmed from attempts to find the underlying assump-
tion as suggested by Ramsey’s maxim. Relevant alternatives, contexts, prac-
tical environments have been invoked and developed in exciting and sophis-
ticated new directions. Some forms preserve the essential feature68 of knowl-
edge closure others do not. And yet, despite the theoretical headway that has 
been gained in developing these theories, the possibility of resolving the 
skeptical-Moorian bind by denying closure should not be forgotten. Besides 
the direct considerations supporting knowledge openness, this position will 
receive more credence the more problems it can simultaneously resolve (or 
avoid). I believe that the wealth of such problems has been underappreciated.  
Let me turn, then, first to consider more thoroughly the nature of Carte-
sian skepticism and its connection to knowledge closure. Subsequent sec-
tions of this chapter will have other forms of skepticism as their main focus.           
                                                       
67 In addition to the reasons we saw in the first chapter there are other reasons to suspect our 
intuitions regarding closure. Closure is a technical term and so is not directly available for 
inspection with regard to common non-theoretical usage. I also think that principles are not 
the primary object of intuitions; cases are. And so any intuition regarding closure stems from 
such cases and not by the general motivations such as the claim that knowledge is expandable 
by inference. Moreover in chapter four we will see highly intuitive principles that are prova-
bly false, principles that have direct relations with knowledge closure.     
68 For the essentials of closure see Chapter 1 p. 29 note 43.  
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2.2. Cartesian Skepticism 
Skepticism of a familiar Cartesian type, I argue, relies on two components: 
the principle of epistemic closure and the underdetermination of knowledge 
by existing evidence. The second component ultimately depends on an as-
sumption that has been questioned, but which will not be discussed in detail 
in this chapter,69 namely, that a subject S can know that a proposition p is 
true, even in cases where her evidence e does not entail p. More telegraphi-
cally and for further reference the thesis runs as follows:70  
 
(F)  It is possible for S to know p, even though S’s evidence and back-
ground knowledge, e*, does not entail p. 
 
It is understood, or at least this is the way I want to interpret this claim, that 
(F) is interpreted probabilistically as follows:71  
 
¬[KS(p)⇒(PrS(p|e*)=1)]   
 
Where e* is all of S’s evidence and background knowledge and PrS(•) is her 
rational credence function mapping any (pertinent) proposition into the in-
terval [0,1]. I will assume that (F) is true, but this does not mean that I am 
hereby committed to the idea that there are no sub-domains of knowledge, 
such as perceptual knowledge, or a priori knowledge for which (F) would 
rightly be considered false. Thus if (F) is true its truth depends on sub-
domains of knowledge. For instance, knowledge about the future, knowledge 
based on induction, and testimony (or “testimony” of instruments such as 
watches and thermometers) may be underdetermined by the evidence, while 
knowledge based on memory and perception is knowledge that is based on 
evidence that entails the known propositions in these restricted sub-domains. 
Which of the sub-domains we choose to focus on will change the subject 
matter of a dispute between a skeptic and her opponent, but as long as that 
sub-domain has underdetermined knowledge, the structure of the argument 
will remain unscathed.  
Let me start by pointing out that if we have a disputed class of proposi-
tions D72 for which (F) is true, then for a given body of evidence e* entailed 
                                                       
69 But see 5.3.3 below, especially 5.3.3.4.   
70 (F) has obvious affinities to the thesis of fallibilism according to, e.g. Stanley (2005: 127); 
Cohen (1988: 91); Pryor (2000: 518); and Feldman (1981: 266).   
71 Williamson denies this interpretation at least for what he calls evidential or epistemic prob-
ability. Here too, 5.3.3. is relevant.    
72 D I view as a domain containing propositions, hypotheses or theories. As noted in the main 
text, D could contain propositions about external world objects, about other minds, about the 
future, but also it could be characterized by method, i.e. propositions believed on the basis of 
induction, by perception etcetera. Within D I might talk about partitions, which, in accordance 
with the convention used in the literature relating to Bayesianism is not a set of subsets of a 
 44 
by a proposition p, there will be another proposition p’ that belongs to D that 
is incompatible with p and that entails e*. We can see this if we take e** to 
be a conjunction of all the propositions of body of evidence e*. Since e** a 
priori follows from (e**∧ ¬p) and is incompatible with p, we can be confi-
dent that for every p of D for which (F) holds, there is at least one such 
proposition. In fact any proposition that entails (e**∧ ¬p) will have the same 
feature and later we will see that this entailment assumption is not required.  
Now in probabilistic terms, if both p and p’ entail e*, then their uncondi-
tional probability will be lower than their conditional one (no matter how 
close to 1 they are unconditionally):73,74 
 
(1)  (p⇒e*) → [Pr(p) = Pr(e*∧p)] 
 
(2)  (p⇒e*) → [ ] 
I am assuming here both that 0<Pr(p)<1, 0<Pr(e*)<1 as well as that p is part 
of the disputed class of propositions D. Though they need not be cashed out 
probabilistically, these two features can be used for skeptical purposes.  
2.2.1 Immodest Skepticism   
A skeptic can utilize (2) in two distinct ways. First, she may invoke the fol-
lowing immodest75 skeptical underdetermination principle:76  
                                                                                                                                
domain but rather a set of propositions that are mutually exclusive that when stated as a dis-
junction is a tautology, i.e. the probability of a partition is 1. A partition, then, is here viewed 
as a mutually exclusive and exhaustive set of hypotheses, propositions, theories, that have a 
common feature upon which we are focusing. For more details see the Appendix.  
Relevant here is the fact that if in one sub-domain propositions are not underdetermined, 
its proposition might follow from propositions of a sub-domain that is. Unless we want to 
commit ourselves to a view according to which knowledge has different senses, the existence 
of an undetermined sub-domain has ramifications for all knowledge. (What the ramifications 
are will depend on how we choose to characterize the domains.)       
73 When the background information plays a distinctive role I will state things more explicitly. 
It should be understood that e* incorporates this background information.  
74 As before I am using the double arrow “⇒” to denote a priori entailment. But the hypothe-
sis need not entail a proposition in order for the probabilistic feature in (2) to hold. What is 
necessary for current purposes is that p make e* more probable that is unconditionally. See 
page 53 footnote 97 for proof.    
75 The reason I call it immodest relates to how it compares with a different skeptical tactic that 
I will turn to shortly, one that relies on a weaker underdetermination principle.    
76 Here and in some of the following, I speak of hypotheses and not of propositions. This is 
mainly in order to follow common custom. Despite the fact that this switch does make a 
difference, I do not think it will make much of a difference for issues raised here, and I will 
say so where it does make a difference.  
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Immodest Underdetermination (IU):77 For all i, l evidence e and subjects S, if 
S knows that hi is true, and hi entails  ¬hl, then S’s total evidence e* favors hi 
over hypothesis hl.  
 
The immodest skeptic poses a skeptical hypothesis sh which together with 
IU threatens to undermine any claim for knowledge of a hypothesis from the 
disputed domain D. This tactic, however, seems less promising than the sec-
ond way of utilizing (2) (which will be considered in the next section) and 
hence receives here a somewhat shortened discussion. The basic idea is that 
a supposed known hypothesis h will be shown to be unknown by an appeal 
to sh, where sh is a hypothesis that entails the evidence but is incompatible 
with h. Since it entails e*, by (2) it receives evidential support from e*. The 
argument then continues by claiming that e* supports both and so does not 
favor h over sh, and hence, by IU, h is not known. Since h is chosen arbitrar-
ily, the claim generalizes to the entire domain of D. 
Notice, however, that what can be derived from (2) (assuming that the 
raising of probability is sufficient for e* counting as evidence for sh) is that 
e* is evidence for sh if sh a priori entails e*. What is needed in order to util-
ize IU for the skeptical purposes, however, is a quantitative claim not merely 
a qualitative one. It has to be shown that hi is not favored by e* and this in-
volves not merely the that e* is evidence for hi and sh, but that the degree of 
evidential support that hi receives from a subject’s evidence is no greater 
than the degree of support that sh receives.78 It is by no means an easy task to 
spell out quantitative evidential support. Indeed in the Bayesian literature on 
evidential support, there are several measures that have been proposed and 
little agreement on the correct one.79 Perhaps here the skeptic will claim that 
it is the non-skeptic who needs to show that hi is favored over sh. Perhaps 
she would add that any evidence that can be appealed to has already been 
accounted for in e* and would be compatible with both sh and hi (which we 
have assumed by letting both entail the total evidence). 
I am not convinced that this is how the dialectic is properly characterized 
and in this respect the immodest skeptics themselves seem to be split.80 Yet I 
am not going to try and settle this complicated issue since I think there is an 
interesting response that a non-skeptic can utilize. The response follows 
from many of the subjective Bayesian conceptions of evidential support. 
Given a certain prior subjective probability distribution, hi will in fact re-
                                                       
77 Several epistemologists have advanced this principle (or a similar one) claiming that it is 
ultimately at the heart of the best version of Cartesian skepticism. Examples are Brueckner 
(1994), Janvid (2006, MS), Pritchard (2005), Vogel (2004), and Yalçin (1992).    
78 Indeed Vogel claims that this is the way to answer Cartesian skepticism. He claims that the 
strait hypothesis is supported to a greater extent by the evidence since it better explains the 
evidence. See Janvid (MS) for an argument that this reply is unsuccessful.  
79 See, for instance, Fitelson (1999), and Eells and Fitelson (2000).  
80 Regarding this claim see Brueckner (2005: 390). For an opposing view see Janvid (MS). 
Interestingly, Brueckner takes the skeptic to be denying something like the (F) principle. 
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ceive greater rational credence given e* than sh will if one takes in the total 
evidential state by a method of Bayesian conditionalization. In other words, 
hi will be supported to a greater degree (for S given e*) than sh will, if S is a 
rational Bayesian conditionalizer and her prior probability for hi is greater 
than her prior probability for sh. The Bayesian multiplier (the evidence given 
the hypothesis divided by the evidence, i.e., Pr(e*|h)/Pr(e*), equals81 the 
skeptical hypothesis’ multiplier Pr(e*|sh)/Pr(e*)), is the same and greater 
than 1, and so conditionalizing will result in greater rational support for the 
hypotheses that had greater initial subjective credence.82,83 
Two reactions suggest themselves on behalf of the immodest skeptic. One 
is that this claim sounds like no more than a shot at pure faith and is not an 
epistemological answer at all. It sounds as though this non-skeptical Baye-
sian is answering an epistemological question with a biographical, subjec-
tive, (or contingent) answer, based on personal preference or bias. By an 
appeal to some convergence results this objection can be answered, I think. 
The details will not concern us here, though the Appendix to this manuscript 
has some information about convergence that is relevant. The basic idea is 
that it is rational to stick to your subjective credence since in the long run 
you are guarantied (given enough evidence) to arrive at the truth. Part of the 
project of subjective Bayesianism is to provide a link between truth and 
agreement on the one hand, and subjective preferences on the other. Condi-
tionalizing on shared evidence provides the link. The skeptic has given the 
non-skeptic no reason to forfeit her (rational) updating strategy on her sub-
jective credence and this non-skeptic has excellent reason to have great con-
fidence in this conditionalizing strategy. In fact, abandoning her evidence 
updating strategy is irrational, she would rightly claim.  
A second reaction of immodest skepticism is to take the Bayesian multi-
plier itself as what “favoring” in the (IU) principle refers to. Only if the Bay-
esian multiplier is greater for hi than it is for sh would a subject count as 
knowing that hi is true. If the evidence itself, the claim would be, gives equal 
                                                       
81 The reason for this is that the likelihoods (the probability of the evidence given the hy-
potheses) is 1 since the evidence follows from both hypotheses. Hence since the evidence is 
the same in both the Bayesian multipliers have the same value.   
82 I take this to be a big problem for IU-skepticism, but there are other more minor problems 
as well. I will mention just one. The immodest skeptic, it seems, needs to provide a clear 
sense of what it means for a hypothesis to be favored by the evidence. This will presumably 
depend on some conception or evidential support together with some way of measuring it. It 
then has to be shown that this conception is better supported than the other (Bayesian) ac-
counts that make other predictions.  
83 I wish to make it clear that the question is not which hypotheses get more or less support 
from a new item of evidence or from the total evidence taken abstractly. Rather the question is 
which of the hypotheses is favored by one's evidence. What the evidence favors for one sub-
ject need not be what it favors for another. For instance, if one is more inclined to think that 
one is a BIV, then the evidence that does not rule out this hypothesis will favor a skeptical 
hypothesis over the others. Also, repeated conditionalization will result in greater divergence 
between one who believes that sh and one who gives greater credence to hi. See Appendix.    
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support to more than one hypothesis as reflected by this Bayesian multiplier, 
the hypothesis will not be known. But the non-skeptic has no forthcoming 
reason to accept this interpretation and if she does, she ought to reject the IU 
principle. The Bayesian multiplier cannot simply be extracted from Bayes’ 
theorem it reflects only part of what rational conditionalization predicts 
should be one’s posterior probability for a hypothesis. To accept this im-
modest skeptical reaction is simply to abandon subjective Bayesianism.84  
Although I will give some reasons for thinking that the Bayesian answers 
the immodest skeptical challenge, ultimately, it will not be my objective to 
try to settle this issue. What I aim to do is to provide an outline of an account 
both of skepticism and of how one can react to it within the open knowledge 
framework. More accurately, my aim so far was only to raise some doubts 
about the immodest skeptical argument that later will allow me to compare it 
with a better skeptical argument that is not susceptible to a Bayesian reply 
along the lines just mentioned. Once it is clear that the open knowledge view 
can deal with both modest and immodest Cartesian Skepticism (where other 
accounts seem to have trouble), this will give at least some support to the 
idea that knowledge is open.  
 
2.2.2. Modest Skepticism   
We have been considering a case where both hi and sh entail the evidence, 
i.e. hi⇒e*, and sh⇒e*. On a standard Bayesian conception of the evidence 
for relation, there is a qualitative claim and a quantitative claim regarding the 
relation between an item of evidence and a proposition supported by that 
item of evidence. (In reality the relation is at least a three-place relation be-
tween two propositions and some background knowledge that will here only 
be presented as a two-place relation for simplicity. The fourth element, a 
subject, will be represented when necessary as an index. Time can also be 
added as a fifth relatum when dynamics are pertinent.) The qualitative claim 
runs as follows and will play a major role in subsequent chapters. Here a 
slightly stronger principle will be used.85   
 
                                                       
84 There is much more to be said here in defense of Bayesian conditionalization. It solves 
many epistemological puzzles, there are the convergence theorems that show why one should 
stick to one’s conditionalizing strategy, Dutch book arguments etc. In another context Karl 
Karlander and I (forthcoming) have proposed a Bayesian reply to the Sleeping Beauty Prob-
lem. This is not to say that there are no problems with subjective Bayesianism. For a less but 
still somewhat enthusiastic approach, see Earman (1993).   
85 This principle does not concern the question of what features e must have in order to count 
as evidence. For present purposes one can think of it as certain knowledge.   
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Qualitative Bayesian Evidence (QBE): e is evidence for h, if and only if, the 
unconditional probability of h is less than the conditional probability of h 
given e.  
E(e,h) ↔ [Pr(h|e) > Pr(h)] 
  
Assuming (QBE) it is easy to see that e* is evidence for both hi and for sh 
(qualitatively speaking). This is shown by (1) and (2) above. But which is 
favored? Here, I claimed, prior probabilities are important. If the prior prob-
ability of hi is greater than the prior probability of sh, than there is no way 
that the result of conditioning on e*, a proposition that both hi and sh entail, 
will change this relation. In fact as more and more evidence comes in, the 
difference between posterior probabilities will grow.86  
 
(3)  Pr(sh) < Pr(hi)   [assumption] 
(4)   
This is enough to show that on one measure of evidential support e* favors 
hi over sh. And this accords with the intuitive conviction that it would be 
irrational to be more confident (or equally confident) given one’s evidence in 
a skeptical hypothesis than one is in one’s own favored (straight) hypothesis 
(if one was not previously inclined to give more credence to the skeptical 
hypothesis).87  
Yet, the account of how to measure evidential support can be contested, 
of course. One could claim that what ‘favors’ in (IU) means, is not the abso-
lute posterior value of probability that e* confers on a proposition, but rather 
what counts is some other measure - perhaps, as stated above, the Bayesian 
multiplier measure could serve this end. This reply would have to be backed 
up by a justification for some conception of quantitative measure of eviden-
tial probability that would pull in the skeptical direction. The prospects of 
such a conception of evidence, I think, are grim. A Bayesian, at least, can 
fend off the skeptical challenge in a non-question-begging way since the idea 
of evidential incremental measures such as the one I have used here is not 
                                                       
86 Put in another way, this shows that hi is favored at least subjectively. Convergence results, 
as outlined in the Appendix, show the epistemic connection between this subjective favoring 
and the objective favoring, i.e. convergence on the truth.     
87 Intuitively, if one initially favors the skeptical hypothesis, one will not know that the 
straight hypothesis is true. This means that there is place for epistemic luck or subjective bias 
in coming to know a proposition. Much more can be said in this regard, but I will leave it for 
another occasion. Some remarks in Appendix are relevant.   
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developed in response to skepticism and is as well established in its own 
right as can be expected.88 
Before moving on to a more promising line of argument on behalf of the 
skeptic, let it be noted that another way to deal with the skeptical immodest 
challenge is to simply deny the principle that underlies it – to reject IU. As 
several authors have claimed, this would entail a denial of epistemic closure 
and would therefore not be an attractive alternative for many epistemolo-
gists.89 In the present context, however, this is not a deal-breaker. It is an 
added advantage of open knowledge that it can solve both skeptical chal-
lenges.  
A second skeptical tactic is to make an initially more modest claim (al-
though the aim is just as ambitious):  
 
Modest Underdetermination (MU): for all i and subjects S, if hypothesis hi is 
in the domain of dispute D and a subject S’s total evidence e* counts in favor 
hi, then S does not know that hi is false.
90 
                                                       
88 We have been assuming that both hypotheses entail the evidence. A skeptic may challenge 
this assumption. Strictly speaking there is no entailment relations in some cases. The hypothe-
sis that one is faced with a table does not a priori entail that one has an experience as if there 
was a table in front of one (and the rest of the subject's evidence is not even mentioned). Or 
the hypothesis that there is a zebra in the pen does not entail seeing a zebra looking animal in 
the pen. The simplification I have been using, however, is not what is at issue. There does not 
seem to be anything stopping one from articulating the cases so that the evidence will follow, 
e.g. that one is facing a table that causes one to have certain table like experiences (and one 
can state the other relevant background evidence as well).   
I wish to register something that I am neglecting and which does need special care. I have 
been talking as if sh is a hypothesis, perhaps a very complex one. This really cannot be so if 
what is needed is entailment. In order for a hypothesis to entail the evidence the hypothesis 
would have to change over time and in accordance with the (purported) knowledge under 
investigation. At this point one might pose a dilemma for the skeptic. If the hypothesis is 
predictive, then it really does deserve proper attention and should be taken seriously by any-
one (at least until it fails repeatedly to predict the evidence). If it is not predictive, then one 
needs to formulate it as a post factum hypothesis. But if it is a post factum hypothesis it ought 
to gain no support from the evidence.  
Appealing though it may seem, it would be hasty to discard skepticism on the basis of 
such a dilemma in its present form. The reason being that the common non-skeptical concep-
tion of reality is no more predictive than the skeptical one. My view is that they are both 
models or at the very least propositions that figure in an argument schema (the skeptical 
argument schema) rather than hypotheses. Only together with some auxiliary hypotheses will 
these propositions entail the evidence. This is why I earlier noted (p. 44, note 76) that the use 
of the term “hypothesis” can make a difference.      
89 Brueckner (1994) claims that (IU) and closure are equivalent and Pritchard (2005) argues 
that (IU) is logically weaker than closure. Unfortunately they are both concerned with justifi-
cation and not knowledge and considering their arguments would take me too far a field. For a 
different view on this matter closer to the one I follow here, see Cohen (1998).   
90 If S antecedently knows that hi is false, then the total evidence does not count in favor of hi 
since presumably she would have to have some evidence in its favor that is not overrun by 
counter evidence. This can be shown by conditionalization. So I need not use the following 




It should be noted at the outset that (MU) coupled with a principle of 
knowledge closure will give the same result that (IU) was designed to pro-
vide. I will turn to show this after saying some things about (MU).   
The (MU) principle can be justified directly. Suppose that one’s total evi-
dence raises the probability of a hypothesis hi that was not previously known 
to be false. There will be many cases in which this condition holds without 
one thereby coming to know that hi is true. It seems dubious, then, that one 
would learn that hi is false by means of probability raising evidence to its 
truth.91 The modest skeptic I have in mind is appealing to the same kind of 
challenge that the open knowledge advocate will press in pages 97 and 126.  
This direct intuitive basis can be backed up by more fundamental princi-
ples. If one accepts (as many do) that the evidence for relation is defined by 
the raising of probabilities, i.e. one accepts (QBE), and furthermore one ac-
cepts that in order to know that hi is true, one needs evidence for it (the total 
evidence to count in its favor), (MU) follows.92 
The point now is, that together with the principle of epistemic closure - 
(CP), (MU) spells trouble for the non-skeptic (Bayesian or otherwise). To 
make things a bit easier, let us revert to a simplified formulation of (CP):  
                                                                                                                                
If there is a time t0 when my evidence was not good enough to know hi is false, and if my 
total evidence at a later time t1 relative to t0 counts in its favor, then I do not know that hi 
false.  
I will later consider a related principle utilized to challenge closure more generally in page 
126.   
91 This claim will be explored more extensively in page 126 and in the proceeding sections.  
92 In order to see this, it should be made plain that we are dealing with a domain of dispute D 
for which both the skeptic and her opponent accept (F). Next, that D includes pairwise incom-
patible hypotheses, i.e. a mutually exclusive and exhaustive partition Q. Let’s assume that we 
have a proposition h that antecedently is not known, that we accept (QBE), and that knowl-
edge requires evidence (that one’s total state of evidence raises the probability of some hy-
pothesis if it is to count as evidence for it). The idea is now to show that if the total evidence 
supports a proposition h, ¬h is not known by an appeal to principles we have already ac-
cepted. I will assume that the two place predicate E(x,y) will relate to the total evidence that a 
subject has (e) for a proposition y and that it supports y.  
 
1. ES(e,h)  [Assumption] 
2. ∀(i)(KS(hi)→ES(e,hi)) [Assumption that knowledge requires S’s total evidence 
needs to count in favor of the known hypothesis] 
3. ∀(i)(ES(e,hi)→¬(Pr(hi)≥P(hi|e)) [Follows from (QBE)] 
4. [Pr(h|e)>P(h)]↔[Pr(¬h|e)<Pr(¬h)]  [Follows from the axioms of probability] 
5. PrS(¬h|e)<PrS(¬h) [1,3,4] 
6. ¬ES(e,¬h)  [3,5] 
7. ¬KS¬h  [MP, 6 and 2 contraposition] 
 
What this argument shows is that if one’s total evidence counts in favor of a hypothesis it will 
not allow one to know that it is false on the assumptions made so far (and total evidence 
includes antecedently known propositions). Another way of showing this more rigorously 
would include times but would be more relaxed with respect to what the total evidence is. For 




Now the modest skeptic with some logical and imaginative acumen, can 
grant that for a proposition in the disputed domain D, the evidence e* favors 
hi over its rivals. (In terms of probability, the probability of hi on ones total 
evidence is greater than it is for any incompatible hypothesis.) However, 
utilizing (CP) she can find another proposition ¬sh, that a priori follows 
from hi, and yet, ¬sh is not known given the evidence if it is not known ante-
cedently.93 The reason for this in probabilistic terms is that sh’s prior uncon-
ditional probability (no matter what it is) is not as great as the conditional 
probability of sh on the total evidence e*. In other words, the probability of 
¬sh goes down. Thus (CP) predicts that it is known yet if one cannot know 
without evidence we must (by reductio) abandon our conviction that hi is 
known whether it is favored or not.   
So the general structure of the skeptical argument that is here recom-
mended for the modest skeptic with regard to a given disputed domain D, 
runs as follows (where Q is a partition of the disputed domain):94 
  
i. S knows that hi is true, where hi∈Q⊂D. [Assumption for skeptic’s 
reductio argument] 
ii. S’s total evidence e* counts in favor of hi. [From (i) and assuming 
that one cannot know a proposition that is not supported or even 
favored by one’s evidence.]  
iii. ∀(i)∃(l)[(hl,hi∈Q)∧(hi⇒¬hl)∧(hl⇒e*)]95 
iv. Evidence e* supports hl (in terms of probability, the conditional 
probability of hl on e* is greater than the unconditional probabil-
ity of hl).   [iii, (1)-(2) above] 
v. S does not know ¬hl is true.  [MU]   
vi. ¬ hl a priori follows from hi.  [iii] 
vii. S knows ¬hl is true.  [(i), (PC) and assuming the 
skeptic runs through an argument that shows this]  
viii. S does not know hl is true.  [v, vii, by reductio and since (i) 
is the only assumption] 
 
Though the argument might seem complex the idea is basically simple. In 
contrast to immodest skepticism, modest skepticism relies on two compo-
                                                       
93 I do not want to enter the dispute of whether standard skeptical hypotheses are known to be 
false or not. My point is that whether the standard ones are known to be false or not, for a 
domain that respects (F), there will be hypotheses that have the features that a modest skeptic 
can appeal to.  
94 I do not claim that this is an original presentation of the skeptical challenge. Stewart Cohen 
if not in detail, at least in spirit, is perhaps the first to suggest this argument on behalf of the 
Cartesian Skeptic. See Cohen (1998). Thanks to Professor Hawthone for pointing this out.   
95 A proof is on p. 98. Also, the second conjunct is superfluous since we have defined Q as a 
partition. 
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nents. First, that we can prove that for any proposition which does not a pri-
ori follow from one’s evidence, there will be other propositions that entail 
the evidence and are incompatible with the hypotheses. This will be shown 
below (p. 98). Second, that one does not know that the skeptical hypotheses 
are false. Why? Because the hypotheses entail the evidence and so if one did 
not know antecedently that they are false, getting evidence in their favor is 
not going to help (MU). This does not connect directly to the skeptics objec-
tives since there is no real threat to the knowledge of the hypotheses for 
which the subject does gain evidence. This is where (CP) comes in. It ties 
the lack of knowledge of the falsity of the skeptical hypotheses to the pur-
ported knowledge of any hypothesis that is incompatible with them. This tie 
in the immodest skeptical argument is supplied in the modest one by closure 
without assuming that the hypothesis that the non-skeptic claims to know is 
not favored by her evidence. In simple terms it is one thing to claim that one 
has no evidence against a skeptical (a posteriori) hypothesis (and this is 
what the modest skeptic relies on), it is quite another matter to claim that one 
does not have any reason to favor one’s own initial belief over a rival skepti-
cal hypothesis. The former only claims that the skeptical hypothesis cannot 
be known to be false on the basis of no evidence. The later needs a much 
stronger claim, i.e. that one’s evidence counts as much in favor of the skepti-
cal hypothesis as it does for one’s own favored mundane one. This claim we 
have seen cause to suspect.      
Let me note some interesting features that become clearer with this argu-
ment in focus, features that will be central in later discussion. The modest 
skeptic is in a position to make the skeptical argument only by appealing to a 
specific hypothesis tailored to entail e*. But there are two ways to customize 
the hypothesis. The first is to forget about general good-for-everything skep-
tical hypotheses that are good for all knowledge claims of given domain. 
Thus the modest skeptic will not pose a brain-in-a-vat-skepticism type chal-
lenge, for instance, but rather a-brain-in-a-vat-having-experiences-of-a-
certain-kind challenge. The reason the modest skeptic needs specific hy-
pothesis is that if sh is not tailored specifically to a priori entail e*, nothing 
would seem to guarantee that S would not know that ¬sh. She would have no 
way of showing that e* supports sh, it seems. A consequence of viewing 
things in this way is that sh would target only a specific proposition, though 
repeating this process in a more or less systematic way will make it clear to 
the non-skeptic that there is no point in going on. Thus this type of argument 
would succeed only by attrition. But another way to look at modest skepti-
cism is to look at the argument schematically. A hypothesis will only entail 
the evidence together with auxiliary claims to allow for a proper entailment 
to hold between it and the evidence. In fact, however, though the modest 
skeptic may need auxiliary hypotheses, the evidence e* need not be entailed. 
It is enough to show that given the skeptical hypothesis, the probability of 
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the evidence is raised.96 So the point is that the modest skeptic can start with 
weaker assumptions, i.e. with hypothesis that together with auxiliaries will 
make the evidence more probable than the evidence is unconditionally. That 
will suffice to bring about the same conclusion the skeptic is after, namely, 
(viii). 
This brings me to the main point. One simple way to avoid skepticism is 
to deny (CP), i.e. to deny that knowledge is closed under proper inference. 
The above (rational) reconstruction of Cartesian skepticism, or Modest 
Skeptics, gives reason to believe, first, that the original item of knowledge is 
supported by the evidence available to the subject, evidence that has not 
been undermined by the skeptic’s argument. And second, that while the evi-
dence has not been undermined and supports the supposed known hypothe-
sis, the skeptical hypotheses are not known to be false. This is why it is natu-
ral to think that knowledge is not closed. In other words, the natural theoreti-
cal reaction to Modest Skepticism is that while the skeptical hypotheses are 
not known to be false, the proposition from which the negation of these hy-
potheses follow, are known. It should be admitted, I think, that while there 
may be other ways to respond to this skeptical challenge, the open knowl-
edge advocate does have the tools to respond to it and on the face of it this 
seems to be the correct reply.         
I am well aware that there are several ways one might attempt to answer 
the modest skeptic (e.g. trying to show that one does know the skeptical 
hypothesis are false, or claiming that awareness to sh in the context of 
knowledge ascription changes the standards required for a proposition to be 
known). The point of this chapter (and those that follow) is not to survey or 
criticize those attempts. I will attempt to make the open knowledge reply to 
the modest skeptical argument more appealing by placing it within a wider 
context along with other challenges it can simultaneously stand up to.  
 
2.3 Mundane Skepticism  
We have seen the workings of Modest Cartesian Skepticism. This section 
focuses on another type of skepticism. To see its potential to undermine the 
idea that we have knowledge of everyday empirical claims let me get back to 
                                                       
96 A proof that all that is needed (for a skeptic) is that the probability of the evidence is raised 
by her skeptical hypothesis, i.e. she need not appeal to hypotheses that entail the evidence: 
[Pr(e|sh)>Pr(e)]→[Pr(sh)<Pr(sh|e)].  
i.   Pr(sh|e)=(Pr(e|sh)/Pr(e))Pr(sh)  [Bayes’ theorem] 
ii.  [(Pr(e|sh)/Pr(e))Pr(sh)>Pr(sh)]⇔ [Pr(e|sh)/Pr(e)>1] [i] 
iii. [(Pr(e|sh)/Pr(e)>1]⇔[(Pr(e|sh)>Pr(e)]  [ii] 
iv. [Pr(e|sh)>Pr(e)]→[Pr(sh)<Pr(sh|e)]  [i,ii,iii] 
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the broader discussion concerning Moore who argues for (3) from (1) and 
(2) as opposed to Cartesian Skeptics who claim that ¬(1) from (2) and ¬(3): 
 
(1) I know I have hands. 
(2) I know that if I have hands then there are external objects.  
Therefore, 
(3) I know there are external objects. 
 
Besides closure, the Moorean and the Cartesian Skeptical arguments 
share one other feature - both arguments relate to an entire field of knowl-
edge. Moore’s argument is meant to prove that we have knowledge of a wide 
range of empirical truths, namely, those relating to the existence of objects in 
the external world. As his Moorean opponent, the Cartesian skeptic also 
relates to an entire domain of knowledge. Cartesian Skepticism represents a 
family of skeptical claims aimed at undermining all knowledge of the exter-
nal world97 (or of other domains) by raising the possibility of systematic 
error about it. But error does not have to be systematic. A different type of 
skepticism is couched in Dretske’s example, trading on the possibility of 
disguised mules. As a skeptical argument Dretske’s example will run as fol-
lows: Standing in a zoo, looking at a zebra, so the skeptic argues, one does 
not know that it is a zebra if one cannot tell that it is not a mule disguised as 
a zebra.  
This type of skepticism – call it Mundane Skepticism – does not target an 
entire field of knowledge, but rather depends on existing knowledge and 
works piecemeal. Let us look at its structure and potential more closely. It 
has by now become familiar to analyze such skeptical arguments into the 
following general form: If S knows that p, she must know all propositions q 
that she knows to logically follow from p. (Since the skeptic has just men-
tioned it, S knows that p entails q.) Furthermore, since she does not know 
that not-q (for some cleverly devised q), she consequently does not know p. 
This is the argument the Mundane Skeptic rallies against our everyday 
commitment to particular cases of knowledge: “you must know all that you 
know to logically follow from your knowledge and you cannot deny that you 
know that not-q follows from what you say you know (I have just shown you 
that it follows). Since for all you know q may be the case, you do not know 
that p.”  
Several writers98 have noticed the potential of this sort of skepticism sepa-
rating it from the more famous (or infamous) Cartesian Skeptic.99 To see the 
                                                       
97 Not all knowledge, since one knows (if Descartes was right) that one exists. If Williamson 
is right one will know a priori that there is at least one false belief (1986). 
98 These include Vogel (1990, 20-3), Cohen (1998: 155), and Hawthorne (2004a: 5). In rela-
tion to Mundane Skepticism, Cohen notes (1998: 155) that in contrast, (immodest) underde-
termination skepticism only works with the kind of skeptical cases that are strongly underde-
termined. I would rather make the distinction by an appeal to anti-realism. The anti-realists 
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force of the challenge set by this latter type of skepticism let us consider a 
few more examples. You go to McDonalds and order a Big-Mac hamburger. 
You pay and receive your meal wrapped in the usual McDonalds wrapping, 
and the taste is as usual. It is safe to say that you know you are eating a 
McDonalds Big-Mac. Your only problem is that you have invited your skep-
tic friend to come with you. She comes up with the following challenge: 
“For all you know the kitchen might have had a major breakdown. The man-
ager – who is the brother of the manager of the next-door Burger King - 
might have borrowed 100 hamburgers from his sister, one of which you are 
now eating.”100 
Let's consider an example of knowledge of the future: Say Marilyn claims 
to know that she will go to the movies in an hour. All the mundane skeptic 
has to do is raise one of the following questions: “Do you know you will not 
be hit by lightning this afternoon? Do you know your family won’t come for 
a surprise visit?” (No analogy between these types of events is intended.) 
Naturally, Marilyn cannot pretend to know that these possibilities will not 
materialize. The skeptic can thus remain confident in her ability to come up 
with these scenarios time and time again (unless, as we will see later, the 
evidence guaranties the truth of the know proposition). Granted, some cases 
are harder for the skeptic than others and some may even be impossible. 
Nevertheless, by committing ourselves to closure, it seems that the mundane 
skeptic can force us to forfeit a large bulk of our empirical knowledge. In 
fact, since she does not rely on the plausibility or even the mere possibility 
of what most would consider outlandish and improbable scenarios such as 
the ones Cartesian skeptics have been using, mundane skepticism is in some 
                                                                                                                                
have no answer to Mundane Skepticism even though they may have a ready reply for Carte-
sian Skepticism. Vogel and Hawthorne take Mundane Skepticism to be primarily an issue 
regarding lottery-like propositions.  
99 Perhaps the first to consider Mundane Skepticism closely as apposed to Cartesian Skepti-
cism is J.L. Austin. A defense of this interpretation of Austin can be found in Kaplan M. 
(forthcoming).  
100 This and like cases are important for several reasons only some of which will be consid-
ered in the main text. One important consideration which I will not enter into in detail has to 
do with the claim made by e.g. Cohen (1988) and Vogel (1990), that skepticism of this sort 
turns on the statistical or lottery-like nature of the background information that allows us to 
know propositions such as “I'm eating a Big-Mac hamburger”. In this case, this suggestion 
seems implausible unless “statistical” just means that we attach some credence or subjective 
probability to the eventuality of a major breakdown in the kitchen and the manager borrowing 
hamburgers from the next-door Burger King. Many cases do have the feature of being based 
on probability estimates of the lottery kind. I also agree that one does not know propositions 
are true on mere statistical background information. My contention is that these things need 
not be connected to one another. The example suggests (and Cohen (1988) agrees) that some 
consequences of things we know are such that would we consider them on the basis of our 
evidence directly, we would not know them to be true. My claim is that the class of such 
propositions is wider than what has been suggested. Once it is admitted that there is a gap 
between knowledge and evidence, there seems to be no reason to think that all propositions 
that may be used by a mundane skeptic will be statistical. My view is that the class is deter-
mined by the evidence.  
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respects more threatening than the Cartesian skepticism. All the MS skeptic 
needs is an ability to imagine scenarios incompatible with something that is 
entailed by what we claim to know and which is not ruled out by our evi-
dence. This skepticism, therefore, depends on an ability rather than a type of 
underdetermined single (schematic) scenario.   
Consider the case from the last chapter from Vogel (1990) – knowledge 
gained by memory: Say you parked your car in a parking space directly in 
front of your house. 10 minutes later a visiting skeptic asks you whether you 
know where your car is. ‘Sure’, you unsuspectingly reply, ‘it is right in front 
of my house!’ The skeptic’s reply is by now almost too familiar: ‘You say 
you know where your car is. Does that mean you know it hasn’t been sto-
len?’ Assuming that your car is still in front of your house and that it has not 
been stolen and returned in the expanse of 10 minutes, your knowing that the 
car is in front of your house entails that the car has not been stolen. But ob-
viously you do not know that your car has not been stolen if all you have to 
go on is your memory of where you parked it. Then again, as long as you are 
not a skeptic yourself, you do not want to say that under normal conditions 
when asked whether you know where your car is, you shouldn’t honestly say 
‘yes’.101 
As the above cases illustrate, Mundane Skepticism is generated by appeal 
to the ability to devise scenarios the negations of which follow from the pur-
portedly known propositions, but which are not supported by the evidence 
one has. Mundane Skepticism is threatening since it relies on very little and 
turns on assumptions (perhaps unavoidably) endorsed by its opponents, 
namely, that knowledge is often based on non-conclusive evidence, that the 
scenarios appealed to (whose truth is entailed by the (purportedly) known 
proposition p) are not supported by the evidence, and finally, that the princi-
ple of epistemic closure is valid. 
But issues are not altogether clear-cut. From the vantage point of the 
skeptic, Mundane Skepticism is both more and less advantageous than Car-
tesian Skepticism. On the one had, its relative weakness lies in the fact that 
since it works piecemeal, it does not undermine entire fields of knowledge at 
once. Also, Mundane Skepticism depends on the evidence available to the 
subject. If you are sitting in your car, the Mundane Skeptic will not be able 
to undermine your knowledge that it has not been stolen (at least not by the 
same argument used before). Mundane Skepticism may not work when the 
non-skeptical opponent has second order knowledge.102 On the other hand, 
                                                       
101 If one is concerned that other evidence in some or all of the above cases is needed in order 
to know in the first place, the cases should be viewed in a way that takes all of the evidence 
under consideration. If this evidence does not a priori entail the known propositions, the (MS) 
skeptic has good reason to think that an (MS) scenario can be found. For a proof of the exis-
tence of such propositions see page 98.    
102 Depending on what it is that one sees as required for knowledge of knowledge, this in 
itself does not diminish the threat Mundane Skepticism poses. Say you know that p and have 
 57 
MS relies not on what is conceivable or possible, but rather on known reali-
ties. While it may be possible that we are all brains in vats (or at least that I 
am), we definitely do not know that we sometimes are. We do, however, 
know that cars get stolen, lightning strikes, people suffer heart attacks, fami-
lies make surprise visits, people die and hamburgers might get switched.  
Placing higher demands on knowledge would not help keep the Mundane 
Skeptic at bay unless we demand that knowledge be based on conclusive 
evidence, i.e. that knowledge would be based on evidence that make the 
proposition certain. This will keep the skeptic at bay only at the cost of our 
becoming skeptics ourselves. Settling for higher demands that fall short of 
conclusively supported knowledge would bring us in one respect closer to 
the skeptic (since we would then agree at the outset that the set of known 
propositions is smaller than usually conceived) yet it would be harder for the 
Mundane Skeptic to come up with challenging cases. Nevertheless nothing 
essentially is changed if we just make things harder (for ourselves and for 
the Mundane Skeptic) in this way, and so I find little promise in looking for 
a solution in this direction.103  
It seems that Mundane Skepticism resists at least some of the strategies 
developed against Cartesian skepticism. Idealist or verificationist positions 
might be immune to the challenge set by Cartesian skepticism. The verifica-
tionist can respond to a Cartesian skeptic by claiming that a skeptical hy-
pothesis of the sort she invokes is not true. Depending on the specifics of the 
account, the reply would either be that what cannot be verified by all possi-
ble data is simply false, or meaningless, or that it is not true. In any case, the 
point is that sentences that are by their nature underdetermined are not true 
according to anti-realists. (Though admittedly this is a reply that works only 
against skeptics who invoke hypotheses that are underdetermined by all pos-
sible data).   
But Mundane Skepticism’s propositions do not allow the verificationist to 
take advantage of the under-determination feature of such scenarios or hy-
potheses (e.g. the world was created 5 minutes ago with dinosaur bones and 
all the required “historical” furniture). The MS propositions are not underde-
termined by all possible data, they are underdetermined merely by the avail-
able evidence. Hence these proposition (or sentences) are simply too robust 
for a varificationist tactic.104 Take the following dialog as an example: 
 
S   (Skeptic): Do you know what time it is?  
V  (Verificationist): Yes, its 5:00  
                                                                                                                                
extra evidence regarding your evidence so that you qualify as knowing that you know p. The 
Mundane Skeptic would first target the evidence that you know that you know, and if success-
ful, in a further stage one’s first order knowledge would be challenged.   
103 See section 5.3.3 regarding Williamson's suggestion to define epistemic probability so that 
all known propositions have probability 1 on the knower’s evidence.  
104 I am indebted to Professor Williamson for this point.  
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S:  How do you know this? 
V:  Look at my watch - it says “5:00.”   
S:  But how do you know your family has not played a trick on you by 
secretly setting your watch one hour back. Surely you can't rule this 
out by looking at your watch. 
 
The verificationist can hardly appeal to her semantics to save her from 
such mundane scenarios.   
2.4 Live Skepticism 
A third kind of skepticism different from Mundane Skepticism and Cartesian 
skepticism has recently been suggested by Bryan Frances (2004). The type 
of skepticism he suggests - Live Skepticism (LS, for short) - is generated by 
the following principle.  
The Live Hypothesis Principle: ... If S is as aware as just about anyone that 
[h] is live... and that [p] entails ¬[h], then if [h] isn't ruled out with respect to 
S, S doesn't know [p].  
 
After introducing this principle and some surrounding (plausible) assump-
tions, Frances argues that some very central claims can fit the role of h in the 
Live Hypothesis Principle (or at least that there are close possible worlds in 
which h is a live hypothesis). For instance, I think that I know that I believe 
that Obama is the US president. But if I know that I so believe and know that 
if I have this belief then those who claim that there are no beliefs (some 
eliminativists)105 are mistaken, then I know that eliminativists are mistaken. 
Now although it is probably true that I do have such beliefs, it is also true 
that I don't know that these theorists are mistaken since they are just as in-
formed as I am (probably more informed about this matter than I am) and I 
have nothing special to say that would make other theorists convinced that I 
know that they are wrong. These theorists disagree with belief-eliminativists 
but they would also admit that eliminativism is a live option (or that it could 
easily become a live option in the sense that it is an improbable yet real con-
tender for replacing the leading accounts). They might even be able to men-
tion future results in psychology that would convince them (though they 
would be surprised if things turned out that way). Now if the theorists who 
believe in beliefs do not think they know that the eliminativists are wrong, 
how could I claim I know them to be wrong? 
                                                       
105 Frances suggests Stich, the Chirchlands, Rorty, Feyerabend, Quine and Dennett as exam-
ples. See Farnaces (2004: 38).  
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Frances, for different reasons from those given by Dretske and Nozick, 
believes that closure is invalid.106 Yet he claims that what Dretske and 
Nozick have to “say against the [closure] principle does not, in my opinion, 
give any reason at all to reject the Live Hypothesis Principle.” (2004: 26) I 
disagree, at least partially. Although I agree that Drestke's relevant alterna-
tive theory does not have the required resources for rejecting the Live Hy-
pothesis Principle, and although I am not sure about Nozick's sensitivity 
requirement107 (the open knowledge condition), I think a proper open knowl-
edge account would find it faulty. The basic reason is simple (though the full 
details will only be given in Chapter 4). Assuming that the eliminativists 
have a way to accommodate all the (good) reasons I have for believing that I 
believe Obama is the US president, I do not have any evidence for the 
proposition the eliminativists are wrong. Assuming I cannot know without 
evidence, I do not know them to be mistaken. Of course, this is only a pre-
liminary sketch, but it shows how ultimately LS depends on knowledge clo-
sure and that open knowledge seems to have the resources to keep LS con-
tained.  
 Chapter Summary 
We have seen three skeptical challenges. Cartesian Skepticism, the first of 
the skepticisms we have seen, uses epistemic closure as premise together 
with the Modest Underdetermination principle (p. 49). The scenarios that are 
typically used are not accidentally far-fetched. In order for them to threaten 
fields of supposed knowledge (domains that are defined as disputed by the 
type of proposition or method of knowing), these scenarios must be highly 
underdetermined (though they need not be absolutely underdetermined). 
Also, Skeptics use cases that are incompatible with what is known so that 
they can be used in a reductio argument that uses closure as premise. The 
feeling of unease that one might feel when presented with Moore's argument 
is evidence (at least some evidence) that these scenarios are not known to be 
false. And this unease gains support from the plausibility of the modest un-
derdetermination principle.  
In contrast with the Cartesian Skeptic, the Mundane Skeptic is initially 
more reserved than the Cartesian Skeptic. The order of quantification is what 
is at issue: The Cartesian Skeptic claims that there is a scenario that is not 
known to be false such that for any proposition in the domain of dispute, e.g. 
empirical propositions that are not a priori certain (I am thinking, for in-
stance), the negation of this scenario follows from any one of these proposi-
tions. In contrast, the Mundane Skeptic relies on an ability to conjure up a 
                                                       
106 See Frances (1999). 
107 See 1.5.2 (above) for the details regarding Nozick’s open knowledge tracking account.  
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scenario for any proposition in the domain that is not a priori certain (or 
follows from one's evidence). That the Mundane Skeptic has a right to be 
optimistic regarding the existence of such scenarios is shown by the proofs 
in pages 98 below and 53 above. (Further analysis of this feature of underde-
termined knowledge will be given in due course.) 
It was also claimed that both the Cartesian and Mundane Skeptics (as well 
as the (LS) skeptics), share a tacit assumption that hinders the scope of their 
suggested cases. They share the idea that they need to find alternatives, i.e. 
cases that are incompatible with what is purportedly known that compete 
with the known proposition for being the best explanation of the evidence, 
favored by the evidence, or receive the greatest probability from the evi-
dence. But with closure they need not do this, all that needs to be assumed is 
that propositions that follow from what is known are themselves not known 
to be true under the circumstances. One way of showing this is by showing 
that these alternatives have a greater conditional probability on the evidence 
than they do unconditionally. Another way is to employ propositions that do 
not contend for being explanations of the evidence at all – that is, proposi-
tions that are not in any real sense alternatives (besides the fact that their 
negation is incompatible with the known proposition). The potential for this 
kind of skepticism will be the focus of the next chapter with regard to the 
implausibility of epistemic ascent: Dogmatism (Kripke, Forthcoming), Easy 
Knowledge (Cohen 2002, 2005) and Bootstrapping (Vogel, 2000, 2007)). 
Frances' Live Skepticism, a skepticism that relies on the ability to use 
knowledge of everyday propositions to infer the falsity of philosophical and 
scientific theories and thereby come to know them to be false (assuming that 
they are), was briefly considered. I claimed, contrary to what Frances says 
regarding this matter, that if one denies closure (at least for the right rea-
sons), one can avoid the threat posed by this type of skepticism.   
The centrality of closure is hard to dispute, yet the considerations regard-
ing closure have not usually been of a direct nature. The way the dispute has 
been conducted is mostly by way of asking whether there is a cheaper way to 
get out of the skeptical bind. The open knowledge advocates though they are 
quick to mention their ability to response to the skeptic have nonetheless 
argued for knowledge openness by appealing to their respective theories. Not 
much has been done to explain how or why knowledge is closed or open 
regardless of any knowledge account. The way I propose to think about the 
issue is as directly as possible. Nevertheless I do not think the benefit of 
open knowledge that can be drawn from having a ready non-skeptical argu-
ment ought to be ignored in thinking about the issue.  
The challenge that the closed knowledge advocate faces is to account for 
one of two alternatives. First, where does the added property originate from 
that allows the negation of skeptical claims to be known by inference? Since 
evidence is not available, something else needs to fill its place. Deduction 
itself does not give us the extra property, and so it seems like either we sys-
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tematically underestimate the kind of evidence we have, or knowledge is not 
closed. Alternately, second, one needs to account for why it is that when one 
deduces a conclusion that is not known from a premise that is, knowledge of 
this premise is lost. In other words one needs to have an account of why 
coming to believe that a skeptical hypothesis is false destroys the knowledge 
of the premise from which it was inferred. The evidence for the premise has 
not been lost so something else needs to be appealed to as an explanation of 
this phenomenon. While in some cases it seems plausible that awareness of 
skeptical claims raises doubt as to whether a proposition is known, other 
cases do not lend themselves as easily to this tactic. Such is the case with 
regard to the scenarios that will be the main concern of the next chapter.  
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Chapter 4: Evidence and Open Knowledge 
 Chapter outline 
The current and next are the central chapters of this monograph. Though the 
argument might at times be involved, it is driven by a simple idea: in the 
analysis of knowledge, the logic of evidence should play a pivotal role. A 
proper account of knowledge, in other words, must be constrained by facts 
about the relation of evidential support.162 Appealing as this idea may seem, 
even among contemporary epistemologists who address evidence in their 
theories, little attention has been given to the actual workings of evidence. A 
proper understanding of constraints on the relation between knowledge and 
evidence, I will argue, has ramifications for epistemology that are as wide-
ranging as they are fundamental. Specifically, since the relation of evidential 
support is not closed under known entailment, there is good reason to believe 
that knowledge is also open. Another way of stating the objective of these 
next two chapters is as setting a challenge for epistemic closure: if, as I ar-
gue, the openness of evidence can be established, how can knowledge be 
closed? The current chapter argues that evidence is open and the next ties 
evidence openness to knowledge openness.   
In this chapter I first - section 4.1 - present a simple case that seems to 
pose an intuitive challenge to knowledge closure. I then argue that regardless 
of intuitions (which actually seem to accord with the analysis), the case is 
one where one lacks evidence for what follows from what is known. Using 
probabilistic reasoning, I show that evidence is not closed, i.e. that one may 
have evidence for p, know that q follows from p a priori, and yet have no 
evidence for q. I turn then - section 4.2 - sketch a preliminary argument 
based on evidence openness for the conclusion that knowledge is open. In 
section 4.3 I show that rejecting the idea that the “evidence for” relation is 
open cannot be maintained on the basis of refusing to view this relation as 
one that entails that probabilities have not been lowered, or refusing to view 
the relation probabilistically. These arguments will also make plain the way 
                                                       
162 There are two central questions that one might focus on in relation to evidence. First, one 
might ask; what is evidence? What does something have to be in order to be counted as evi-
dence? Second; what is the “evidence for” relation? What kind of relation is it? My main 
focus is on the second question, specifically, if the relation is closed under known inference. 
Some of the comments in this chapter, however, have more to do with the first question.   
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in which Hawthorne’s arguments (of Chapter 1.5.1) can be answered by an 
open knowledge advocate.   
 
4.1 The Watch Case and its Probabilistic Analysis.  
You look at your watch and see that it reads “3:00”. Assuming that the time 
actually is 3:00 o’clock and that all other things are normal, you know that 
the time is 3:00. By trivial reflection you also know that if the time is 3:00 
o’clock, then if your watch reads “3:00”, it is showing the correct time. Do 
you know that if your watch reads “3:00”, it is showing the correct time? 
Do you know, just by looking at it, that even if the watch has stopped, it is 
showing the correct time? 
Intuitively, it does not seem that you do. Perhaps you already know be-
forehand - relying on other sources - that your watch is working properly, or 
at least, that it is accurate. But if you don’t, it does not seem like the kind of 
thing that can be known on the basis of the fact that the watch shows “3:00”.  
And yet, epistemological orthodoxy says that you do (or, at least, that you 
often can) know this. Since knowledge is closed under known entailment, 
the claim goes, a belief properly derived from a known proposition is itself 
known. Having derived the belief that if my watch reads “3:00”, it is show-
ing the correct time, from your knowledge that the time is 3:00 o’clock, you 
know this conditional is true. Knowing that your watch shows “3:00”, you 
can derive the consequent of the conditional and hence know that your watch 
is showing the correct time. 
Why hold fast to this counter-intuitive conclusion? The answer, as in 
many similar cases, is the principle of epistemic closure. The watch reading 
example, however, brings out not only the counter-intuitive consequences of 
closure, but also theoretical reasons for thinking that it fails in cases of this 
sort. To put it succinctly, the reason we tend to deny the status of knowledge 
to the conclusions of such inferences is that they lack evidential support. In 
what follows I wish to elaborate and support this claim by analyzing this 
example in detail. This analysis will, in turn, serve my more ambitious at-
tempt to motivate knowledge openness and lay bare its benefits.   
   
4.1.1. Evidence and Probabilities 
Your reading of the watch provides you with the evidence in virtue of which 
your belief that it is 3:00 o’clock gets to count as knowledge. But what does 
it mean that reading “3:00” off the watch is evidence for your belief? One 
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common rendering of this relation is in terms of conditional probability.163 
Let “p” denote the proposition that the time is 3:00, and the proposition that 
the watch reads “3:00” will be “e”. We can then see that the probability that 
the time is 3:00 given the evidence (which in this case is e), is greater than 
the probability of p without this evidence: Pr(p|e) > Pr(p). 
Even if it cannot be accepted as a definition of evidential support, it 
seems that any account of evidence should grant the following crite-
rion:164,165 
 
                                                       
163 The notion of probability that I am appealing to here is a more or less a standard construal 
of subjective Bayesian probability. The prior probabilities reflect, either possible betting 
behavior or are read off of other sorts of behavior with no small bit of idealization. To dodge 
the well-known Bertrand Paradox as well as for other reasons, I am not very optimistic about 
objective readings of prior probabilities. Let me just say here (though these issues will be 
considered more carefully in this and the next chapter), that I take evidence to either be a 
special kind of knowledge, roughly, certain knowledge, known knowledge or less than certain 
knowledge using Jeffrey Conditionalization, to represent the proper change from prior to 
posterior probability. Let me also note that I sometimes treat probabilities as if they amount to 
1 for the purposes of ease and clarity. I don't see any special problem with doing this for the 
purposes of certain examples. As far as I can tell all the cases will yield the same results 
without this simplification.     
Central here is the assumption that there is a way to define prior probabilities that can 
then be compared with conditional probabilities in accordance with the axioms of probability. 
This allows a comparison between an event’s likelihood in relation to a body of evidence 
prior to the availability of the item of evidence under consideration, with its probability after 
it becomes available. Surely the issue is vexed, yet by leaving the method of setting the priors 
pretty much open, I hope I can get things started without, so to speak, loading the dice in 
anyone's favor.   
Together with a priori propositions, I do treat necessary a posteriori propositions, e.g. 
“I exist” and, if Williamson is right, “there is at least one believer” (Williamson 1986) etc, as 
having a prior probability of 1, but not much else. In particular, although in some cases it 
seems plausible to associate probability 1 to known propositions, I do not accept that this is 
the case across the board. Some of the arguments proposed below can be reformulated as a 
challenge to those who, following Williamson (2000: 184-237), view knowledge as always 
having probability 1 and 5.3.3 spells some of these challenges out more directly.   
164 Note that this criterion is weaker than the identification of the evidence for relation with 
the raising of probabilities.   
165 Some may be worried that not all evidence is propositional, that experiences, for instance, 
such as the experience of a blue patch in one’s visual field, may be evidence for one that there 
is something blue in the vicinity. If you have such worries, take as the relata figuring in (EC) 
(and the other evidence principles below) the proposition that S is experiencing a blue patch 
in his field of vision. I propose this measure only in order to sidestep this thorny issue. 
Let me just note in passing that I view Williamson's argument (Williamson 2000: 194-
200) from the fact that we use evidence in, e.g. inferences to the best explanation, to the con-
clusion that evidence is propositional, as somewhat too quick. One might view the evidence 
as represented in such inferences as I do here and still insist that the evidence itself, e.g. expe-
riences, or perceptions, is non-propositional. Moreover, one might also view the probabilities 
as representing e.g. the non-propositional brain states and the causal relations these states 
have with behavior. That I am in a certain brain state, for instance, might be correlated with 
behavior probabilistically. For helpful conversation regarding this issue, thanks to Professor 
Kathrin Glüer-Pagin.         
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(EC)  Necessarily, if e evidentially supports p, then the probability of p 
given e is not lower than the prior unconditional probability of p. 
(E(e,p) → (Pr(p|e) ≥ Pr(p))           
 
“E(e,p)” means that e evidentially supports p.166 How does your situation 
vis-à-vis the accuracy of your watch fare with respect to this principle? From 
p it follows that if the watch shows “3:00”, then the watch is showing the 
correct time. The antecedent of this conditional is just e, materially implies 
the consequent of this conditional (call it “q”)167 assuming p; that the time is 
indeed 3:00. Hence one can know by mere reflection that:168 
  
(1) p⇒(e→q)  
 




But do you have evidence for (2)? Presumably, if you do, it must be the 
evidence that facilitated knowledge of p in the first place (or some other 
aspect of your evidential situation), namely, e. But if it is a necessary condi-
tion on evidence that it not decrease the probability of that for which it is 
evidence (EC), then e does not provide (2) with evidential support. This is 
because the conditional probability of (2) on e is not greater than the prob-
ability of (2). In fact, since e verifies the antecedent of (2), given e, the prob-
ability of the conditional is lowered. The reason for this is that the truth of e 
excludes all the cases in which (2) is true in virtue of the falsity of its ante-
cedent. So in fact,  
  
(3) Pr(e→q|e) < Pr(e→q) 
 
This can be proven assuming that Pr(e∧¬q)>0 (that there is some, perhaps 
even minute, probability that the watch shows “3:00” and it is not 3:00): 
 
i.  Pr(¬(e→q|e)) =






                                                       
166 I will mostly suppress representing the necessity operator and quantification.   
167
 q can be viewed as a conjunction of two claims, that your watch reads “3:00” (e) and that it 
is 3:00 (p).  
168 Since q is just p∧e, we have: [p⇒(e→(e∧p))]⇔[p⇒(e→q)], and since the left hand side of 
the a priori equivalence is a tautology, the right side is a tautology (and knowable as such).   
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ii.  Pr(e ∧¬q)
Pr(e)
>Pr(e∧¬q)= Pr(¬(e→q))   [assuming that 0<Pr(e)<1] 
iii.  Pr(x|y)>Pr(x) ↔ Pr(¬x|y)<Pr(¬x)       [follows from the axioms]   
iv.  Pr(e→q|e) < Pr(e→q)         [i, ii, iii] 
Assuming in (ii), as in this case one should, that the unconditional probabil-
ity of e is not 1 or 0, (3) results.169 And from (EC) and (3) it follows that e is 
not evidence for (e→q). It is this lack of evidence that explains why, al-
though properly derived from a known premise, (2) is not known.170,171 
Similar considerations explain a host of other examples some of which 
are proposed in the literature as challenges to the validity of epistemic clo-
sure. We have already seen some in the previous chapters: It follows from 
something’s being a zebra that it is not a mule disguised to look like a zebra. 
And yet, seeing a zebra-looking animal in the pen, although providing one 
with evidence that there is a zebra in the pen, does not provide any evidence 
that the animal is not a disguised mule. In fact, that there is a zebra-looking 
animal in the vicinity is, at least to some extent, an indication that there is a 
zebra-looking disguised mule in the area. Memory of having parked one’s 
car in the driveway ten minutes ago evidentially supports the belief that 
one’s car is in the driveway. It provides no evidential support for the entailed 
belief that one’s car has not been stolen in the last ten minutes. Perceiving 
one’s hands is evidence that one has hands, it is not evidence that one is not 
a bodiless brain in a vat. The same holds for the Dogmatism problem, the 
Easy Knowledge problem, Bootstrapping, other epistemic ascent cases, Live 
skepticism, Mundane skepticism and many more that may not seem intui-
tively problematical yet under analysis will be revealed as unsupported by 
one’s evidence.172 Examples of all these sorts abound. What is common to 
                                                       
169 Much thanks here to Peter Pagin for first proving the above claim. Also, many thanks to 
Karl Karlander for making the necessary assumptions clear. The proof I give here connects 
easiest to other arguments in this and the next chapter.  
170 If one is worried that I have not taken all the evidence under consideration, perhaps not 
taking into account background knowledge of the reliability of one's watch, one can simply 
interpret e as including this background knowledge nothing short of entailment will matter.   
171 The problem discussed here is akin to the Easy Knowledge problem discussed by 
Hawthorne (2004a: 73-8) introduced in Cohen (2002) and further developed in his (2005). As 
mentioned in the previous chapter the issue discussed here does not relate to the question of 
whether the method for knowledge gain is right, whether the knowledge is basic, or easy. As 
will become apparent, the core issue, I believe, relates to the failure of evidence closure and 
differs significantly from Cohen’s and Hawthorne’s discussion with respect to the analysis 
and solution of these problems. Regardless of the differences I am indebted to them for their 
groundbreaking work on these as well as related issues.  
172 This last claim is important to appreciate since the fact that one has not evidence for a 
proposition is a good reason to think that she does not know it to be true. And yet, since these 
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all, I claim, is the failure of the evidence for the originally known proposi-
tion to carry over and support the inferred proposition. Lacking evidential 
support, it seems, empirical beliefs of this sort do not qualify as knowledge 
(though I will claim later that they do qualify as justified beliefs). The same 
idea, then, accounts for a large number of unhappy consequences of epis-
temic closure. For instance, having proper evidence that p is true can allow 
one to know p, but not that the means by which the evidence was acquired 
are reliable (the bootstrapping problem), or that evidence against p is mis-
leading (the dogmatism problem).173 Proper evidence can provide warrant in 
believing that p, but does not supply one with reasons for believing that this 
evidence is not misleading.  
Admittedly, denying the status of knowledge to properly inferred beliefs 
exemplified in these cases has its cost, namely, the rejection of the intuitive 
and extremely popular principle of epistemic closure. Yet in view of a theo-
retical explanation of why and under what conditions it might fail, and in 
light of the vast epistemic challenges it overcomes, it would be irresponsible 
not to give it more serious attention. This chapter aims to explain why evi-
dence is not closed and why the connection evidence has with knowledge, 
together with the plausible (perhaps even inevitable) assumption of knowl-
edge fallibilism, open knowledge seems to result.  
I shall also propose an open knowledge reply to the Hawthorne’s argu-
ments of the first chapter, an argument we saw Dretske’s and Nozikc’s ac-
counts do not have the resources to handle. I will also try and show why 
some ways to circumvent knowledge openness in light of evidence openness 
are ultimately not workable, and this will be further developed in the next 
chapter. The challenge, I will claim, remains: if knowledge is not always 
based on conclusive evidence, and if evidence is not closed, how can knowl-
edge be closed?   
 
                                                                                                                                
cases are not readily available to our attention, we will not tend to deny knowledge of the 
premise from which the unknown proposition was inferred.  
173 Notice that my formulation of the problem is more general in that it does not rely on the 
intuition that knowledge is gained too easily nor on the intuitive oddity of bootstrapping 
oneself into knowledge of the reliability of one’s sources. As will become evident in what 
follows I rely on structural features of evidence and the principles governing the relation of 
evidential support. Contrary to what some have alleged, the denial of closure is motivated not 
merely by the desire to avoid Cartesian skepticism, or by specific accounts of knowledge (like 
Nozick’s or Dretske’s). Besides the argument here relating to the structural features of evi-
dence, since epistemic closure is implicated in a wealth of epistemic puzzles, including, in 
addition to those already mentioned, the lottery paradox (see Vogel 1990, Hawthorne 2004a), 
some of the semantic self-knowledge puzzles, and more (see Chapter 1), open knowledge 
enjoys the benefit of solving or defusing many, perhaps even all, of these puzzles.  
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4.2. Probabilistic Argument for Evidence and 
Knowledge Openness  
In the course of analyzing the watch case, I have claimed on probabilistic 
grounds and the (EC) principle, that (a) evidence is open, i.e. one can have 
evidence for a proposition p, know that q follows from p, yet the evidence 
for p cannot count in favor of q. That is, we have seen a proof that shows 
that the evidence that raises the probability of a proposition p can lower the 
probability of a proposition that a priori follows from it.174 (b) that this phe-
nomena accounts for many cases that seem intuitively to be problematical.  
A tacit appeal was made to the thesis of fallibilism that has already played 
a role in previous chapters, the idea that one can know that p on the basis of 
evidence and background knowledge that does not entail p. This assumption 
was explicit in the proof with regard to the watch case when it was assumed 
that Pr(e∧¬q)>0. This assumption need not be true in many cases, for exam-
ple, it is not true with regard to mathematics when one's evidence on the 
basis of which one comes to know a mathematical truth is a proof. But given 
that the probability of a known proposition is less than 1, the argument for 
knowledge openness is prima facie compelling.  
To make the argument more explicit, let me state it schematically.  
 
(i) Fallibilism - One can know that p even though one's total evi-
dence does not guarantee that p. That is, one can know that p 
even though the probability of p given one's total evidence is less 
than 1.  
(ii) (ii) (EC) - If the probability of a proposition p is lower given e 
then it is un-conditionally, e is not evidence for p.  
(iii) (KE) - If one knows that the p is true, one has evidence for p.  
(iv) So, Knowledge is not closed.  
 
(iv), I will argue, follows from (i), (ii) and (iii). But this argument is in need 
of elaboration. Specifically, not only do the premises need support, there are 
further claims that need to be established before it is made clear why (iv) 
follows from the premises. I will repeat the argument of chapter two that for 
all propositions p, if all available evidence e (which could be a long conjunc-
tion) does not conclusively establish that p, then there is a proposition q such 
that q follows from p and e lowers the probability that q. With this claim 
established, for all subjects S and every known proposition p that does not 
follow from S's total evidence, there will be a proposition, in fact many 
                                                       
174 Unless we are dealing with Multi Premise Closure, the probability of a proposition that 
follows from p cannot be any lower than the conditional probability of p on the evidence. 
Nevertheless, it can lower its prior probability; cases where its unconditional probability is 
greater than the conditional probability of p on e. I will have more to say about this later in 
this chapter.   
 97 
propositions, which are not supported by the totality of S's evidence which 
can be properly inferred from p. Hence, given that in order to know that a 
proposition is true, S needs to have evidence for it, knowledge is open. So 
the basic idea is that since evidence is open, so is knowledge. The more de-
tailed argument, then, is as follows (Open Knowledge Argument):  
 
I. Fallibilism - One can know that p even though one's total evidence does 
not guarantee that p. That is, one can know that p even though the prob-
ability of p given one's total evidence is less than 1. [assumption] 
II. For any fallibly known proposition p  (in the sense of (I)) there is a 
proposition q that a priori follows from p such that the conditional 
probability of q given all the available evidence is lower than the un-
conditional probability of q.  [independent proof] 
III. (EC) - If e is evidence for q then the conditional probability of q given e 
is not lower than the unconditional probability of q. [assumption] 
IV. For any fallibly known proposition p, there are propositions that a pri-
ori follow from it which the available evidence does not support (the 
probability of the proposition is lowered). [I, II, III] 
V. (KE)  For all subjects S and propositions p, if S knows that p, then S 
has evidence for p.175 [assumption] 
VI. Knowledge is open - For all subjects S and propositions p and q, if a 
proposition p is fallibly known by S to be true, there is a proposition q 
such that even if S knows that it follows from p, S is in no position to 
know q by competent inference (keeping the evidence fixed).  
 
Several of the premises of this argument can be challenged, of course, 
namely, (I), (III) and (V). Also the argument can be taken to be a reductio 
for one of the premises. I take Cartesian skepticism to be making such an 
argument to the conclusion that no proposition is fallibly known.176 Yet (II), I 
now argue, cannot be challenged.  
No matter how high the probability of p given e is, since the probability 
of e∧¬p need not be 0 (given fallibilism), the probability of ¬(e∧¬p) will be 
                                                       
175 One might want to restrict these claims to empirical propositions. The restriction depends 
on one's conception of evidence. One might take proofs and a priori reasoning as a type of 
evidence, or not. If you believe that there are propositions that need no evidence to be known, 
restrict the claim in any way you see fit. Surely there are many types of propositions that have 
to be supported by available evidence in order to be considered as known - it is those that we 
need to quantify over.   
176 Since a Cartesian Skeptic wants to challenge almost all empirical knowledge, she will have 
to argue that all empirical knowledge is fallibly known. The dream or demon hypothesis is 
supposed to supply a motivation (among other things) for accepting this premise. Chapter 2 
focuses on this matter. At this stage let me just note that a more promising line for the skeptic 
to take for substantiating the premise is to claim that if evidence does not entail a proposition, 
that proposition cannot be known. This would place the non-skeptic in the uncomfortable 
position (if she is interested in showing the skeptic to be wrong) to either jettison closure, or 
argue that empirical knowledge is not fallible.  
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lower given e than it is unconditionally (assuming that e is S's total evi-
dence).  
 
(1)  KS(p)∧(Pr(p|e)<1)  [Fallibilist assumption] 
(2) Pr(e∧¬p|e) = Pr((e ∧¬p)∧ e)
Pr(e)
 > Pr(e∧¬p)    
(3) Pr(¬(e∧¬p)|e) < Pr(¬(e∧¬p)) [(2), Kolmogorov axioms] 
(4)  KS(p ⇒ ¬(e∧¬p)) [assuming that S so reasons]  
(5)  ¬ES(e,¬(e∧¬p)) [(3), (EC)] 
(6) ¬KS¬(e∧¬p)  [(5), (KE)]                
Assuming, that is, that e’s unconditional probability is greater than 0 less 
than 1 (0<Pr(e)<1). (3) has a feature that is not essential to the argument. For 
the argument to go through suffice it that the probability of the evidence is 
lowered by the proposition that follows from the known proposition. Also, 
the argument could have terminated at (3), the point of continuing to (6) was 
to place (3) in the context of the open knowledge argument: Since S knows 
that p and does not know a proposition S knows logically follows from p, 
knowledge is open.  
As I just mentioned, any proposition that follows from p and lowers the 
probability of e, will have the same features, i.e., it follows form p and yet 
the evidence lowers its probability.177 For every fallibly known proposition 
there are, then, a host of propositions that follow from one’s knowledge that 
are not supported by the totality of one’s evidence, and are hence (given KE) 
not known. 
Rejecting (II) as a way to resist the open knowledge argument does not, 
then, seem promising. Another way to respond to the argument is to reject 
(I). But I think it cannot simply be rejected, one would need to come up with 
some reason to think that given one’s evidence, the probability of a known 
proposition will always be 1. One reason for rejecting (I) is equivalent to 
skepticism178 and can be improved on by accepting the conclusion of open 
knowledge, i.e. open knowledge is better than skepticism (other things being 
equal). Another way has been proposed by Williamson and will be consid-
ered in detail in the next chapter. So let us see how well one might do by 
questioning the other premises. Here are the options (at least those I can 
think of) for one who wants to resist the open knowledge conclusion (VI): 
 
                                                       
177 See proof in page 53, note 96, Chapter 2.  
178 Other ways of rejecting the first premise will be considered in Chapter 5.   
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(a) Evidence can lower probabilities: It is not the case that whenever 
the probability of p given e is not as great as the unconditional 
probability of p, e cannot be evidence for p. 
 
(b) Evidence is not probabilistic: No account of the relation of “evi-
dence for”, or more generally perhaps, of the relation of “reasons to 
justifiably believe” can be given in terms of probabilities.  
 
(c) Knowledge is not dependent on evidence: There are some cases 
where one knows that a proposition p is true, even though one has 
no evidence for p. Perhaps all that is needed, in some cases, are 
general reasons (or suitable initial probabilities) with no special evi-
dence concerning p.   
 
The next section contains an argument aimed at defusing (a) and (b). No 
appeal to probabilities is needed, I will argue, in order to reach the conclu-
sion that evidence is open. (c) will be one of the subjects of the next chapter 
(5.2). To be sure, (c) (and what it is aimed at) is in need of refinement. The 
purpose here was to display in broad strokes the central ways to avoid the 
conclusion of the argument for knowledge openness.  
It should be noted that responding to the argument by seeking a refined 
notion of evidence does not seem promising. I have not assumed any special 
conception of evidence nor does the argument presuppose that all knowledge 
requires evidence. Suffice it that some knowledge requires evidence (of 
whatever non conclusive kind) and one may fill out the details regarding the 
nature of this evidence in many ways.    
In sum, we have seen so far a case – the watch case – that intuitively 
poses a challenge for knowledge closure. This intuition was reinforced by 
considerations concerning probabilities and the (EC) principle. The argu-
ment first established evidence openness since the watch case itself is a clear 
probabilistic counterexample to evidence closure, and the argument contin-
ued by claiming that this openness of evidence can be used as an argument 
for open knowledge. Since evidence is open, it was argued, assuming the 
possibility of fallible knowledge, there is a compelling argument to the con-
clusion that knowledge is open as well. Three major directions of responding 
to this argument were sketched and rejoinders to these responses will be 
argued for in further sections.  
4.3 Evidence Openness from Principles     
The previous section included an argument for knowledge openness that 
appealed to evidence openness assuming that evidence conforms both to the 
axioms of probability and to (EC). Two reactions to the argument were men-
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tioned that I will respond to here. One is that (EC) fails miserably, evidence 
can lower the probability of a proposition and count as evidence for it, and 
this happens systematically with regard to all the cases where an entailed 
proposition has its probability lowered by the evidence that supports one’s 
knowledge. This was option (a) above. Option (b) states that evidence is 
simply a non-probabilistic notion. The argument below defuses both these 
responses by an appeal to non-probabilistic reasoning showing that on very 
weak assumptions, it is more or less an established fact that if one’s evidence 
for a proposition p is non-conclusive, then one does not necessarily have 
evidence for q even if one knows that q follows from p a priori.  
A second objective of this section is to defend open knowledge from John 
Hawthorne’s argument (of Chapter 1) aimed at refuting it. Hawthorne’s ar-
gument, as we saw in Chapter 1, shows that in accepting weaker principles 
than the closure principle, leading figures of open knowledge (Nozick and 
Dretske) have tacitly or explicitly accepted inconsistent commitments. The 
current section will show that not only does Hawthorne’s argument not re-
fute a correct open knowledge account; his argument helps reveal the under-
lying structure of open evidence which can be used as an argument to sup-
port it.  
Imagine you are looking for zebra-look-alike mules. Where would you 
look? It would be natural for you to do so among zebra-looking animals. 
Admittedly, zebra-looking mules would be hard to find, but if there is any 
chance of finding some (at least the ones which are well disguised) you had 
better search among zebra-looking animals. Seeking them among the ele-
phant-looking animals, or the banana-looking objects holds little promise of 
success. Your chances of encountering a zebra-looking mule are slim. But 
the probability that an object encountered is not a zebra-looking mule is even 
lower when a zebra-looking animal (say, a zebra) is visually observed. Al-
though it does not constitute strong evidence, a zebra-looking animal gives 
some support to the proposition that a given object is a zebra-looking mule. 
In probabilistic terms, the presence of a zebra-looking animal raises the 
probability that a mule disguised to look like a zebra is present.179 
Now in the normal case, when one sees a zebra-looking animal, one has 
evidence that the animal is a zebra. But anyone who knows that a zebra is 
not a mule, must realize that at the same time that one gains evidence for Z 
(= there is a zebra in the pen) in this way, one loses evidence for ¬DM (= it 
is not the case that there is a disguised mule in the pen), or, in other words, 
one gains evidence for DM. Denying this quickly gets one into serious trou-
ble in trying to provide a plausible account of evidence. The argument below 
shows why (in non-probabilistic terms). 
                                                       
179 There is no essential probabilistic point here. All that I am claiming is that some measure 
of support is given to DM by a visual observation of a zebra looking animal. This will be 
argued for more directly below.     
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The following principle, it seems, must be a part of any plausible theory 
of evidential support: 
 
Consistency of Evidence (CS): For all evidence e and propositions p, if e evi-
dentially supports p, e does not evidentially support the negation of p. 
Evidence addition (EAD): For all evidence e and propositions p1 and p2, if e 
evidentially supports p1, e evidentially supports p1 or p2. 
Evidence equivalence (EEQ): For all evidence e and propositions p1 and p2, if 
e evidentially supports p1, and p2 is logically (or a priori) equivalent to p1, e 
evidentially supports p2.  
 
The latter two principles are designed to emulate principles concerning 
knowledge that Hawthorne employed in the service of his argument against 
knowledge openness, but other principles could be used as well. (EAD) is an 
evidential analog of Hawthorne’s (AD) which states (roughly) that adding 
disjuncts to a known proposition results in knowing the disjunction. (EEQ) 
emulates the (EQ) principle stating that if one knows that p is a priori 
equivalent to q, then one knows q if one knows that p. We will have occa-
sion to come back and consider Hawthone’s arguments, shortly. For the time 
being, note that the three principles enjoy a high degree of intuitive appeal. 
The first principle, the consistency of evidence, expresses the simple idea 
that if something is to count as evidence for some theory, hypothesis, propo-
sition or what have you, it cannot also support its negation. Or, in other 
words, that a proposition supporting both a hypothesis and its negation, does 
not constitute evidence for either. The principle (EAD) stems from the idea 
that evidential support is a relation that is closed under certain logical opera-
tions. Addition captures the idea that adding disjuncts to a supported hy-
pothesis does not undermine the degree of support for a disjunction. 
Equivalence - (EEQ) - expresses the idea that “confirmation of a hypothe-
sis is independent of the way in which it is formulated” (Hempel 1965: 13). 
The truth-values of logically equivalent hypotheses stand or fall together, so 
equivalent hypotheses must also be supported together.180   
Although the principles appear plausible, their conjunction with (even a 
particularly weak version of) the thesis of underdetermination of theory by 
                                                       
180 In terms of a coarse-grained possible world semantics, we might say that any evidence that 
the actual world is one of the p1-worlds (the possible worlds in which p1 is true) is also evi-
dence that the actual world is a p2-world, since in those terms the sentences express the same 
proposition. The (EEQ) principle is justified by the claim that any evidence that the actual 
world is one the p1-worlds, is also evidence that the world is an p2-world if “p1” and “p2” are 
true in the same worlds. I might add that I don’t want to lay to much weight on this kind of 
reasoning in support of (EEQ) since possible world semantics is faces trouble of its own when 
it comes to closure principles.     
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evidence, leads to a contradiction. Strong underdetermination is the conten-
tious claim that all possible evidence cannot fully determine the choice be-
tween (some) mutually incompatible theories. Weak underdetermination 
(henceforth: UD), however, states that, at least insofar as actual evidence 
goes, there can be two theories (or more) that are supported by the evidence 
but incompatible with each other:181 
(UD) A certain body of evidence may support two or more theories, hypothe-
ses or propositions that are incompatible with one another.182  
 
Here are some examples. Consider first the case of competing interpreta-
tions of formulas of quantum mechanics. The two leading interpretations of 
quantum theory are, apparently, compatible with all (possible) observations. 
And yet, since one, the Copenhagen interpretation, entails that every particle 
has a momentum and the other, the Bohmian interpretation, implies that 
particles have no momentum,183 the two are mutually incompatible. Pre-
sumably, the evidence we have supports both interpretations. Thus, there is 
evidence supporting the Copenhagen interpretation (CQM). By (EAD) it 
follows that this evidence also supports: the Copenhagen interpretation is 
true or the Bohmian interpretation is false (CQM∨¬BQM). But this is 
equivalent to: it is not the case that the Copenhagen interpretation is false 
and the Bohmian is true (¬(¬CQM∧BQM)), and so the evidence supports 
this latter proposition as well (by EEQ). Now since the truth of one interpre-
tation entails the falsity of the other, the Bohmian interpretation is true 
(BQM) is equivalent to the Bohmian interpretation is true and the Copenha-
gen interpretation is false (¬CQM∧BQM). Thus by evidence equivalence 
(EEQ) the evidence supports the claim that it is not the case that the 
Bohmian interpretation is true. It follows from (CS) that the evidence sup-
ports neither the Bohmian interpretation, nor its negation – in contradiction 
to what we have assumed.   
Or take a more mundane, non-scientific, example. Say David is slightly 
color-blind so he cannot always tell blue from green, although usually he 
gets such things right. Seeing what appears to him to be a blue car David 
presumably has evidence – albeit inconclusive – for there being a blue car 
before him. But the evidence is compatible with there being a green car be-
fore him. It follows by (EAD) from this latter claim that the evidence sup-
                                                       
181 For the argument below all that is needed is that there are some cases of underdetermina-
tion, for instance, induction to a claim that might even turn out to be false after many confirm-
ing instances.  
182 A probabilistic proof would be easy enough, but here I am limiting myself to non probabil-
istic arguments.  
183 I have been told that the difference between the Copenhagen interpretation and the 
Bohmian interpretation is not quite as I present it here. Since quantum physics is not the issue, 
let us pretend that I have presented the issue correctly. In any case, the interpretations are 
apparently incompatible.   
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ports: there is a green car or it is not the case that there is a blue car. Since 
the second disjunct is implied by the first, the disjunction is equivalent to: it 
is not the case that there is a blue car. By equivalence, then, the evidence 
supports the claim that it is not the case that there is a blue car. Once again, 
assuming (CS), the argument shows that David has no evidence that there is 
a blue car before him.  
This may not seem too problematic if you take David’s case to be unique 
in some sense or are willing to disqualify his perception as evidence for there 
being a blue car in front of him (despite the fact that it clearly raises the 
probability that this is the case).184 But the problem generalizes. The above 
examples both have the same form and follow from the apparently undeni-
able reality of underdetermining evidence. (UD) entails that given a finite set 
of evidence propositions e, this evidence can equally support two incompati-
ble theories, T1 and T2. Thus, T1 implies not-T2, and T2 implies not-T1. Let 
me state this more formally as follows:  
 
(1) E(e,T1) ∧ E(e,T2) ∧ (T1⇒ ¬T2) [UD]   
 
(EAD) entails the following: 
 




(3) E(e,T1∨¬T2)  [MP, 1, 2] 
 
Now, since T1 entails the negation of T2, the following a priori equivalence 
holds:185 
                                                       
184 Note that this may not be a happy position even with regard to this case. Imagine that 
David identifies these colors correctly only 50 percent of the time. Now if David believes that 
there was a blue car in front of him, I take it that that would constitute some evidence for there 
being a blue car there. Imagine that in a court case, a defendant’s car is green and David is a 
witness. Would not his belief that it was blue count as some evidence for the car being blue? 
Is David’s testimony just as relevant to the case as someone who did not see the getaway car?  
Suppose someone says “yes, it is only evidence for the following: Either the car was green or 
it was blue.” By the Kolmogorov axioms (since the events are mutually exclusive), the prob-
ability of this proposition is equal to the sum of the probabilities of both disjuncts 
(Pr(Bc∨Gc)=Pr(Gc)+Pr(Bc)). Now if you believe that the raising of probabilities is evidence, 
then (assuming that the probability goes up to 0.9) Pr(Gc)+Pr(Bc)=0.9 and assuming that the 
prior probability of Gc was low, e.g. Pr(Gc)=0.05 (since it could be any one of the different 
car colors), then the probability of each of the disjuncts has gone up considerably. It therefore 
seems that on this construal, it would count as evidence for both disjuncts. If you still find this 
case unconvincing just focus on the others. My purpose is not to convince anyone on issues 
related to color perception. As noted, any underdetermined case will do.   
185 The proof is straightforward. First, from left to right: Given that ⊢T1→¬T2 and assuming 
T1∨¬T2, either T1 is true, in which case so is ¬T2 (by the implication), or ¬T2 is true. So 
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(4) (T1∨¬T2) ⇔ ¬T2 
 
It thus follows from (3) that:  
 
(5) E(e, ¬T2)  [(EEQ), 4, 3]  
 
But given the principle of consistency (CS), this entails that e does not evi-
dentially support T2. 
 
(6) ¬E(e, T2)  [CS, 5, 1] 
 
and (6) contradicts (1).186  
Call this argument the Underdetermination Argument (UA for short) for 
the evidence openness. Notice that in the course of UA there has been no 
essential appeal to probabilities (although it follows on probabilistic grounds 
as well). The question now will be which of the principles should be jetti-
soned.     
 
4.3.1. Equivalence, Consistency and Addition 
The equivalence of evidence is involved in one of philosophy’s notorious 
paradoxes, namely Hempel’s paradox of confirmation. In Hempel’s argu-
ment the standard conception of evidential confirmation leads to apparently 
unreasonable results. Specifically, Hempel showed that coupled with the 
Nicod principle,187 the principle of equivalence leads to the conclusion that 
pink stockings evidentially confirm the claim that all ravens are black. The 
present argument shows that a black raven equally supports the claim that 
not all ravens are black and is thus no evidence at all. Given even weak 
(UD), no matter what conception of confirmation it is coupled with, whether 
Nicod’s or some other conception, the (EEQ) and (EAD) principles lead to 
paradox. These considerations seem to point to the rejection of (EEQ).188   
                                                                                                                                
T1∨¬T2 implies ¬T2. Now from right to left, ¬T2 clearly implies the disjunction T1∨¬T2. 
Hence, ⊢(T1∨¬T2) ↔ ¬T2.  
186 In terms of Modal Logic, what we have here is a failure of Monotonicity+Equivalence. 
Monotonicity is the condition that: ⊢◻(p)→◻(p∨q) and replacement of Modal Equivalence is 
⊢◻(p↔q)→(◻p↔◻q). Together these two entail closure. Thanks to Johan van Benthem for 
pointing out the analogy.      
187 In simple terms the principle states that universal generalizations of the form 
∀(x)(Rx→Bx) are supported  by instances of the form: Rx∧Bx.      
188 Scheffler and Goodman reject equivalence as a reaction to the raven paradox. See, e.g. 
Scheffler and Goodman (1972: 78), Scheffler (1963: 289), Goodman (1955: 71-2). A more 
recent attempt is made in Yablo (MS).    
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It may be suggested at this point that neither (EEQ) nor (EAD) are to be 
identified as the culprit. It is rather (UD) that is incompatible with (CS). To 
be sure, Hempel, who did not want to give up on evidence closure realized 
the challenge that simple cases of evidence underdetermination may pose for 
his account: 
A finite set of measurements concerning the changes of one physical magni-
tude, x, associated with those of another, y, may conform to and thus be said 
to confirm, several different hypotheses as to the particular mathematical 
function in terms of which the relationship of x and y can be expressed; but 
such hypotheses are incompatible because to at least one value of x, they will 
assign different values for y.    
   Hempel (1965: 33) 
 
Unlike Hempel, Carnap was less reluctant to endorse the full consequences 
of (UD) – the rejection of consistency (1950: 474-6). Thus, it may be sug-
gested, it is (UD) that is incompatible with consistency, not (EEQ).  
But the consistency principle that Hempel and Carnap had in mind is sig-
nificantly stronger than (CS):  
(CS*) If e evidentially confirms p1, e does not evidentially confirm a contra-
dicting hypothesis p2 (to an equal degree). 
 
Surely, this principle is not compatible with (UD), and given the perva-
siveness of (UD) it must be rejected. (CS), however, is not as disposable as 
(CS*). How can a piece of evidence support some hypothesis if it supports 
its negation? (CS), it seems, is a principle that no plausible theory of confir-
mation can deny, for otherwise what is left of empirical refutation of a the-
ory? Indeed Hempel and Carnap both embrace the following definition of 
“disconfirmation”:189 
(DC)  e disconfirms a proposition (or hypothesis) p if it confirms ¬p. 
 
Thus, if e confirms both p and its negation, it both confirms and discon-
firms p and is thus evidence neither for p nor for not-p. Insisting that (DC) is 
true and (CS) false would lead to theoretical nihilism with regard to evi-
dence.  
The distinction between (CS) and (CS*) may seem contrived. Neverthe-
less, a closer look at the substance of (UD) supports such a distinction. Pre-
sumably, when a proposition is underdetermined by evidence, there are two 
incompatible propositions p1 and p2 supported by the available evidence e. A 
set of measurements, to take Hemple’s example, is entailed by both func-
tions f1 and f2 and thus supports both. Yet it does not seem to support the 
                                                       
189 Hempel (1965: 37). Cf. Carnap (1950: 479). 
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negations of either function. Observations that some animal looks like a rab-
bit can be taken to support both the hypothesis that it is a rabbit and the hy-
pothesis that it is a hare (by someone who cannot tell a rabbit from a hare), 
since this observation is entailed by both hypotheses.190 Yet ‘it is not a rabbit’ 
and ‘it is not a hare’ do not imply the observation of a rabbit-looking animal 
(quite the contrary). Thus neither of these hypotheses should gain any sup-
port from the observation of a rabbit-looking animal.  
So, although (UD) arguably entails that (CS*) is to be rejected, (CS) is 
not expendable for any proper theory of the relation between evidence and 
hypotheses. And yet, as the argument above shows, assuming so much as the 
weak (UD) and (EAD), the (EEQ) principle conflicts with (CS). Taken to-
gether these principles lead to the conclusion that e evidentially supports p 
and evidentially supports not-p. The implausibility of this conclusion is even 
more striking in light of the following consideration. It may be suggested 
that evidential support collects over conjunction:191 
(ECJ) if e evidentially supports p and e evidentially supports q, then e eviden-
tially supports p and q. 
 
Given this principle, the Underdetermination Argument  (p. 104) entails that 
any underdetermining evidence e supports a contradiction. This seems like a 
conclusion no proper theory of confirmation can endorse. 
But even if (ECJ) is rejected (as I think it must be - see below) our prob-
lem is still very pressing. Since (UD) appears to be an undeniable reality, 
and since (CS) must be regarded non-negotiable, it seems that we must give 
up either (EAD) or (EEQ). 
If you are still not convinced, here is an argument to an implausible con-
clusion that does not assume (CS).192 For simplicity let's say that we have 
evidence consisting in a conjunction of two atomic propositions a and b. 
Two hypotheses result from operations on the three atomic propositions a, b 
and c (a∧b∧c and a∧b∧¬c). Both c and ¬c are consistent with a and b. Now, 
the evidence raises the probability of a∧b∧c, as well the probability of 
a∧b∧¬c (this can be proven trivially). But we need not use probabilities and 
the assumption that the raising of probabilities is what the “evidence for” 
                                                       
190 Using probabilities, a proof would be straightforward. Pr(p|e) when p entails e will be 
greater than the prior probability of p. The reason is: Pr(p|e)=Pr(p∧e)/Pr(e)=Pr(p)/Pr(e)>Pr(p) 
(whenever the prior probability of e is less than 1). But here I am restricting myself to non-
probabilistic reasoning.   
191 The principle follows from multi premise closure for evidence, but, in fact, evidence does 
not collect over conjunction. See Carnap’s example below. Moreover, the principle leads to 
paradox - the lottery paradox and the preface paradox.         
192 In conversation Ofra Magidor suggested that one who goes as far as to claim that evidence 
is non-probabilistic and that (CS*) is to be rejected, might very well (given the options) opt 
for rejecting (CS). I see her point but I think that the argument in the main text will deter one 
from going in such a direction.  
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relation consists in, to be convinced that a∧b is evidence for both a∧b∧¬c 
















(10) is already implausible (and adding (CS) or using probabilities would 
make for incoherence). But things get worse for evidence-closure given the 
assumption that a∧b is evidence neither for c, nor for ¬c. A plausible claim 
(at least in this context) is that if e is evidence for p-or-q, and e is not evi-
dence for q, then e is evidence for p (at least for atomic independent proposi-
tions), that is: 
  
(11) [E(e,p∨q) ∧ ¬E(e,q)]→E(e,p).   
 
(11), however, would lead us to the impossible situation that a∧b is evi-









I take it that a proposition cannot be evidence against itself (unless it is para-
doxical, self undermining or contradictory perhaps, which presumably 
atomic independent propositions are not). And so we have an argument with 
no appeal to (CS) showing that evidence is not closed. Since we must accept 
(UD), either (EEQ) or (EAD) must be rejected. But if this is the case, then 
we have shown that evidence is not closed under known entailment. To state 




Evidence Closure:193 For all propositions p and q and evidence e, if e is evi-
dence for p, and q follows a priori from p, e is evidence for q.  
 
Since p∨q follows a priori from p, and assuming that we can show all the 
relevant equivalences hold a priori, we can state the logical relations be-
tween the different principles as follows:  
 
(14) Evidence Closure ⊢ (EEQ)  
(15) Evidence Closure ⊢ (EAD) 
 
The following is also true, and plays a pivotal role in responding to 
Hawthorne's argument against knowledge openness: 
  
(16) (EEQ), (EAD) ⊢ Evidence Closure 
 
We have seen an argument for the following:  
 
(17) (EEQ), (EAD), (CS), (UD) ⊢ ⊥ 
 
The last argument made no use of (CS):  
 
(18) (EEQ), (EAD), (UD) ⊢ ⊥  
 
That is, that even without (CS) the conjunction of (EEQ) and (EAD) in 
light of the fact that evidence in at least some cases underdetermines propo-
sitions it supports, leads to absurdities. Since (14) and (15) clearly hold, I 
think we can safely conclude that Evidence Closure is invalid. No matter 
which of (EAD) or (EEQ) will turn out to be responsible for the contradic-
tion, Evidence Closure must be relinquished. And since no special appeal 
has been made to probabilities or the lowering of probabilities, the attempt to 
circumvent the Open Knowledge Argument (argument (I-VI) p. 97), is 
wrongheaded. The only other option is to claim that there are no cases of 
(UD) in conjunction with a claim that evidence is not probabilistic, and this 
must be regarded as a very desperate measure indeed. 
Essentially, the argument for evidence openness is complete, but it will be 
important to try to determine whether it is (EEQ) or (EAD) which is to be 
dispensed with. To this end it might be important to be clear that (EEQ) is 
involved in the same kind of argument together with another principle. The 
                                                       
193 As with the other principles, I suppress mention, for simplicity, of subjects and other fine-
tuning. Nothing will turn on this simplification.    
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next section contains an argument showing that (UD), (EEQ) and the distri-
bution of evidence principle are incompatible: 
 
(19) (EEQ), (EDIS), (UD) ⊢ ⊥ 
 
4.3.2. Equivalence and Distribution 
As in the previous case, let us start with two underdetermined theories T1 and 
T2: 
  
(20) E(e,T1) ∧ E(e,T2) ∧  (T1⇒¬T2) [assumption] 
 
By (EEQ), we have:  
 
(21) E(e,T1∧¬T2)  [(EEQ), (20)] 
 
The following would seem to be a highly plausible principle and is an evi-
dential analog of Hawthorne’s (DIS) principle for knowledge:194 
Evidence Distribution (EDIS): If e is evidence for p and q, then e is evidence 
for p and e is evidence for q.   
 
(EDIS) and (21) gives us: 
  
(22) E(e,¬T2).    [EDIS, (21)] 
 
Yet having assumed that e supports T2, the result is the same contradiction 
we had before. So we need to give up either (EDIS), (EEQ), (CS) or (20) (a 
particular instance of (UD)). The last two I have claimed are virtually unde-
niable, and I have argued that even without (CS) an absurdity follows, i.e. 
that the conjunction of any two atomic propositions is evidence that one of 
them is false (p. 107).  It seems clear, then, that either (EEQ) or (EDIS) must 
be given up. And we have also seen that we need to decide whether to give 
up (EEQ) or (EAD). So the choice is really between (EEQ) on the one hand, 
and both (EDIS) and (EAD) on the other. In other words, the Underdetermi-
nation Arguments show that equivalence cannot be maintained along with 
evidence addition or with evidence distribution. The next section is an at-
tempt to say which is the culprit.   
 
                                                       
194 See p. 30 above.  
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4.3.3. EAD, EDIS and the Logic of Evidence  
Which of (EEQ) or (EAD) and (EDIS) is to be rejected? The case against 
(EEQ) has been mounting. Yet, despite the appeal there is in rejecting 
(EEQ); despite the fact that rejecting (EEQ) provides a quick way out of the 
paradox of the ravens, despite the fact that we would be giving up one prin-
ciple rather than two, I will argue that (EEQ) should be maintained and 
(EAD) and (EDIS) are to be rejected.195 Here my reasons for rejecting these 
latter principles will be partly probabilistic.196  
If T1 and T2 are incompatible theories and have the same initial probabil-
ity, then this probability must be equal to or less than 0.5 (thus: (T1⇒¬T2) 
→[Pr(T1)+Pr(T2) ≤ 1]). Let us suppose that each theory has an initially prob-
ability of 0.2. The probability of ¬T2 is therefore 0.8. Now say we receive 
evidence e that supports both T1 and T2 to an equal degree (for simplicity). 
Assume that Pr(T2|e)=0.4 and likewise Pr(T2|e)=0.4. The initial probability 
of (T1∨¬T2) = Pr(T1) + Pr(¬T2) - Pr(T1∧¬T2), which equals 0.8.197 Now if e 
supports T2 and T1 equally (as we have assumed), then given e the probabil-
ity of T1∨¬T2 decreases to 0.6 (Pr((T1∨¬T2)|e)=0.6). The reason is simple, 
since the probability of T2 rises, the probability of ¬T2 decreases and since 
from T1 it follows that ¬T2, the probability of the disjunction T1∨¬T2 drops 
(equivalently Pr(¬T2|e)=0.6). Hence, e is not evidence for T1∨¬T2 even 
though it is evidence for T1 (assuming, that is, that if e lowers the probability 
of a given theory T, it does not count as evidence in its favor).198 
A similar argument holds for (EDIS). If we treat the evidence for relation 
as a conditional probability relation such that it raises it relative to the un-
conditional probability, the probability of T1 given e is the probability of e 
and T1 divided by the probability of e (Pr(T1|e)=Pr(T1∧e)/Pr(e)). Assume that 
the probability of T1 is 0.2 and that of e is less than 1 (and greater than 0). If 
T1 entails e, then Pr(T1|e)>0.2, and likewise for T2.
199 This means that the 
probability of ¬T2 given e, is less than 0.8. Now since T1 entails ¬T2, the 
prior probability of T1∧¬T2 is just the probability of T1. And, as you may 
have figure out already, e must increase the probability of T1 to no lesser a 
                                                       
195 Harman and Sherman (2004) reject (EQ) as a reaction to Hawthorne’s arguments (that are 
presented in Chapter 1.5.1). (EQ) is the epistemic counterpart of (EEQ) and so it may be that 
they would deny the later principle. Goodman, Scheffler and Yablo reject (EEQ) (see note 
189) as a way to resolve the raven paradox. I think that in light of the considerations in the 
main text, this direction is wrongheaded.   
196 I have already completed my argument on non-probabilistic grounds that evidence is not 
closed under known a priori entailment since whether (EEQ) or (EAD) and (EDIS) are to be 
rejected Evidence Closure must be rejected. So there is no apparent reason for me to continue 
restricting myself to non-probabilistic reasoning.  
197 Since the probability of T2 was stipulated to be 0.2, the probability of ¬T2 is 0.8, and the 
probability of T1∧¬T2 is just the probability of T1.  
198 This assumption is not to be confused with the stronger claim that evidence just is increas-
ing the probability of a hypothesis. Here I am merely assuming that evidence cannot lower the 
probability that the proposition it supports is true.  
199 This is shown by simple application of Bayes’ theorem. 
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degree than it does that of T1∧¬T2, so all is well for the first equivalence step 
of the argument that utilizes (EDIS) (assuming that e supports both T1 and T2 
to an equal degree). But what about the last step that uses (EDIS)? Clearly, 
although e raises the probability of T1∧¬T2, e lowers the probability of ¬T2 
(since it raises the probability of T2). And so, unless we want to claim that e 
provides evidential support for a theory, proposition, or hypothesis, even 
though it lowers its probability, we must give up (EDIS). 
This explanation appealed to probabilities, but this is not the only way to 
determine which of the principles are to be rejected. Let me briefly outline 
an explanation of what I take to be going on in these cases without employ-
ing probabilities. This explanation will serve the open knowledge propo-
nent's arguments below since it will explain (if she is correct), why closure 
seems compelling in the first place.  
The basic idea is that before evidence is received, a disjunctive proposi-
tion, p or q, can already be well supported (the notion of support need not be 
construed probabilistically). The evidence, although lending support to one 
of the disjuncts, can count against the disjunction. Since most objects are not 
disguised mules, the assumption that some (yet unperceived) object is a ze-
bra or not a disguised mule is highly plausible. But the fact that the object 
looks like a zebra makes it more likely (again – not necessarily in term of 
probability) that the object is a mule disguised to look like a zebra. It is the 
neglect of such possibilities that inclines us to accept (EAD) and (EDIS) and 
may explain the appeal that knowledge closure enjoys, as well. 
4.3.4. Carnap’s Matrix 
The formal considerations of the previous subsections are exemplified in the 
following scenario devised by Carnap (1950: 382-5).200 The table below rep-
                                                       
200 Hempel (1965: 31-33) argues that if evidence is closed under strict implication, every 
proposition is evidence for any other. I present Carnap’s example since, as will become evi-
dent, it relates directly to the principles that we have been concerned with. Namely, (EAD) 
and (EDIS). Hempel’s argument proceeds via what he labels the “converse consequence 
condition.” But here is another more general way to proceed: Assuming that a proposition e is 
evidence for a proposition h iff the probability of h given e is higher than the probability of h 
(E(e,h) =def Pr(h|e)>Pr(h)), let me first establish a lemma: 
 
Lemma. For all empirical propositions p and q, if p entails q, then q is evidence for p. 
 
Recall the definition of conditional probability: Pr(p|q)=Pr(p∧q)/Pr(q). Now let us assume (as 
is plausible if we are considering empirical matters) that 0<Pr(q)<1 and that p strictly implies 
q. It then follows that: 
(1) (p⇒q)⇒[Pr(p)=Pr(p∧q)] [Since p and p∧q are equivalent, Kolmogorov axioms] 
(2) Pr(p∧q)/Pr(q) > Pr(p) [1,since 0<Pr(q)<1 and Pr(p∧q)=Pr(p)] 
(3) Pr(p|q)>Pr(p) [2,conditional probability] 
(4) E(q,p)  [3,Evidence def.] 
Now, the lemma entails: 
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resents players in a game all of whom have equal chances of winning. The 
‘M’s represent male contestants and the ‘F’s denote female contestants.   
 
 Local Out-of-towner 
Junior F F M M M 
Senior M M F F F 
  
Recall the evidence criterion (EC) regarding the relation of evidential 
support (p. 93 above): 
 
 
(EC)  Necessarily, if e evidentially supports p, then the probability of p   
given e is not lower than the prior unconditional probability of p. 
◻(E(e,p) → (Pr(p|e) ≥ Pr(p))    
 
Let j be the proposition that the winner is junior, s that the winner is a 
senior, l that the winner is local and o that the winner is from out of town. 
Let f represent the proposition that the winner is a female contestant and m 





So the probabilities of both s and o are raised given the information that 
the winner is female. Now let us look at the probability of the disjunction 
o∨s: 
 
                                                                                                                                
(5) ∀p∀qE(p,p∧q) [Lemma] 
Assuming for reductio that evidence is closed under (known) entailment we have:  
(6) ∀p∀q∀r(E(p,q)∧(q⇒r))⇒E(p,r)) 
But then since q follows from p∧q, we have the triviality result: 
(7) ∀p∀qE(p,q) [5,6] 
(7) is surely unacceptable, so one must either reject evidence closure or the proposed defini-
tion of evidence (or the Kolmogorov axioms). By relying on the weaker criterion EC rather 
than on the definition of evidence as the raising of probabilities, we avoid the rejection of the 
proposed definition of evidence as a reply to the argument against evidence closure. Another 
version of Hempel’s argument – similar to the one presented here – can be found in Kaplan 
(1996: 45-56). 
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Initially, Pr(o∨s)=0.7. Given f it becomes 0.6. 
 
Thus, the probability that the winner is either a senior or from out-of-
town decreases given that the winner is a female contestant. So by (ES), 
although f is evidence for s and evidence for o,201 it is not evidence for s-or-
o. If anything, the fact that the winner is a female is counter-evidence to the 
claim that the winner is either a foreigner or a senior.202 
Now to (EDIS). We have the following initial probability assignments:  
 
Pr(l)=0.5; Pr(j)=0.5; and Pr(j∧l)=0.3.  
 
Given the evidence that the winner is a female the probabilities are:  
 
Pr(l|f)=0.4 ; Pr(j|f)=0.4; and Pr(j∧l|f)=0.4.  
 
Thus while f raises the probability of the conjunction it lowers the prob-
ability of each conjunct. This is a stronger result than the one argued for 
above (though the assumptions are stronger).203 
                                                       
201 This can be denied of course. But in light of the arguments above, this seems to be the 
wrong thing to say.  
202 Notice that Carnap’s argument can be blocked by claiming that although there is a raising 
of probabilities, that does not mean that f is evidence for either disjunct. To prove the point in 
the way Carnap envisaged one would have to appeal to a stronger principle than (EC) 
(roughly, that raising probability is a sufficient condition of evidence). Notice, however, that 
no such principle is needed for the argument from (UD), nor for the watch case argument. 
Carnap’s point, however, is entirely in line with what I have been arguing for. 
Notice also how strange it is that one could have evidence for p and evidence for q, yet 
lack evidence for p or q. Asserting as much in ordinary conversation would seem barely 
intelligible.    
203 The table also provides a counter-example to collection of evidence. Consider the prob-
ability distribution for the following proposition: l, j and l-and-j. Pr(l)=0.5, Pr(j)=0.5, 
Pr(l∧j)=0.3. Now consider the information that the winner is a male contestant (m). The prob-
abilities given the truth of m are: Pr(l|m)=0.6, Pr(j|m)=0.6, Pr(l∧j|m)=0.2. So the probability of 
each of the conjuncts goes up, yet the probability of the conjunction goes down. If we take 
any of the contradictory underdetermined cases and a place them as a conjunction, we will get 
a similar result.  
There is an amusing case in which the probability of the conjunction goes down to zero. 
Say n people come to a party each wearing a hat. We want to evaluate the probability that 
each of the people will go home with someone else's hat (we can represent this as a long 
conjunction: “the fist guest to leave takes a hat that does not belong to him and the second 
guest to leave….” Suppose we know the first k people go home with other people’s hats when 
k=n-3. Now focus on the last three people left at the party, assuming the three remaining hats 
belong to them. If we get the evidence that the third before last took the hat of the second to 
last, and the second to last took the hat of the third to last, the probability that the hypothesis 
is true drops to zero. The last guest at the party must go home with her own hat (or with no 
hat). In some respects this case is similar to the lottery cases, however, it is different in the 
sense that with every departure of a guests, the probability of the conjunction goes up while 
the actions of the second to last guest brings it down to zero (from 0.5). This case is given 
(with some changes) by Rosenkrantz (1981). 
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The conclusion, I maintain, is that (EEQ) is valid, and that both (EAD) 
and (EDIS) are not. Granted, denial of two plausible principles is more 
costly (other things being equal) than denial of one, and although denial of 
(EEQ) dissolves the raven paradox, we have seen an example - Carnap's 
example - that shows (EAD) and (EDIS) to be false, and we have a probabil-
istic and non probabilistic explanation of their failure. Moreover, probabilis-
tically, (EEQ) is easy to prove:   
Let us assume that p and q are a priori equivalent. Then p iff q and p∨¬q 
is a tautology, and thus, Pr(p) + Pr(¬q) = 1. Hence Pr(p) = 1 - Pr(¬q) = 1 - 
Pr(¬p) , so the initial probabilities of q and p are the same. Now by the same 
reasoning if e raises the probability of q it will likewise do so for p (the 
equivalence is a priori). Hence, if p and q are equivalent, then if e is evi-
dence for p, it is evidence for q. Another way to go is simply to say that if q 
follows from p its probability can be no lower than that of p, and likewise for 
p with regard to q (since p follows from q). Hence, before and after evidence 
e comes to light and is used as evidence, their probability will be the same.  
So the conclusion that (EEQ) is to be accepted and (EAD) and (EDIS) re-
jected, is quite conclusive. It is the failure of evidence to be closed under 
these, and other modes of valid deductive inference, that (as I will argue here 
and in the next chapter) explains many of the cases that trouble contempo-
rary epistemologists. Whether or not epistemic closure will survive, is an-
other matter.      
 Chapter Summary 
Before returning to Hawthorne’s arguments against knowledge openness as 
well as some other arguments, let me quickly take stock of what has been 
argued for in the preceding sections and add a few comments that will moti-
vate some of the discussion of the next chapter. First, the watch case was 
presented. I argued that propositions that follow from the knowledge that is 
gained by looking at one’s watch is not supported by the evidence that al-
lows the knowledge of what time it is. This I take to be intuitively right, but 
the argument did not rely on this intuition.204 The argument depends on the 
idea that evidence does not lower probabilities, and supposing that one did 
not know beforehand that one’s watch is showing the correct time, if it reads 
“3:00”, it does not seem possible that one will learn this from looking at 
one’s watch. (I am supposing that one does not have other watch independ-
                                                       
204 Other cases have the same structure but are less intuitive. For instance, it seems that if 
looking at one’s watch gives one evidence for the time being 3:00, it should also count in 
favor of the proposition that It is 3:00 or it is not the case that the time is not-3:00 and it 
seems like it is.  
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ent information that comes to light together with reading the watch, e.g., the 
sound of three clock-tolls.)  
One might complain that my argument was too quick since if one did not 
know this beforehand one would not know that the time is 3:00 by looking at 
one’s watch. This reply is problematical. It is hard to uphold such a require-
ment on knowledge unless one supposes that one also knows, for instance, 
that one’s ticket will be a loser before buying a ticket. It is hard to see how 
someone can know that one’s watch is accurate at a specific occasion on 
mere probabilistic grounds but not that one will lose a lottery (even though 
the probabilities can be much higher that one will lose a certain lottery). One 
might be highly justified in believing that one’s watch is accurate now, but 
this will not be changed by looking at one’s watch and gaining evidence that, 
if anything, counts against the proposition that if the watch reads “3:00”, it 
is showing the correct time. It seems inevitable, for instance, that in order to 
know the following proposition one needs evidence: If your watch reads 
“3:15,” your watch and not my watch that reads “3:00”, needs to be cor-
rected. I doubt someone would claim that such a proposition can be known 
without evidence, and yet, we have seen that the evidence for knowing that 
the time is 3:00, need not transfer to all propositions that follow from what is 
known. So even if one would be tempted to claim that the examples I used 
are known somehow antecedently without empirical evidence, we know that 
there are some propositions that follow from the known proposition and are 
not supported by the available evidence and background knowledge. This is 
because we can prove that if the evidence together with background knowl-
edge does not entail the known proposition, there are such propositions. So 
unless one would want to claim that all the unsupported propositions are 
known antecedently, I don’t see how this reply could be made to work. In 
particular I have claimed that looking at your watch and noting that it reads 
“3:00” gives you no evidence for the proposition that if your watch reads 
“3:00,” it is showing the correct time. Although this was a mere example, it 
shows that as good as your evidence is for the latter proposition, it seems 
doubtful that you can go from not knowing that it is true to knowing that it is 
true by looking at your watch. And indeed if we assume that you did not 
know it antecedently, how could you come to know it by inferring it indi-
rectly from a different proposition that is supported by your new evidence, 
namely, the new knowledge that the time is 3:00? To put it another way, 
suppose you do not know that the time is 3:00 by looking at your watch and 
noting that it shows “3:00”. It is clear now, I think, that you have no new 
evidence for the proposition that if your watch reads “3:00,” it is showing 
the correct time. But whether your evidence is good enough for knowledge 
or not is irrelevant for the case at hand. Unless you antecedently know all 
propositions that are not supported by your evidence, this suggestion will 
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only offer a reply to regarding certain cases. It will not offer a more general 
reply.205  
Second, on the basis of the probabilistic argument for the openness of 
evidence, I presented a generalized argument against knowledge closure. 
The basic idea was that since evidence is not closed, the evidence that allows 
one to know a proposition will not put one in a position to know the logical 
consequences of this new knowledge since this new evidence need not give 
one evidence for those consequences (even in cases when one is aware that 
they are consequences). I also argued, that for any proposition knowledge of 
which is based on evidence that does not raise the probability of this proposi-
tion to 1, there will be propositions that follow from this proposition that are 
not supported by the evidence. Since this has been established, I think it is 
safe to say that if knowledge depends at least sometimes on evidence (and 
perhaps in certain domains it always does), then for every body of knowl-
edge that is based on non-conclusive evidence, there will be cases that pose a 
formidable challenge for closured knowledge whether or not we can recog-
nize them as such.   
So, third, a straightforward way to respond to the openness of knowledge 
argument seems to be to either question the idea that knowledge does not 
have to have probability 1, or to question the idea that evidence is open.206 
The arguments from the logic of evidence are meant to serve as a response to 
the latter way of trying to respond to the knowledge openness argument.   
A response that I will have less to say about, is the claim that, e.g., em-
pirical knowledge does not require evidence. This suggestion seems wrong-
headed. It seems that although we do not have a good grip on all the features 
of knowledge, of evidence, and how they relate, we can feel secure that 
some domains of knowledge require evidence. But even if knowledge does 
not always require evidence in a certain domain, there is still no reason to 
think that the propositions that follow from known ones that are not sup-
ported by the available evidence are precisely those that do not require evi-
dence. Absent any reason to think that this is wrong, I think it is pretty safe 
to say that this type of defense of closure is useless. There are further sug-
gestions of how to respond to the Open Knowledge Argument that I have not 
yet dealt with. One such is that the central cases, such as the Dreske's zebra 
case, are one’s for which the probability is, in fact, raised. This last claim 
                                                       
205 Roger White (2006) advances an argument on probabilistic grounds against Mooreianism 
(or Dogmatism) similar to the one advanced here. As I understand his argument it is not di-
rected against knowledge closure and assumes, in contrast to the Underdetermination Argu-
ment, that evidence is probabilistic (an assumption that can be denied by a Mooreian). Unfor-
tunately his argument is focused on justification closure, a principle I will later argue is com-
patible with open knowledge and so it does not directly relate to the issues I discuss here.  
206 Other less obvious ways will also be considered in Chapter 5. Let me just say that I will 
not be able to consider all replies but merely those that I think might seem plausible. Ulti-
mately the argument will rely on the idea that open knowledge is the simple and elegant solu-
tion to the challenge and brings with it many theoretical benefits.    
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does not target the Open Knowledge Argument as such, but will nevertheless 
undermine much of its attraction if it turned out that central cases do not lend 
support to the open knowledge account. I will critically consider one such 
argument in the next chapter (5.1.1.1.) and will also respond to further ways 
that might be considered as a proper reply to the Open Knowledge Argu-
ment.            
These last remarks concern the overall strategy and direction of this and 
the next chapter. But it is also important to take notice of more specific is-
sues. First, given the high plausibility (or inevitability) of (UD) and (EEQ), 
(EAD) and (EDIS) must be rejected in order to avoid contradictions. We 
have also seen independent reasons for rejecting (EAD) and (EDIS) having 
to do with the logic of evidential support. Now it is easy to see that if evi-
dence is to play an important role in characterizing central features of a logic 
of knowledge, these conclusions put considerable pressure on the epistemic 
counterparts of these principles, namely (AD) (roughly, that if one knows 
that p one can know that p-or-q) and (DIS) (that if one knows that p-and-q 
one can know that q). By ‘an important role’ I mean roughly, conceptions of 
knowledge according to which if one lacks evidence for a claim, one does 
not know it. (I provide a more detailed articulation of possible roles evidence 
might play in the next chapter.) Second, although denial of (EEQ) may have 
some advantages even in relation to evidence (i.e. avoiding the ravens para-
dox), the other principles must in any case be rejected as they have definitive 
counter-examples and a clear explanation of their failure. Third, proponents 
of knowledge openness (at least those of the sort I have in mind) would be 
well motivated to deny the epistemic counterparts of the principles (EAD) 
and (EDIS) on the same grounds that give rise to the denial of closure. The 
reason to deny closure and these weaker principles as well is that evidence 
supporting a known proposition need not carry over through these modes of 
inference to the propositions inferred. One knows that there is a zebra in the 
pen even though one does not know that there is no painted mule in the pen, 
because, while one has evidence for the former proposition, one has no evi-
dence for the latter relative to a fixed body of background information. In 
fact, as I have claimed earlier, one’s evidence tells against the hypothesis 
that there is no disguised mule in the pen.  
A fourth point should be stressed in this context. I have demonstrated that 
in order to keep fundamental features of evidence one must give up other 
principles that may at first seem undeniable. For instance, it seems highly 
implausible that one can have evidence for p-and-q and yet have no evidence 
for p and no evidence for q. It is conceivable, therefore, that much of the 
current distaste with closure-denial stems from convictions about evidence 
that are in any case misguided. I will have more to say about this as well in 
the next chapter. Finally, we have seen that whether or not the relation of 
evidential support can be construed in terms of probabilities, there is good 
reason to reject the principles; (EAD), (EDIS). In both probabilistic terms – 
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that evidence does not reduce probability (EC), and non-probabilistic terms – 
that evidence cannot support both a proposition and its negation (CS), I have 
argued that these principles are invalid (and even this last principle has been 
shown not to be essential). As we will see, there is reason to suspect that the 
appeal of Hawthorne’s arguments against epistemic openness turns on the 
same feature of knowledge that, as we have seen in the case of evidence, 
give rise to principles that might seem plausible, yet must ultimately be re-
jected. To give substance to this claim, I now return in the next chapter to 
first consider Hawthorne’s argument and then consider other challenges to 
the Open Knowledge Argument.   
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Chapter 5: Open Knowledge – Costs and 
Benefits 
5.1. From Evidence to Knowledge  
To defend closure against examples advertised by its deniers, John 
Hawthorne (2004a, 2005) argues (as presented in Chapter 1.5.1) that inter-
preted in the way closure deniers would have us interpret them, these exam-
ples conflict with other, more basic and weaker epistemic principles. The 
advocate of knowledge openness, he claims, is forced to reject these highly 
compelling principles. In other words, to deny closure on the basis of these 
examples is tantamount to denying a number of weaker principles as well. 
Thus, if his arguments are cogent, Hawthorne manages to significantly raise 
the cost of knowledge openness.207  
                                                       
207 Hawthorne's argument is, of course, not the only argument against knowledge openness. 
The argument that open knowledge has unintuitive consequences is perhaps the most promi-
nent one employed among contemporary epistemologists. I do not think it to be a very con-
vincing argument, however.  
On any open knowledge account, conjunctions of the form: ‘he knows it’s a zebra, but he 
does not know it’s not a disguised mule’ which DeRose calls “abominable conjunctions,” - 
come out true (1995). Nevertheless, not all closure advocates agree that these conjunctions are 
as bad as DeRose makes them out to be.  There is much to be said about these conjunctions 
and surely I cannot address all aspects of this vexed issue here. I shall note just a few points 
oriented towards explicating the relation between this issue and evidence openness, and ex-
plain why I do not take these consequences as seriously as many epistemologist have.     
First, it is not clear that proponents of epistemic openness should even attempt to alleviate 
the unintuitive consequences of non-closure. The reason is simple. Presumably, they have at 
least one eye focused on providing a reply to skepticism. Regardless of whether their reply is 
successful or not, it should include an explanation of the force of skepticism – why the skep-
tic’s challenge is so gripping. The oddity of abominable conjunctions can be one source of 
this force. If their abominability is alleviated, this avenue for explaining the force of skepti-
cism is no longer available to the proponents of epistemic openness. There is something to be 
said, therefore, for just accepting a surface unintuitiveness involved in epistemic openness, 
particularly if – as the account of knowledge openness aims to do – it is explained by the 
underlying evidential structure.   
Second, to say that the open knowledge account is committed to abominable conjunctions 
is not quite to say that it is committed to their assertibility or believability. The fact that they 
come out true according to the theory does not mean that there are no independent constraints 
on belief and assertion that prevent them from fitting either of these categories. Pragmatic 
considerations, for one, may explain this. Thus, for example, if beliefs are rationally closed 
under logical inference, then one is not necessarily committed to first-person abominable 
conjunctions such as “I know that these are my hands, yet I do not know that I am not a hand-
less brain in a vat.” Although I don’t know that I am not a brain in a vat, since I believe it, 
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After looking closely at principles and probabilistic properties of the evi-
dence for relation in Chapter 4, we are now in a position to revisit 
Hawthorne’s arguments. The purpose of the section 4.3 was, among other 
things, to see whether those arguments raise the cost of the open knowledge 
account that is motivated by the logic of the evidence for relation. I argued in 
Chapter 1 that these arguments are in fact successful against Dretske’s and 
Nozick’s open knowledge accounts. Yet the way I have presented the argu-
ment for open evidence makes it manifest, I hope, that they do not impede 
on open knowledge that relies on open evidence. 
Hawthorne assumes in the course of his arguments that the following 
principles would be accepted, at least initially, by open knowledge advo-
cates:  
 
                                                                                                                                
there is a perfectly good pragmatic explanation for why I will not ordinarily assert the con-
junction, and why, if I were to assert it, it would appear odd. In general, all the proponent of 
epistemic openness needs is a way of explaining why forming the relevant beliefs is blocked. 
And this leads to the final comment. 
Most importantly, third, I have argued that any plausible account of evidence is commit-
ted to the truth of what we may call abominable evidence constructions. For instance, that S 
may have an item of evidence for p and for q but not for p-and-q, or have evidence for p and 
evidence for q, but not evidence for p-or-q, or evidence for p-and-q but no evidence for either 
p or evidence for q. So defenders of closure are in the same boat as their opponents when it 
comes to evidence. They too are committed to the possible truth of the unintuitive conjunction 
“I have evidence that the winner will be a local junior player but not that it will be a local 
player.” Moreover, it is the closure advocate that is committed to the truth of claim such as 
“she knows there’s no colored water in the bottle although her evidence tells against it.” 
Hence it is far from clear that the closure of knowledge liberates from costs at the level of 
intuition. Williamson, as I will argue below, is committed to justification openness, and most 
closure advocates believe that there are constraints on closure such that it is possible to know 
that one's car is in the driveway but not that it has not been stolen (e.g. since one has not 
formed a belief on the basis of proper inference). So conjunctions of the abominable type are 
a problem for more or less everyone. Moreover, the open knowledge advocate relies on evi-
dence openness to be unintuitive, if where intuitive, one could use evidence to define closed 
context sets. Thus since evidence is not intuitively open, salience of propositions that are 
known on the basis of evidence which is in fact open will provide contextual predictions of 
knowledge where evidence is absent.         
Still, you might think, better to have unintuitive consequences in one realm (i.e. evidence) 
than in two (knowledge and evidence). But if the open knowledge account is cogent these 
unintuitive results are not really distinct. The truth of unintuitive claims about knowledge 
stems directly from the truth of the analogous claims about evidence to which all are commit-
ted. But more importantly, given these undeniable features of evidence, the open knowledge 
account is better equipped to provide an explanation of the unintuitive conjunctions regarding 
knowledge. Knowledge has unintuitive consequences because evidence (on which knowledge 
is based) has unintuitive logic. Moreover, since justification can be closed on an open knowl-
edge account (see below), at least one type of unintuitive conjunction might be avoidable.   
Regarding the role of intuitions in philosophical methodology my view is that cases should 
have primacy, not principles. Since principles are valid only if they hold in all cases, I am 
suspicious of arguments that proceed solely on their surface intuitiveness. This is not to say 
that we always have a choice. We might have to start from such premises but I think we ought 
to make the best efforts in making sure that there are no further theoretical considerations at 
our disposal.         
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(AD)  Necessarily, if S knows that p and infers p∨q from p, then S knows 
that p∨q.  
(DIS)  Necessarily, if S knows that p∧q and infers q from p∧q, then S knows 
that q. 
(EQ)  Necessarily, if S knows that p and knows that q is a priori equivalent 
to p, then S knows that q. 
 
We saw that the pairs (AD)-(EQ) and (DIS)-(EQ) give the same results as 
(CP) contrary to what both Dreske and Nozick seem to have realized (though 
Nozick anticipates the equivalence of (CP) and the combination (DIS)-
(EQ)). Thus, e.g. Nozick argued inconsistently that (AD) and (EQ) are valid 
principles while denying that (CP) is. Thus, Hawthorne shows that these 
open knowledge proponents need to reevaluate their accounts and concede 
that what they took as valid principles in their theories must be denied. 
But this is not the case with open knowledge that is motivated by open 
evidence. We saw that the evidential counterparts of (AD) and (DIS), that is, 
(EAD) and (EDIS), are not valid principles, thus one who accepts that 
knowledge is open because evidence is, will deny the principles that are 
necessary for Hawthorne’s arguments. So, for instance, an open knowledge 
proponent of this variety would be well advised to admit that if one knows 
that there is a zebra in the pen, one can know by competent inference utiliz-
ing (EQ) that there is a zebra in the pen and that there is no disguised mule 
in the pen.208 But in some cases, one will not thereby be in a position to come 
to know by proper inference that there is no disguised mule in the pen. So 
although Hawthorne’s arguments are valid, what I am recommending for the 
open knowledge proponent is that she claim that they are not sound. Al-
though (EQ) is a valid principle, since (EAD) and (EDIS) are not, (AD) and 
(DIS) are not valid from an open knowledge perspective and so the costs of 
open knowledge are not expected to rise by Hawthorne’s arguments. 
I have proposed, then, in light of Hawthorne's argument against open 
knowledge a unified rationale for the rejection of epistemic closure, addition 
and distribution, namely, that evidence is not closed under these operations. 
Still it is important to note why this account does not provide a defense for 
Dreske’s and Nozick’s knowledge openness. Roughly on their accounts 
knowledge is not closed due to its underlying subjunctive structure. On the 
account proposed here, in contrast, it is not the subjunctive structure of 
knowledge to which its openness is indebted, but rather the evidential nature 
of knowledge and the logic of evidential relations. 
                                                       
208 Harman and Sherman (2004) respond to Hawthorne’s argument by denying that this is 
right. That is, they deny (EQ). I think that this is the wrong response but I cannot go into this 
issue here. Though my own reasons are slightly different, I think Hawthorne (2004b) ade-
quately addresses their concerns. 
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Having a response to Hawthorne’s arguments does not yet justify thinking 
that knowledge is open. That justification was supplied in the previous chap-
ter by the Open Knowledge Argument. It is time to examine closely its 
premises to see whether they can be questioned. The current section is aimed 
at looking more closely at the link between evidence and knowledge that the 
Open Knowledge Argument (p. 97) appeals to. After making clear what is 
needed for the Open Knowledge Argument as far as the evidence-knowledge 
link is concerned, I will employ an objection to correct a lacuna in this ar-
gument (5.1.1). I will then look briefly at a suggestion that knowledge is 
closed even though one lacks evidence for the consequences of knowledge 
since proper inference itself provides the added required justification (5.2.). I 
then consider the suggestion that gaining knowledge of a proposition 
changes the evidential situation since all knowledge can count as new evi-
dence. I conclude that this suggestion on one variant (Jeffrey Conditionaliza-
tion) does not challenge the Open Knowledge Argument (5.3.1) while using 
knowledge as evidence by Standard Conditionalization does (5.3.2). I then 
offer general reasons for why this second suggestion is problematic, and then 
more specific arguments criticizing Williamsonian epistemology that takes 
this rout in defending (multi-premise) closure (5.3.3). I conclude section 
(5.3) with some benefits the open knowledge account has and then go on to 
defend justification closure within this framework ((5.3.4) and (5.4.2), 
respectively). To make this route somewhat clearer, let me get back to the 
main features of the Open Knowledge Argument.           
  The probabilistic Open Knowledge Argument is as follows: 
  
I. Fallibilism - One can know that p even though one's total evi-
dence does not guarantee that p. That is, one can know that p 
even though the probability of p given one's total evidence is less 
than 1. [assumption]  
II. For any fallibly known proposition p  (in the sense of (I)) there is 
a proposition q that a priori follows from p such that the condi-
tional probability of q given all the available evidence is lower 
than the unconditional probability of q.  [independent proof] 
III. (EC) - If e is evidence for q then the conditional probability of q 
given e is not lower than the unconditional probability of q. [as-
sumption] 
IV. For any fallibly known proposition p, there are propositions that a 
priori follow from it which the available evidence does not sup-
port (the probability of the proposition is lowered). [I, II, III] 
V. (KE) - For all subjects S and propositions p, if S knows that p, 
then S has evidence for p. [assumption] 
VI. So,  Knowledge is open - For all subjects S and propositions p and q, 
if a proposition p is fallibly known by S to be true, there is a 
proposition q such that even if S knows that it follows from p, S 
 123 
is in no position to know q by competent inference (keeping the 
evidence fixed).  
 
We have seen a proof of (II), and (I) will be considered more closely later 
in this chapter. Regarding (III), the basic idea behind it was to argue that the 
following principles are incompatible: 
 
(EC)  For all evidence e and propositions p, if e is evidence for p, then e 




Closure of Evidence (CE): For all subjects S, evidence e and propositions 
p and q, if  
 
 (i)   S has evidence e, 
 (ii)  S knows that S has e,   
 (iii) S knows e evidentially supports p,  
 (iv) S knows that p (logically or conceptually) entails q,  
 
then, e evidentially supports q for S. 
 
It is of course possible to retain (CE) at the expense of (EC). But first, this 
must be regarded as a significant cost. It is hard to imagine a theory that 
captures a workable notion of evidence while violating (EC). Second, the 
examples I have been considering all invoke a strong intuition that, regard-
less of (EC), there is reason to doubt (CE). Although one does have evidence 
that the time is three o’clock (i.e. the watch showing “3:00”), one does not 
have evidence for the truth of: even if the watch has stopped, it is showing 
the correct time, or that if the watch shows “3:00”, it is showing the correct 
time. While one’s memory of having parked the car is evidence that the car 
is in the driveway, one does not have evidence that the car has not been sto-
len. And likewise for many other cases. (Yet, other cases do not arouse the 
same confidence.) Finally, third, to be in a position to claim that (CE) is 
valid one would need to argue either that there are no cases of underdetermi-
nation as I have described them something which follows from premise (I) 
(reminder: all that is needed is inductive underdetermination perhaps even to 
a false conclusion), or, one would have to find some problem with the (UA) 
for open evidence (p. 104).    
Moreover, we have now independent arguments and an explanation of 
what the mistake is in endorsing (CE). This explanation was given both in 
probabilistic and non-probabilistic terms. The following is another way of 
explaining what is transpiring in these cases in terms of possible worlds. 
Having evidence supporting a proposition p may be explicated as having 
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reason to believe that the actual world is one of the p-worlds. Or if you pre-
fer, that evidence for p raises the probability that the actual world is one of 
the worlds in which p is the case. Now if q (a priori) follows from p, then 
any world that is a p-world is also a q-world. So you might think that evi-
dence that the actual world is a p-world must also be evidence that the actual 
world is a q-world. But, intuitive as it may be, this last step is incorrect. If p 
implies q, then surely, a world that is a p-world is also a q-world (and this 
might also explain why knowledge closure seems so intuitive). However, 
whether the evidence supporting the claim that a world is a p-world also 
supports the claim that it is a q-world depends on the relation between the 
purported evidence and q. Specifically, it depends on whether the evidence 
raises or lowers the probability that the world is a q-world (or in other words, 
whether it counts in favor or against the world being a q-world). Now, al-
though the probability that the world is a q-world cannot be lower than the 
probability that it is a p-world, if the initial probability that the world is a q-
world is higher than the posterior probability of p, evidence that it is a p-
world might lower it. This is why, as we have seen, a proposition that in-
creases the probability of p can lower the probability of a proposition q im-
plied by p.209 This suggests that if, as urged, the idea that evidence must not 
lower the probability of the proposition which it supports is to be preserved, 
(CE) must be renounced. Evidence is not closed under known entailment.   
Now since items of knowledge that are underdetermined (or fallibly 
known) entail propositions for which there will be no evidence, or alterna-
tively, since any item of knowledge of a disputed domain210 needs evidence, 
epistemic openness is a simple and elegant upshot of the openness of evi-
dence.  
But as far as the argument goes, premise (V) (or (KE)) regardless of its 
plausibility, has not been supported by argument. The next sections fill this 
lacuna.  
5.1.1. Premise (V) of the Open Knowledge Argument 
It will be shown in this section that in a certain sense, (KE) might not serve 
the purpose of the Open Knowledge Argument, and yet a more careful and 
modest knowledge-evidence link, will.      
It may be that not all knowledge is based on evidence. A person may 
know that she intends to φ, without having any evidence (other than her very 
                                                       
209 The same explanation with minor modification can account for cases involving disjunction 
and conjunction. The explanation cannot account for cases involving equivalence, which is 
one reason to think this is the correct response to the cases above.  
210 A disputed domain of knowledge in the present context is just one for which there is 
agreement between the open knowledge proponent and the closure proponent that it is a do-
main for which there is no requirement that knowledge is based on conclusive evidence.     
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intention, perhaps).211 Perhaps one can know some things a priori having no 
empirical evidence at all, one might know that one does not have one's hand 
in a fist behind one's back without looking at it or feeling it, or one might 
have basic perceptual knowledge that is non-evidential. I don't pretend to 
have any new considerations about this complex issue. I want to focus atten-
tion on propositions knowledge of which uncontroversially depends on evi-
dence. In what follows, then, (unless I indicate otherwise explicitly) my fo-
cus will be on the type of knowledge that plausibly depends on evidence. 
Chapter 4 opened with such a case. One cannot know, it seems, that a 
watch, even if it has stopped, is showing the correct time unless one has in-
dependent evidence to that effect. In such cases, I have argued, it is some-
times the case that one has evidence allowing knowledge of a proposition p, 
which nonetheless (and taken as a whole) counts against what one knows to 
follow from p. Thus evidential closure conflicts even with the rather weak 
idea that evidence cannot decrease the probability that the proposition it 
supports is true. Given this modest assumption, the relation of evidential 
support is not closed under known implication and the argument from (UD) 
proceeds with an even weaker non-probabilistic assumption, namely, on 
(CS) (and even (CS) is not required in the last analysis - see p. 107).  
But the open knowledge argument leaves the nature of the dependence of 
knowledge on evidence unspecified. As I hope to show, the open knowledge 
advocate need not appeal to an especially strong form of dependence. The 
dependence I will appeal to on behalf of the open knowledge proponent is 
modest in both scope and strength. Its scope does not range over all justified 
belief, but rather encompasses only knowledge in a domain of dispute.212 In 
fact, I want to remain more or less neutral on the question of what kind of 
knowledge depends on evidence. I do maintain, however, that at least some 
knowledge both depends on evidence and is underdetermined by it (weakly 
underdetermined). Also, the strength of the dependence claim here is mini-
mal. Strong dependence claims that enough evidence is both necessary and 
sufficient for believed true propositions in a domain of dispute to count as 
knowledge. A milder form of dependence is the claim that evidence is only a 
necessary condition for knowledge in such a domain. While I find this posi-
                                                       
211 If evidence cannot support itself, it seems that knowledge one has of one’s intention is 
knowledge without evidence. That claim that evidence does not support itself has been chal-
lenged by Williamson (2000). Other examples suggest themselves that do not depend on this 
assumption. It seems that I know that my hand behind my back is not in a fist without evi-
dence. Perhaps here the evidence is that I lack a certain tension in my muscles. The issue 
surely deserves more inquiry.  
212 Contrast Conee and Feldman: “evidentialism is a supervenience thesis according to which 
facts about whether or not a person is justified in believing a proposition supervene on facts 
about the evidence that the person has” (2004, 1, emphasis added). The difference in scope is 
substantive for, as will become clearer below, I maintain a distinction between justified belief 
and knowledge-promoting justification. 
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tion agreeable, the argument for epistemic openness does not even require 
this much. A more modest dependence constraint is the following:  
Negative Evidence Dependence (NED): For a domain of dispute D, if an 
agent S does not know p at time to, between which time and some later time t1 
the only change in S’s evidential state is the addition of information i count-
ing as a whole (together with one's former evidence) against p, then S does 
not know p at t1.
213 
 
So long as we accept this rather weak constraint, there are good grounds 
(in light of the Open Knowledge Argument) for denying epistemic closure. 
Since evidence supporting one proposition can count against another propo-
sition entailed by it, and since knowledge is prevented when the change in 
evidential status counts against the latter proposition, there is reason to con-
clude that knowledge is not closed under known entailment.  
An example might help. Take the proposition that your car has not being 
stolen from 87
th
 and Broadway. Having parked your car a while ago (you 
don't know where in Manhattan you parked the car), presumably you don't 
know whether this proposition is true or false.  At some time, you suddenly 
remember parking the car there. Since the probability that it was stolen from 
87th and Broadway goes up, if you did not know that your car has not been 
                                                       
213 Further qualifications are needed, since one might correct one's reasoning, find a mistake, 
etc, between to and t1 and thereby come to know that p, without any new evidence. So here 
one might add that other things are equal, or that S has not reconsidered during this time 
anything with regard to p, simply treat the correction as new evidence, and so forth. Also, 
there are cases where the antecedent of the claim is satisfied, such as when one does not be-
lieve the proposition yet the additional evidence that counts against the proposition cause S to 
believe it (perhaps for the first time). I hope that the spirit of (NED) is clear enough so that I 
can use it without adding these (and perhaps other) qualifications. Thanks here to Professor 
Pagin.  
There is another kind of concern that I am ignoring. Suppose part of the evidence that is 
gained counts in favor and part of it against p. It might be the case that even though as a 
whole this new evidence counts against p, it still allows for knowledge that p. I don't know 
myself if a plausible example of this kind can be constructed, but I see no reason why this 
would be impossible. Nevertheless, since any underdetermined knowledge will have proposi-
tions that follow from the known proposition but are not supported by the evidence only one 
case where (NED) holds is needed. And, since the examples are clearly not of the type that 
would cause trouble for (NED), I will not explore this possibility further.  
To exclude cases where some of the evidence counts against p and some for it as cases 
posing an obstacle to knowledge, I interpret “additional information” as counting against p 
only if the information gained as a whole counts against p. When we view the evidence as a 
whole, I will assume that differences in the order of the receiving of information will not 
matter. To this end it might be required to instate a threshold or to be able to appeal to times 
before t0 for comparison. Again, since only one case of (NED) is needed, I will not spend time 
refining it. Here too, thanks to Professor Pagin.     
In light of these worries, then, I am not advancing (NED) as a principle but merely as a 
claim about how knowledge normally relates to evidence. To advance it as a principle one 
would have to deal not only with the worries just outlined, but also with cases where one 
moves from a Gettier case to a non-Gettier situation, or cases where fake barns are removed 
from the vicinity. Thanks here to Professor Hawthorne and Maria Lasonen-Aarnio.          
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stolen from 87th and Broadway before remembering where you parked your 
car, surely you do not know it now that you remember having parked it 
there. If anything, your memory counts against the truth of this proposition 
(i.e. it makes the possibility that the car was stolen from this location more 
likely). Nonetheless assuming memory can sometimes facilitate knowledge 
of the location of your car and that there are no defeaters in this case, you 
know that your car is on 87th and Broadway. Since you know that that the car 
is on 87th and Broadway entails that it was not stolen, closure entails - contra 
to what we have just seen - that you know this as well. So if (NED) is not 
absolutely misguided, i.e. if it does not fail in all cases214 of underdetermined 
knowledge, and if you do not know a priori all the probability lowered 
propositions that follow from your knowledge, we have found good reason 
to question the validity of closure.  
  
5.1.1.1. An Objection to the Use of (V) 
Quite surprisingly, perhaps, premise (V) – the idea (roughly) that by neces-
sity if one knows, one has evidence – is problematical if used in an argument 
concluding with open knowledge (IV). The best way to appreciate the prob-
lem is to consider an objection to (V), one that I will claim can be met by 
using (NED) in its place. The problem with premise (V) is that it will not, in 
the last analysis, serve the open knowledge proponent’s purpose.      
To see the objection consider the probabilistic argument for knowledge 
openness. It may be objected that even if all I have said is true and the evi-
dence in these cases lowers the probability of the derived propositions, in 
cases of knowledge other evidence always creeps in which raises it. E.g. the 
absence of signs indicating that the animal in the pen is a disguised mule 
raises the probability that it is not a disguised mule, given that it is more 
likely than not that if there were a disguised mule in the pen, the zoo keepers 
would tip visitors off using sign posts.215  
The objection more specifically is as follows. From the axioms of prob-
ability if follows that Pr(p|e)>Pr(p) iff Pr(¬p|¬e)>Pr(¬p). Now, since this is 
the case, the absence of evidence that does not come to light, counts against 
any given proposition if in fact this evidence has not come to light (assum-
ing, perhaps, that a subject can reflect and realize that such evidence has not 
materialized). But since any fallibly known proposition has some evidence 
that would make the proposition more likely, there is always evidence 
                                                       
214 I say “all cases,” since we have seen that for any underdetermined proposition, there are 
propositions that follow from it that are not supported by the evidence taken as a whole (p. 
98). In other words, we need not treat (NED) as a principle or necessary requirement on the 
evidence knowledge relation. Suffice it that we treat (NED) as a claim about how knowledge 
regularly relates to evidence. See previous note.     
215 This objection was raised by anonymous referee to a similar argument to the one proposed 
here in a coauthored manuscript (Sharon and Spectre, unpublished manuscript).      
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(which is constituted by this evidence not materializing) against any proposi-
tion that is fallibly known. No wonder, then, that for any fallibly known 
proposition p there are propositions that follow from it that the available 
evidence counts against. There is evidence, after all, that counts against the 
proposition p itself. Yet this in and of itself is no cause for worry, since pre-
sumably, whenever we know a proposition fallibly, the overall evidence will 
count in its favor. We can therefore rest assure that although some evidence 
will always count against a fallibly known proposition, this evidence will be 
overrun by the evidence for it, taken as a whole. What matters, then, with 
regard to knowledge is what a body of evidence counts for as a whole. 
But now a new thought might be of concern to the open knowledge pro-
ponent. In the zebra case, for example, there will always be evidence (the 
type of evidence that materializes in the form of lack of counter-evidence to 
a fallibly known proposition) that counts in favor of there not being a dis-
guised mule in the pen. For instance, as noted above, the fact that the zoo-
keepers did not put up a sign warning visitors of disguised mules, can count 
(together with background knowledge that zookeepers are usually reliable) 
in favor of the animal not being a disguised mule. But looking back at (KE) 
it is now apparent, that at least in some cases (perhaps even in all cases), for 
a derived proposition q from a known proposition p, there will be some evi-
dence counting in favor of q. Hence the conclusion that knowledge is open 
would not follow from the premises since (KE) might be true, yet one might 
always have some evidence for any proposition inferred from a known 
proposition. Contra-posed, (KE) is the claim that if one has no evidence, one 
does not know, but here, and perhaps in all cases, one does have some evi-
dence in favor of the derived proposition.  
  The open knowledge proponent needs to do more work, then, in showing 
that properly inferred propositions from fallibly known propositions could be 
unknowable relative to a fixed body of evidence. She can either try to show 
that not all derived propositions are of the kind that have some evidence in 
their favor, or alternatively she can appeal to a different principle. So I think 
the open knowledge advocate should accept that as things stand, the Open 
Knowledge Argument is not sound. Yet a closer look at the substance of 
(KE) will reveal that there is firmer ground on which to place the argument.    
This realization is what motivates the use of (NED) in place of (KE) (the 
second way in which an open knowledge proponent may respond to this 
worry). In countering this objection in light of (NED) what has to be done is 
to show that the evidence gained as a whole counts, in the relevant cases, 
against the proposition that is entailed by the known proposition. So in the 
zebra case, if we call the absence of warning signs etc ¬e*, what the open 
knowledge proponent needs to show is that e counts in favor of DM more 
than ¬e* counts against it. Specifically, the evidence as a whole, including 
the visual appearance of a zebra looking animal needs to lower the probabil-
ity of ¬DM more than ¬e* raises it.  
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I will soon return to just such an argument, but first allow me to note that 
the objection hardly seems applicable to all the examples we have seen (this 
was the first way an open knowledge advocate may respond to the objec-
tion). Consider, for instance, of the watch216 or the stolen car cases. Although 
with relation to the watch case the point was formal, intuitively, it is hard to 
think of convincing cases where evidence can play the same role as ¬e* does 
in the zebra case. Similarly with regard to the car case.   
Moreover, there is always a way to formulate the deduced proposition so 
as to either eliminate the possibility of such evidence as ¬e* (“the animal in 
the pen was deviously swapped for a disguised mule to intentionally deceive 
visitors”) or to include one’s total evidence and generate the same argument 
I presented above with relation to the watch case (p. 93). The idea is that 
when the known proposition is p and the added (or total) evidence that al-
lows one to know it is e, the directive is to infer ¬(e∧¬p) from p. If one does 
not have evidence for this claim beforehand, one will not have it after receiv-
ing e. From the fallibilism assumption (I), the subject will count as knowing 
p on the basis of e even though the conditional probability of p given e is 
less than 1. One way to understand this assumption is that one does not know 
before e becomes one’s total evidence, that e∧¬p is false. But the probability 
of the falsity of e∧¬p only decreases when e is one's (new) total evidence, 
hence, one has no evidence for it. More generally, any proposition that both 
makes the total evidence more probable (even if it does not strictly entail it) 
and is incompatible with the known proposition, will have the effect of gain-
ing support from the evidence that allows knowledge of p such that its nega-
tion can be inferred. These propositions will have the features that the objec-
tion neglects.  
To make things yet more explicit I will argue that even if I stick with the 
original inferred proposition (that the animal in the pen is not a disguised 
mule), the kind of evidence such as ¬e* does not pose a problem for the 
Open Knowledge Argument. To pose a problem it is not enough that when-
ever it is known that an animal is a zebra there will be some evidence that 
raises the probability that it is not a disguised mule. As noted, ¬e* must raise 
the probability that the animal is not a disguised mule more than the fact that 
it looks like a zebra lowers it. If this is not the case, then (NED) is applicable 
and the Open Knowledge Argument is reinstated.  
Let us consider what the objection requires. Take a concrete case. In visit-
ing a zoo one can see animals of various types. When looking at an animal 
from a far, it could be any one of the 1,000,000 animals populating zoos (call 
them o). Suppose there are 10,000 zebra-looking animals (=zl), out of which 
                                                       
216 In the watch case we have a proof that generalizes as follows: For all propositions p and all 
evidence e,  Pr(e→p|e)<Pr(e→p). [assuming that Pr(¬p∧e)>0]. Since (e→p) follows from p, 
we know that as a whole the evidence e (which will include that fact that ¬e* has not materi-
alized). Hence, as a whole, the evidence will count against previously unknown propositions 
that follow from one's knowledge.      
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10 are disguised mules (=dm). Nine of the disguised mules have some indi-
cation of the disguise (=idm) that would tip off zoo visitors that there is a 
disguised mule present, and one of them is an unmarked perfectly disguised 
mule (=dm*). The rest of the zebra looking animals are zebras (=z). Upon 
having the visual input caused in the right way by having a zebra present, 
one will presumably know that it is a zebra. Now let us see whether the fact 
that there is no sign indicating a disguised mule (=¬e*) raises the probability 
that the animal is not a disguised mule more than the appearance of a zebra 
(=a) lowers it. Assuming that it does, the following must be true (I am treat-
ing the predicates, e.g. z, dm, as propositions in the formulation such that 




that is, that the appearance of a zebra-looking animal and the absence of 
indications that there is a disguised mule in the pen, the conditional probabil-
ity, is lower than the unconditional probability of the presence of a disguised 
mule. However, the left side equals (slightly more than) 10-4. The right side 
equals: 10/106=10-5. Starting with plausible numerical assignments, then, no 
problem arises for the original analysis of the example. Seeing a zebra look-
ing animal in the zoo raises the probability that the animal is a disguised 
mule more than it lowers it even though the zookeepers are more likely than 
not to put signs up that warn visitors of the disguise (9 out of 10 times, in 
this example).   
But the above is not specific to this assignment. In fact for the conditions 
to be as the objection would require, it must be the case that the frequency of 
disguised mules is greater than the total number of objects divided by the 
number of zebra-looking animals. This can be argued for in the following 
way: The objection requires that the probability that the animal is a disguised 
mule given the evidence be greater than its probability before the evidence is 
in. The initial probability that something is a disguised mule is just the num-
ber of disguised mules divided by the number of animals (DM/O).217 The 
probability given the evidence is the delimited DM*/(ZL-(DM-DM*)). Since 
in normal cases the total number of animals (O) is much greater than that of 
the zebra-looking animals, for DM*/(ZL-(DM-DM*)) to be less than DM/O, 
the number of disguised mules times the number of zebra looking animals 
must be very large as well (given that DM*=1, roughly, ZL×DM>O).218 
                                                       
217 Underlined capital letters stand for the number of objects the propositions are about. 
218 Even though this is very implausible, it is even less plausible if we drop two assumptions. 
First, that we restrict ourselves to animals and not objects more generally. Second, we have 
assumed that the number of well-disguised mules (DM*) is 1. If the number is greater than 
one, circumstances must be even more extreme for the objection to apply. To see this, con-
sider a more general version of the objection. The objection depends on the following claim 
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Such circumstances are not impossible, but are certainly quite unusual and 
they do not look like the kind of conditions necessarily imposed on knowl-
edge. In normal cases, the presence of peripheral information of the sort 
invoked in the objection can raise the probability of the entailed proposition, 
but usually this will be by a minute degree, a degree that will not overcome 
the decrease in probability brought about by the whole of the evidence sup-
porting the known proposition. Moreover, the open knowledge proponent 
needs only one possible case where the decrease of probability will not in 
fact be overcome by the peripheral evidence that the objection appeals to.219 
Actually, there is one way of taking the case and turning it in favor of the 
Open Knowledge Argument. Let us restrict the case so that a visitor to the 
zoo knows that the zoo has a designated “zebra” pen, but doesn’t know that 
it contains a zebra (z), nor does he know that it does not contain a disguised 
mule (whether with some indication (idm) or without (dm*)). Let the num-
ber of zebra-looking animals be N. Before coming to the pen area the prob-
ability of dm* is DM*/N, but after looking to see what the animal and the 
surroundings look like – seeing that the animal looks like a zebra and finding 
no indication of it being otherwise – the probability of dm* rises. It is now 
DM*/(N-IDM). That is, the probability of there being a hoax or some other 
form of deception rises.  
One could claim in reaction that I have changed the proposition from the 
animal is not a painted mule, to something else (perhaps: the animal is not a 
mule deceivingly made to appear as a zebra). This is true, but first, the pre-
vious argument makes it implausible that the probability of painted mules 
given the total evidence drops. And second, the proposition, i.e. the animal 
in the pen is not a cleverly disguised mule, can be taken without too much of 
                                                                                                                                
Pr(¬dm|e∧a) > Pr(¬dm) (where e is the total evidence including the absence of telling marks). 
This claim is true iff Pr(e∧a|¬dm) > Pr(e∧a|dm). Proof:  
 
1.   Pr(¬dm|e∧a) > Pr(¬dm)  
2. Pr(e∧a|¬dm)Pr(¬dm)/(Pr(e∧a|¬dm)Pr(¬dm)+Pr(e∧a|dm)Pr(dm))>Pr(¬dm)   [Bayes' 
Theorem and law of total probability] 
3.  Pr(e∧a|¬dm) > Pr(e∧a|¬dm)Pr(¬dm)+Pr(e∧a|dm)Pr(dm) 
4.  1> Pr(¬dm)+Pr(e∧a|dm)Pr(dm)/ Pr(e∧a|¬dm) 
5.  Pr(dm) > Pr(e∧a|dm)Pr(dm)/ Pr(e∧a|¬dm) [1 – Pr(¬A) = Pr(A)]    
6.  Pr(e∧a|¬dm) > Pr(e∧a|dm)   [÷Pr(dm), ×Pr(e∧a|¬dm)] 
which by the definition of conditional probability translates into:  
Using the notation I adopted, the proportions need to be as follows: Z/O-DM>DM*/DM iff 
DM*×(O-DM)<DM×Z. As I have claimed, although this is not impossible, it’s unlikely and 
doesn’t seem to accord with any intuitive knowledge criterion. In fact it seems to me to be a 
reductio of any conception of knowledge that entails that these proportions must hold a pri-
ori. Perhaps one would be inclined to restrict the calculation in some way. Yet to impose 
further restrictions is simply to claim that the visual evidence always has a very limited im-
pact for the purposes of identifying and thereby coming to know what object one is facing.  
219 Here too thanks to Professor Pagin.  
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an interpretive stretch, to include absence of indications to the contrary. But 
even waving this claim about the original proposition, we now have the pre-
sent case as a new and more properly founded example supporting the objec-
tives of the Open Knowledge Argument.  
So to conclude the rejoinder to the objection, I think both paths of re-
sponding to the objection are viable. First, not all propositions will have 
some evidence counting in their favor. Second, in place of (KE) one can 
safely use (NED) for the purposes of the Open Knowledge Argument. I have 
found no reason to think that anything special is going on in cases of knowl-
edge that is not the case with respect to evidence more generally. In fact, 
given the proof that any underdetermined proposition has propositions that 
follow from it that are not supported by the evidence, all that might be 
shown by the objection is that some cases are not of this type. Yet even the 
case that might seem to accord with the objection, namely, the zebra case, 
has been found to rely on some very peculiar initial conditions. Thus, given 
the openness of evidential support and given the plausible assumption that 
some knowledge is underdetermined (i.e. falls within the domain of dispute) 
and accords with (NED), the Open Knowledge Argument seems to be on 
firm ground.  
 
5.1.1.2. An Objection to (NED)220 
What is knowledge? What is evidence? What is the relation between knowl-
edge and evidence? These are notoriously difficult questions and I cannot 
pretend to be able to answer them. But nevertheless we can gain a better 
understanding of these notions. One way to approach this, the way in which I 
have so far tried to guide the discussion, is by exploring the principles that 
we think pertain to these notions and see if there is cohesion among them. 
Often they come into conflict and we need to make a choice. The attempt 
here will be to make a choice between which three unappealing claims about 
knowledge and evidence we need to accept given some basic assumptions. 
These are the more basic assumptions (I repeat them here for convenience):  
Fallibilism: One can know that p even though one’s evidence (including 
background information) does not conclusively establish that p. This means 
that one can know that p even though one’s epistemic posterior probability 
for p (however we want to spell it out) is less than 1.  
(EC): The evidence for relation is constrained by the probabilistic evidence 
criteria: If evidence e supports the truth of proposition p, then the conditional 
probability of p given e – Pr(p|e) – is greater than or at least equal to the un-
conditional probability of p – Pr(p).  
 
                                                       
220 The discussion of this section reacts to problems for (NED) posed by Professor Pagin.  
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Now the problem is that these assumptions lead to the following choice 
between three claims none of which seem like anything we would want a 
theory to include (at least initially). We need, then, to accept one of the fol-
lowing:   
a One can know a proposition even though relative to a time where one did not 
know this proposition to be true, one merely gains information that lowers its 
probability. Given (EC) this means that one could come to know that p with-
out additional evidence.  
b The order in which one receives evidence makes a crucial difference. Two 
subjects may have the same prior probability same evidence and same poste-
rior probability yet one knows and one does not.  
c  subject may lose knowledge even though all she has is slightly undermining 
evidence (and her posterior probability surpasses any plausible knowledge 
threshold).  
 
To see that we are faced with this choice (given our more basic assump-
tions) let us consider the following stories.  
 
Case A: Subject A goes to a zoo not knowing whether there is a zebra, a dis-
guised mule or whether there is neither, at the zoo. He has a high prior (sub-
jective) probability given his background information that there is no pained 
mule at the zoo he is visiting, yet he does not know it. At the entrance, he is 
warned by the ticket salesperson that there will be no disguised mule in the 
pen unless there are signs posted at the pen that say that there is a painted 
mule in the pen. A proceeds and sees what looks to him to be a zebra at the 
pen. A believes it is a zebra, but since he cannot tell a zebra from a painted 
mule his total evidence slightly lowers the probability of there not being a 
disguised mule in the pen. Had he not been tipped-off at the entrance, his 
evidence would further lower the (rational) probability of there not being a 
disguised mule at the pen.     
Case B: Subject B has the same prior probability that A had for there not be-
ing a disguised mule in the pen upon coming into the zoo. She is not tipped-
off by the ticket salesperson as A was, but goes directly to the pen. She too 
has her probability for there not being a mule in the pen lowered since she 
(like A) cannot tell a disguised mule from a zebra. Her probability for there 
not being a disguised mule in the pen is lower than A’s at the pen. However, 
when she leaves the zoo, the salesperson tells her what he told A. Thus her 
probability for there not being a painted mule in the pen goes up and she 
leaves the zoo with the same posterior probability as A. 
 
We will soon compare these cases to two further stories, but for now let 
us see how a-c relate to the A and B stories. To make things a bit easier let 
us adopt the conventions above: Z = the animal in the pen is a zebra; DM = 
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the animal in the pen is a mule made to look to a non expert as a zebra; ZL = 
the animal in the pen looks like a zebra (or a well disguised mule); SP = the 
salesperson says that if there is no indication at the pen, there are no painted 
mules there; NS = there are no signs at the pen indicating that there is a dis-
guised mule in the pen. PrA(•) = A’s rational probability function. (Similarly 
with B when the subscript changed). 
We have four times: before going to the zoo = t, going into the zoo = t’, at 
the pen = t’’, and coming out = t’’’. These will be indicated along side the 
probability function thus: PrA,t’(•) (= the unconditional probability of •, for A, 
at t’).    
Before going into the zoo A and B have the same probability for ¬DM, 
PrA,t(¬DM)= PrB,t(¬DM), and they persist with this same probability at the 
zoo entrance (at t’). Whether A’s conditional probability function changes at 
t’, is an issue we will come back to. For now, let’s assume not. At the pen, 




The reason for this is that PrA,B(¬DM|LZ) = PrA,B(¬DM|LZ∧SP) <  
PrA,B(¬DM|LZ∧SP∧NS) < PrA,B(¬DM). The lack of signs, let us suppose, 
without the information from the salesperson adds nothing to the evidence 
that supports the hypothesis that there is a mule in the pen, i.e. the animal 
looking like a zebra or a disguised mule. We are assuming that the evidence 
for the presence of a disguised mule, the evidence of an animal which looks 
like a disguised mule, counts more for there being a disguised mule in the 
pen than the lack of signs and the salespersons warning combined. If this 
sounds wrong we can imagine that A and B merely hear some of what the 
salesperson says such that they are not very confident that he actually was 
asserting SP. He may have been saying that this is how it is in other zoos. 
Also, in accordance with standard Bayesian scruples, at t’’’ A and B adjust 
their probabilities to their evidence and since they started off with the same 
priors, we have; PrA,B(¬DM|LZ∧SP∧NS) = PrA,B,t’’’(¬DM). 
Now given (EC), A has no new evidence at the pen for ¬PM, or any time 
after and hence if we want to reject a, we will have to agree that he does not 
come to know ¬DM. However, B does have evidence since PrB,t’’(¬DM)< 
PrB,t’’’(¬DM) (even though it is lower than PrB,t(¬DM)). Hence, if we reject a, 
A does not know that ¬DM when leaving the zoo while B might.  
It seems doubtful that A can come to know ¬DM by probability lowering 
evidence. But if A does not, neither should B and yet, B does have evidence 
when coming out of the zoo relative to the low probability B assigns to ¬DM 
at the pen. But if we let B know that ¬DM, we will have to accept option b. 
The order of the evidence will matter for what one comes to know.  
The best solution, it seems, is to reject both a and b by quantifying over 
times in the following way (which is a version of (NED)):  
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For all times t’ and t’’, if S does not know that p at t’, and gains no evidence 
in favor of the truth of p between t’ and (the later) t’’, then S does not know 
that p at t’’. 
 
Regarding our two subjects A and B, the principle seems to give the right 
result. Both A and B came into the zoo without knowing that ¬DM and they 
leave without knowing that ¬DM simply since the evidence raised the prob-
ability of DM more than it lowered it. It seems right, then, to say that both 
did not know that ¬DM before going to the zoo (as we have assumed), and 
they leave the zoo ignorant. There posterior and prior probabilities are the 
same and the order of receiving the evidence should not matter. Since they 
both have a greater posterior probability relative to the time they were igno-
rant for DM, they leave the zoo not knowing that ¬DM.   
But this response will leave us with the odd position of having to accept c. 
The following problem regarding a third case C will bring this out more 
clearly. 
Case C: Subject C goes into the same zoo with the same probability as A and 
B had for ¬DM. Our trusty salesperson tells C that there is no disguised mule 
in the pen. This raises the probability of ¬DM and we can suppose that in this 
way (even though C has no idea about how reliable our salesperson is) he 
comes to know that ¬DM. We are to imagine that this item of evidence is not 
so strong since seeing the zebra in the pen, S’s evidence of a disguised mule 
decreases the probability of ¬DM in such a way that it equals A and B’s 
probability to what is was leaving the zoo (at t’’’).  
 
If we accept b, we must say that C does not know that there is no painted 
mule in the pen. The reason for this is that if someone were to first go to the 
pen, the probability would first be lowered and then raised upon hearing that 
there is no mule in the pen to a level beneath the one this person came into 
the zoo with. Since we have already seen that this cannot be a case of 
knowledge (if we want to accept a and b), we must say that C loses her 
knowledge upon receiving slight disconfirming evidence. Hence, we must 
accept c.  
I think that this is the best option. Yet I admit that as it stands it seems to 
be an unattractive one. Before trying to explain why I take this to be the best 
option, let us see how the probability changes for C with regard to ¬DM.  
 
PrC,t’’’(¬DM) = PrC,t’’(¬DM) < PrA,B,C,t(¬DM) < PrC,t’(¬DM)  
 
We are also imagining that KB,t’(¬DM) and the implausible result is that 
¬KC,t’’(¬DM) and  ¬KC,t’’’(¬DM). In words this is a case where upon coming 
to the zoo C does not know that there is no disguised mule in the pen, then 
learns that that this is the case, and upon receiving slight disconfirming evi-
dence, C loses this knowledge.  
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There are two things we need to think of at this point. One is whether we 
actually need to agree that KC,t’(¬DM). The second thing to think of is 
whether assuming that KC,t’(¬DM), there is no way to make ¬KC,t’’(¬DM) 
more plausible. I think that whether or not we answer the first question af-
firmatively the answer to the second question is affirmative.  
Why is it doubtful that KC,t’(¬DM)? After all, PrC,t’(¬DM) is greater than 
the initial probability, and if there is a knowledge threshold, it surely sur-
passes it (it must be the case that PrA,B,C,t(¬DM) is above the threshold if it is 
a constant threshold for both Z and ¬DM). One reason to doubt that C has 
this knowledge is that the evidence would not be strong enough for a subject 
who had a lower prior probability. Imagine we had a subject D who has a 
lower prior probability for ¬DM than C has. The question we need to ask 
ourselves is whether the evidence C got in favor of ¬PM is good enough for 
D to know that ¬PM. If it is, the next question we need to ask ourselves is 
whether the evidence ZL that lowered the probability of ¬DM for C beneath 
what it was prior to entering the zoo, would do the same for subject D. If the 
conditional probabilities are objective (as most subjective Bayesians be-
lieve),221 then it must. And this means that the counter evidence is not as 
weak as we have imagined, or alternatively it would not be strong enough 
for D to come to know ¬PM. Ether way, we have a motivation for saying 
that C loses her knowledge at t’’ (which is the answer to our second query).  
It might seem, however, that this suggestion is ad hoc. The point is, how-
ever, more general and when looked at carefully makes good sense. Let us 
imagine that the evidence C receives would have been good enough for D 
(with a lower prior probability for ¬DM) to know ¬DM. No matter how 
strong this evidence is, we know that the counter evidence is stronger since 
C’s probability for ¬DM upon leaving the zoo is lower (if this case is to pose 
any problem in the first place) than it was when C came into the zoo. This is 
the case no matter how strong or weak we believe C’s evidence must be for 
him to know that ¬DM. Since the counter evidence will be stronger than 
whatever we require, accepting c no longer seems objectionable. First, if we 
think that in order to know a proposition one needs to have strong evidence, 
the kind of evidence that would raise the probability of a proposition for a 
large range of prior probabilities222, we need not accept a, b or c. The reason 
                                                       
221 Here what I mean is that the likelihoods are objective, i.e. the probability of the hypothesis 
given the evidence. The likelihood divided by the prior probability of the evidence is the 
Bayesian multiplier that will determine whether the evidence counts for or against a proposi-
tion. On an objective reading of the likelihoods any body of evidence will count in favor or 
against the same propositions for any pair of subjects. For more see Appendix specifically 
with regard to convergence theorems.   
222 We cannot just allow any range of prior probabilities. Say we do, say for instance, that we 
require that the body of evidence will raise the probability no matter how low for a proposi-
tion p, such that in order to know that p one needs to have evidence that raises the probability 
of p. Since for any given body of evidence no matter how strong we can find a prior probabil-
ity distribution that will be so low that one who had this probability would rationally remain 
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for this is that in order to lose knowledge it is now clear that the counter 
evidence must be strong as well. Second, we will need to accept c if we are 
relaxed with respect to how strong evidence needs to be in order for a sub-
ject to come to know that a proposition is true. Nevertheless this will not be 
an intuitively bad position since accepting that slight disconfirming evidence 
can destroy knowledge will be explained by the fact that this knowledge was 
acquired through even slighter evidence. In other words, a subject may loose 
knowledge by slight disconfirming evidence (above the knowledge threshold 
if there is one) if the way in which she came to this knowledge is by evi-
dence that is even slighter. 
The moral of our stories is that all subjects came in and went out of the 
zoo ignorant of whether or not there is a disguised mule in the zoo. Our 
problem with subject C was only an apparent problem. C’s prior probably 
upon coming to the zoo is greater than the one he walked out of the zoo with, 
hence the counter evidence he got is stronger than whatever evidence for 
¬DM he encountered. If so, it seems plausible to say that he came in and 
went out not knowing that ¬DM and we can leave the question of whether 
the weak evidence ever allowed him to know it for further investigation. The 
apparent problems we encountered are the result of the possibility of divid-
ing a body of evidence in different ways such that they either first count 
against and then for a proposition or vice-versa. The principles we accepted 
seem resilient to these kinds of worries upon closer scrutiny. 
5.2. Knowledge Without Evidence 
There are other more general ways that a proponent of knowledge closure 
may respond to the Open Knowledge Argument. One suggestion is that 
knowledge need not depend on evidence. The propositions that closure en-
tails to be known are properly deduced from true, justified premises, and 
proper deduction is as good a justification as anyone can ask for. Alterna-
tively one may accept the dependence of knowledge on evidence, yet claim 
that the original known proposition (p) is one’s evidence.223 Since p implies 
                                                                                                                                
extremely confident that it is false, being free with the prior probabilities does not seem like a 
good idea. Nevertheless this objection to allowing prior probabilities to be as one chooses 
neglects the fact that evidence is not the only necessary requirement on knowledge. We might 
want to place rational confidence at some threshold as such a requirement.     
223 These two replies are not meant to be exhaustive, but seem to be the most pertinent. I 
cannot hope to survey all the possible reactions. I do claim however, that there are only two 
general possibilities here. Either reject (NED) or claim that somehow it is not violated. This 
first option seems highly questionable though this rejection might be given an explanation I 
am unaware of. The second seems to be more promising and can take on several forms only 
some of which have been mentioned. Hawthorne and Cohen raise a similar worry not with 
regard to evidence in general, but to cases of easy knowledge that turn, as I claimed in the 
main text, on failure of evidence closure. Hawthorne mentions three replies: 1. A priori con-
tingent knowledge is much more widespread than we may have imagined. 2. Skepticism. 3. 
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q, if p is one’s evidence one can know q. I will consider these options in 
turn, the first in this section and the second in the next.    
Knowledge indeed requires justification and a priori inference from a sin-
gle premise is usually good justification for belief. Thus it may be claimed 
that a belief that is the fruit of valid inference from knowledge is justified, 
and is hence known, or that it puts the subject in a position to know. As it is 
undisputed that knowledge of the sort under consideration is normally based 
on evidence, however, proponents of this view must provide the source of 
justification in cases where evidence is lacking. Specifically, since the justi-
ficatory force of inference depends on the justification of the premises, when 
this justification does not transmit (as is the case in the examples above) 
something else must be proposed as the source of justification for the con-
clusion. 
Here it may be suggested that the dependence claim (NED) should be de-
nied.224 The inference from p is itself a source of epistemic justification for q, 
                                                                                                                                
When a proposition is known, its probability is raised to 1, with a widespread violation of van 
Fraasen’s Reflection Principle (Hawthorne 2004a: 75-7).  
I will have more to say some of these options in the main text, it might be worth, however 
to say something that directly addresses them here. (1), I think, would quite surprising if it 
turned out to be true. Even if it could be argued for with respect to cases of easy knowledge, it 
is hard to see how in every instance of failure of evidential closure a priori knowledge would 
be present. It seems highly unlikely that one can have a priori knowledge that cars are not 
frequently stolen or that zoos do not paint mules to look like zebras, etc. Even granting a 
priori contingent knowledge of this sort, or denying that it must be strictly a priori (perhaps it 
is inductive background knowledge), will not relieve any worries since this knowledge per-
tains to types not to tokens. In other words, although I may know that cars are not often sto-
len, I certainly don’t know by memory that my car today has not been stolen. If memory and 
induction won’t deliver such knowledge, claiming to know a priori that my car is not stolen 
seems questionable. (I mention in passing that there seems to be a regress argument if it is 
claimed that one will (always?) know by induction that one’s car today has not been stolen 
and the like.) For the suggestion to work, an explanation should be offered for the systematic 
divorce between evidence and knowledge it entails. In other words, the challenge for those 
who want to advance such a position is to spell it out not only with respect to certain cases but 
systematically. This is because we have a proof that generalizes underdetermined knowledge 
to unsupported propositions that can be validly inferred from knowledge. Even if such an 
account can be spelled out I doubt it will be as simple as the present open knowledge sugges-
tion. Moreover, it might not solve all the problems for knowledge outlined in Chapters 2 and 
3 as well as the other challenges for closed knowledge.  
The second response (2) can be improved on by rejection of closure. Thus one can be 
skeptical of knowledge (or even the possibility of knowledge) of problematic propositions 
such as that one is not a brain in a vat, that there are mind-independent objects etc., without 
denying knowledge of ordinary empirical truths.  
(3) might be the best track for the defender of closure to take, but this entails, as I will ar-
gue below 5.3, several unfavorable consequences. The most developed account along these 
lines is Williamson’s.   
Cohen’s favored reaction (at least at one time it was) is to claim that closure is inapplica-
ble to what Sosa has called “animal knowledge.” It seems that even Cohen is not entirely 
happy with this response, perhaps because he recognizes that it amounts to a significant limi-
tation of epistemic closure (see Cohen 2002).  
224 In effect, denial of dependence is not enough for this line of argument to work. Since 
closure must be valid in all cases, what must be accepted is the claim that in all cases where 
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not supervening on the evidential justification for p.225 But this seems to con-
flict with the general worry: Presumably the inferred proposition, q, is not 
known prior to its inference from p. So prior to acquiring evidence e, q was 
not known. But since e reduces the probability of q, it is apparently not in 
virtue of the acquisition of e that q came to be known. If e does not provide 
the justification enabling knowledge of q, its role must be in facilitating the 
inference. Indeed without e, p would not have been known and q could not 
have been inferred from knowledge. But if e cannot justify q and if the infer-
ence from knowledge of q is not available without e, how can the inference 
provide more than e itself could?  
In effect what I am recommending on behalf of the open knowledge ac-
count, is a step back to enable a view of the entire process of acquiring (the 
contested) knowledge that q. From this vantage point, knowledge that q 
seems doubtful: Taking the entire process of (would be) knowledge that q, if 
it cannot be gained directly through e, finding a proposition that can be 
known from e and then inferring q from that proposition, would seems in 
general to be a highly questionable method for gaining new knowledge. Yet 
this in effect is what this suggestion amounts to. From the perspective of the 
whole process, this seems like not much better than wishful thinking. And 
this, I think, is what (NED) brings out quite straightforwardly; aside from 
peculiar cases, a proposition cannot come to be known on the basis of evi-
dence that lowers its probability, directly or indirectly. The present proposal 
amounts to claim that probability-lowering evidence is a general method for 
knowledge gain.          
In addition, even if knowledge does not rely on evidence, counter-
evidence to one’s belief can defeat the belief’s status as knowledge. Now in 
the examples we have been considering it is not just that one lacks evidence 
for the q-propositions, rather one actually has evidence against them (on the 
assumption that decrease of probability constitutes counter-evidence). In the 
aforementioned cases one has evidence that tells against the truth of the q-
propositions. Given the evidence, that is, the probability of q decreases. Thus 
the divorce from evidence required of this defender of epistemic closure is 
more radical than merely claiming that knowledge can be had without evi-
dence. Knowledge, she must claim, can be had in the face of counter-
evidence. If epistemic closure is to hold, that is, not only is the connection 
between knowledge and possession of evidence to be severed, it must also be 
                                                                                                                                
the evidence does not entail the known proposition, one can know that a proposition is true 
even though relative to a prior situation in which the proposition was not known to be true, 
one has gained probability lowering evidence, which allow one to now know. Thus, if one 
does not deny (NED) one would need to claim that although knowledge of the derived propo-
sition is not possible on the basis of the evidence itself, it can be known by inferring it from a 
proposition that can be known under the circumstances. But then, one might ask, where does 
the added knowledge-promoting feature come from? It cannot come from the inference for the 
inference in itself does not provide added justification.   
225 Something along these lines is hinted at by Silins (2005). 
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admitted that a belief formed in contrast to one’s evidence can bring about 
new knowledge. This I take to be a highly implausible concession. Even if 
(NED) fails sometimes, it seems highly questionable that it might fail sys-
tematically for all propositions that are underdetermined by the evidence that 
allows them to qualify as knowledge. The inference itself then, is not and 
cannot be considered to be an independent source of knowledge.    
 
5.3. Knowledge as Evidence 
A defender of epistemic closure may try a different direction. Perhaps she 
might suggest that the inference of q from p is itself part of the evidence. 
Since the truth of p clearly speaks in favor of the truth of q (in fact, it guar-
antees it), if p is now known, it can itself be the new evidence (or reason) on 
the basis of which q becomes known. (NED) then is not violated since its 
antecedent is not satisfied. Between t0 and t1 evidence is gained, namely, p 
itself.226  
As far as the open knowledge proponent is concerned, there is one way of 
understanding this suggestion that leaves everything as it was. Another way, 
however, would be a proper reply to the open knowledge argument, but has 
undesirable implications. I will argue that this later suggestion would entail 
sufficiently far-reaching consequences, consequences that do not compare 
well with the open knowledge account. In other words, if this suggestion is 
right, we need to change the basic notions of probability and its relation to 
chance; we need to give up on justification closure; to surrender to the Lot-
tery and Preface paradoxes; to give up on the significance for knowledge of 
the distinction between multi- and single premise closure227 (accept conjunc-
tion introduction closure); we need to surrender fallible (or underdetermined) 
knowledge. This means that in saving knowledge closure we are in effect 
committing ourselves theoretical changes regarding knowledge and the no-
tions that are related to it that are worse than the change we need to make 
when accepting knowledge openness. Moreover, we would lose an elegant 
                                                       
226 In light of the discussion in Chapter 1, there is one way of taking the current reply to the 
open knowledge argument as a serious worry, another way is a non starter. Nearly everyone 
agrees that modus ponens is a valid form of inference. If p is true, and if p then q is true, then 
q is true. This claim has little to do with the current suggestion. The question is whether q is 
known, not whether it is true. From the factivity of knowledge and modus ponens, we can 
derive the truth of q but not its being known. The difference is between the following forms of 
inference: K(p→q)⊢Kp→Kq, and Kp∧(Kp→Kq)⊢Kq. The open knowledge advocate is not 
contesting the second, but only the first form of inference. 
227 This consequence – that single-premise as well as multi-premise closure for knowledge 
would hold – will rightly be viewed more as an advantage than a shortcoming. It preserves the 
role of inference regarding knowledge generally (See Chapter 1). Nevertheless it spells trou-
ble for the role of inference with regard to justification and has bad consequences of its own 
some of which will be the focus of section 5.3.3.    
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and simple way of coping with many problems that open knowledge can 
account for.  
The next section spells out the unproblematic way (from the standpoint of 
open knowledge) of accepting the idea that p itself is what supports q. The 
sections that follow will focus on the problems that the second way brings 
with it through a criticism of the most worked out theory of this variety, 
namely, Timothy Williamson’s safety account of knowledge.   
Before proceeding I want to make it perfectly clear that I do not claim to 
have in my possession an a priori argument for the conclusion that any other 
way to respond to the open knowledge argument besides those I have pro-
posed is moribund. Rather the claim boils down to the following: One, there 
is a formidable challenge to open knowledge from open evidence. Two, 
there is a simple way to solve the challenge which is to accept the conclusion 
of the argument that knowledge is open. Three, besides the other ways to 
respond to the open knowledge argument which I have yet to consider in 
detail, the prospects of such a reply are not particularly rosy. That is, a denial 
of (NED) across the board is not at all appealing – there is no reason to think 
that probability-lowering evidence is a general way to obtain new knowl-
edge. Although there are proper replies that do not conflict with (NED) such 
as the claim that propositions that follow from p and are not supported by the 
evidence are known a priori, such replies on the face of it do not seem plau-
sible. It does not seem like we can know a priori all the consequences that 
have their probability lowered by the evidence that supports our knowl-
edge.228 If we are to be fallibilistsm and accept (NED) the Open Knowledge 
Argument poses a formidable challenge to closed knowledge. Fourth, the 
denial of closure gives us a simple and elegant reply to many central episte-
mological problems some of which were the topic of Chapters 2 and 3. Fifth, 
we have an explanation of the oddness of denial of closure due to the odd-
ness of the underlying structure of the evidence for relation. In other words, 
we are going to have to get used to the claim that relative to a fixed body of 
evidence we have evidence for p-and-q but have no evidence for p and no 
new evidence for q. Sixth, this explanation can meet the most forceful argu-
ments against open knowledge advanced by John Hawthorne. In sum, we 
have a simple and elegant way to avoid many of our problems in epistemol-
ogy including the open knowledge argument and an explanation of why this 
track has been avoided despite its advantages. These considerations do not 
entail knowledge openness but they do give us excellent reason to reconsider 
our view of knowledge closure.  
With this clarification in place, let us proceed and consider an entirely dif-
ferent type of reply to the argument. That is, the idea that whenever knowl-
edge is gained it changes the evidential situation.   
                                                       
228 I am not sure in any case that this reply is consistent with fallibilism.  
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5.3.1. Knowledge as Evidence: Jeffrey Conditionalization  
Richard Jeffrey (1964, 1965) proposed a rule of rational belief update that 
yields Bayesian Conditionalization229 as a special case. The basic idea is to 
exploit the law of total probability in order to reflect rational changes in an 
evidential state that do not amount to propositions becoming certain. The 
standard rule is that a subject who becomes certain of the truth a proposition 
e, should change her credence regarding the truth of proposition p in accor-
dance with the laws of probability in the following way:  
 
Standard Conditionalization: Pr1(p) = Pr1(p|e) = Pr0(p|e) 
   
where “Pr0” is a rational credence function before the evidence becomes 
known for certain and “Pr1” after. It is understood that certain knowledge 
means that Pr1(e)=1. But the Standard Conditionalization rule does not say 
what a rational agent should do if the probability of e changes so that the 
agent is now more confident but still less than certain that e is true. Here 
Jeffrey advises taking advantage of the law of total probability, to get a more 
general form of conditionalization regularly labeled “Jeffrey Conditioning:”  
  
Jeffrey Conditionalization: Pr1(p) = Pr1(e)Pr0(p|e) + Pr1(¬e)Pr0(p|¬e) 
 
Trivially, Jeffrey Conditionalization is the same as Standard Bayesian 
Conditionalization if Pr1(e)=1 since the posterior probability of ¬e is 0.230  
Now the claim we are interested in exploring is whether when we take 
known propositions as our new evidence we can avoid the open knowledge 
argument. That is, whether (NED) can be respected by a closed knowledge 
infallibilist view. Let us first take the simplest case where we derive p from p 
itself. This is a case that the open knowledge proponent will not question. 
The question, however, is whether the probability of p will be promoted if 
we allow any known proposition to serve as evidence. The answer is nega-
tive, the new probability of p will not be promoted to 1 when we Jeffrey 
conditionalize on p itself, rather, it will remain the same:  
 
Pr1(p) = Pr1(p)Pr0(p|p) + Pr1(¬p)Pr0(p|¬p) = Pr1(p)Pr0(p|p) 
 
                                                       
229 For more on Bayesian Conditionalization, see Appendix.  
230 When we are dealing with a change in a partition (a set of exclusive and exhaustive propo-
sitions) of evidence statements (not merely the simple case of e and ¬e), we take the sum of 
multiplied probabilities to determine the posterior probability of p:  
Pr1(p)=∑1≤i≤nPr
1(ei)Pr
0(p|ei), where {e1,e2...en}  is the partition.  
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This result is a good one, since we do not want the fact that an inference 
was made to change the rational credence for a proposition nor the evidential 
situation itself.  
Now suppose you get to know that p with some evidence e at time t-1 but 
that e underdetermines p, so that Pr(p|e)<1. We can assume that e is now 
known for certain at t-1 so that Pr0(p)=Pr-1(p|e)=Pr0(p|e)>>Pr-1(p). Suppose 
you also know that q follows from p and you properly infer q from p, 
thereby basing your new posterior probability for q on the basis of this infer-
ence. What is the new probability of q given your new evidence (where your 
new evidence includes p now that it has come to be known)? Using Jeffrey 
Conditionalization the answer is:  
  
Pr1(q) = Pr1(p)Pr0(q|p) + Pr1(¬p)Pr0(q|¬p)  
 
Since Pr0(q|p)=1, the posterior probability of q will be at least as high as 
Pr1(p). So now the question we should consider is whether Pr0(q) is greater, 
equal, or smaller, than Pr1(¬p)Pr0(q|¬p)+Pr1(p). If it is smaller or equal, 
nothing substantial will have changed relative to the cases we have previ-
ously considered. So all that is needed for the purposes of an open knowl-
edge proponent is a case where we can show that in fact there is a reduction 
of posterior probability of q relative to the prior probability of q (between t0 
and t1).  
To see that this is possible let us take the following case: q will be 
¬(e∧¬p) which follows from what we will Jeffrey Conditionalize on which 




Since the old and new probability of e is 1 (Pr1,0(e)=1), the value of 
Pr1(e∧p) equals that of Pr1(p) (which we assume is less than one). So we 
need to determine what the value of Pr0(¬(e∧¬p)|¬(e∧p))Pr1(¬(e∧p)) is.  
The value of Pr1(¬(e∧p)), is that of Pr1(¬e∨¬p) = Pr1(¬e) + Pr1(¬p) –
Pr1(¬e∧¬p) = Pr1(¬p) (the other probabilities are zero). Next we need to see 
what the value of Pr0(¬(e∧¬p)|¬(e∧p)) is. By the conditional probability 
definition we have  
 
 
and so the new probability of ¬(e∧¬p)=Pr1(p) which we know is not greater 
than Pr0(¬(e∧¬p).231    
                                                       
231 And relative to the time before Pr(e)=1, Pr–1(¬(e∧¬p))>Pr0(¬(e∧¬p))=Pr1(¬(e∧¬p)).  
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Now if the prior probability of q is greater than its posterior probability, 
(the probability of q has now gone down) the same kind of reasoning regard-
ing the other cases will be applicable. Assuming that is, that we accept the 
idea that evidence cannot lower the probability of that for which it counts as 
proper evidence and that probabilities are raised for knowledge (at least in 
some cases) to less than 1. Even though, as suggested, all knowledge counts 
as evidence, there is good reason to conclude that since evidence is not 
closed, neither is knowledge. The non-probabilistic arguments of 4.3 con-
firm this result. 
Besides having a way to answer the objection, the open knowledge advo-
cate can agree that all knowledge is evidence. Whether this is desirable or 
not is another question that I will not try to evaluate here. An open knowl-
edge advocate can accept the idea that knowledge is evidence in a way that 
seems to be less objectionable than on the closed knowledge view. The main 
benefit is that on her view a known proposition p will not be promoted to 
probability 1 if it was not 1 at an earlier time conditional on the evidence that 
allows it to be known (Pr(p|e)).232 In sum, it seems that the objection to the 
Open Knowledge Argument turns out to be compatible with open knowledge 
and poses no threat without further assumptions.  
5.3.2. Knowledge as Evidence: Standard Conditionalization   
Open knowledge has been shown to be compatible with taking all of one’s 
knowledge as one’s evidence. (NED) is not violated since gaining knowl-
edge would mean gaining new evidence, but if this evidence does not entail 
the new knowledge, there are propositions that follow from what one knows 
that are not known. This also accords with the intuition that, e.g. looking at 
the airport monitor allows one to know that one’s flight will stop in Chicago 
but not that one’s plane will not crash on its way (to take one of Cohen’s 
example).  
But there is another way to understand the idea that all knowledge is evi-
dence that would counter the Open Knowledge Argument. This way of un-
derstanding the thesis that all knowledge is evidence would allow one to take 
                                                                                                                                
There is a debate which I am not going to try to enter regarding the question of order matters 
for Jeffrey Conditionalization. This would appear to be the case if we take both e and p in the 
above example to be simultaneous. Here I merely need one case which also seems to yield the 
right result. The same kind of result can be obtained with regard to Carnap's example taking f 
to be probability 1. See 4.3.4.    
232 I note in passing that besides the suggestion of preserving E=K with Jeffrey conditionali-
zaion and taking E to be a subset of what is known such as what is known for certain (which 
is a departure from E=K), we might also take E to be what is known directly. I.e. whatever is 
known not on the basis of inferring it from knowledge is evidence. Besides the conception of 
evidence as certainty, the other suggestions are in need of further development. But the basic 
idea in all of these suggestions is simply to respect the claim that there is no added evidence 
that somehow creeps in when a proposition is known on the basis of evidence that does not 
entail the (newly) known proposition.       
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the evidence as supporting itself. Such a conception of evidence has been 
developed by Timothy Williamson. Before directly considering the relevant 
parts of his account, let us first see what the suggestion is more generally.    
 The general idea is that when one properly infers from one's knowledge, 
new knowledge is gained not by having the evidence now apply to the in-
ferred proposition, but rather, by treating the known proposition itself as 
one’s new evidence. Closure of knowledge has to do with the extension of 
evidence to bear on new proposition only in the sense that knowledge is 
evidence (or rather that all that is known can count as evidence with prob-
ability 1).233  
 This idea conflicts with the way we usually think about evidential sup-
port. Consider the following illustration of evidential dialogue. 
  
A: Don’t worry, the car was not stolen. 
B: How do you know? 
A: Well, it’s in the driveway. 
B: And how do you know that? 
A: ‘cause I parked it there. 
 
This dialogue brings out two aspects of what I will later consider more 
closely, namely, the backtracking structure of evidential support. The first is 
that we usually do not regard a belief as knowledge-promoting evidence 
unless it is itself evidentially supported (or supported by other knowledge-
promoting justification). The second is that the degree to which a belief can 
support other beliefs is limited by the evidence or justification it enjoys. 
Thus a common continuation of the dialogue above would probably be: 
B:  But that doesn’t prove anything. If it were stolen, you’d still remember hav-
ing parked it there. In fact, cars are usually stolen from where they had been 
parked. 
 
One’s belief that the car is in the driveway can only be evidence that it 
was not stolen if it was itself supported by evidence suggesting that the car 
was not stolen. Similarly, a belief (or fact) that an animal is a zebra cannot 
support the belief that it is not a disguised mule unless it is itself supported 
by evidence that tells against the animal being a disguised mule. Thus, sup-
pose A’s final response was not memory of parking the car, but rather  
                                                       
233 Here we need to separate two general cases. On the one hand, we have the idea that p is 
what allows q to be known when p becomes known, and yet p is not to be considered as evi-
dence. This suggestion conflicts with (NED). On the other hand, the suggestion we are con-
sidering now is that p once it becomes known is part of the subject’s evidence. This sugges-
tion can either take the form of Jeffery Conditionalization or Standard Conditinalization. On 
the former we have just seen that it poses no new threat to the Open Knowledge Argument. 
On Standard Conditionalization knowledge must have probability 1. Hence, we are dealing 
with a view that seems to conflict with fallibilism.   
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A:  I’m looking at it. 
 
If A’s evidence for believing that the car is in the driveway is of this sort, 
the doubt about his knowledge that it hasn’t been stolen does not arise. The 
reason is obvious – perception of the car in the driveway supports the belief 
that it has not been stolen (so that this belief, other things being equal, will 
count as knowledge). 
But the idea that p or the inference from p is itself evidence is not only 
unintuitive. If any item of knowledge is allowed to be knowledge-promoting 
evidence, non-conclusively based knowledge will provide conclusive 
knowledge. This is because if e is non-conclusive evidence enabling knowl-
edge of p, which implies q, and p can be taken as evidence for q, then q is 
conclusively supported by the evidence (in probabilistic terms, given p, the 
probability of q is 1 assuming that the suggestion is that one is allowed to 
used Standard Conditionalization). Still worse, all knowledge, it may seem, 
will in effect be based on conclusive evidence. The reason is that once p is 
known – no matter what evidence it is based on – if it can serve as one’s 
evidence in accordance with Standard Conditionalization, it will support 
itself conclusively. In other words, knowing that p, I can, according to the 
present proposal, use p as my evidence, and since I know that p entails p, I 
can generate for myself conclusive evidence for p. By trivial logical opera-
tions, my evidence has been upgraded from fallible/underdetermining evi-
dence that has probability less than 1, to conclusive evidence with probabil-
ity 1. Inductively based knowledge turns instantaneously into knowledge 
having the full support of deduction. Moreover, since I have such conclusive 
evidence in support of p, I can infer (and therefore know) that any evidence 
counter to p is misleading. In simple terms, then, allowing all known propo-
sitions to serve as evidence makes knowledge (potentially) infallible. Hence 
the open knowledge argument is in reality being countered by rejecting the 
first premise, i.e. by demanding that all knowledge have probability 1.   
Adherents of this proposal must admit that a proposition can provide evi-
dential support only to the degree to which it is itself supported. Thus if 
one’s evidence for p raises the probability that p is true to 0.8, for instance, p 
can provide evidential support no stronger than that. The transmitted eviden-
tial support will not be conclusive, but at most 0.8 probability.234 This is the 
suggestion of using Jeffrey Conditionalization, which is similar to using the 
evidence itself and will not serve the purposes of the proponent of closed 
knowledge. So in order for the suggestion to work it must be explained why 
in the context of knowledge the proposed theory of evidence will have a 
different result. If p cannot support q to a degree greater than that to which it 
                                                       
234 There are other dimensions to evidential support besides the probability it confers. I will 
return to this issue below.    
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is supported, it seems, this must be because its epistemic credibility, so to 
speak, relies on the support p itself enjoys, i.e. the support supplied by e. A 
piece of evidence can support an item of belief only to the degree to which it 
is itself supported. Thus, while it can warrant (or even require) belief in q, p 
offers no epistemic support of its own, but merely the support it received 
from the evidence on which it is based. In other words, forming a belief on 
the basis of one’s evidence does not improve one’s evidential situation. The 
reason must be because whatever evidential support one has is determined 
by the evidence one relies on. For otherwise it should be possible for q to 
enjoy a degree of support exceeding that provided by e to p (contra (NED)).  
This is made evident by the following observation. Suppose, given the 
rate of breakdowns of your watch, the fact that it shows “3:00” raises the 
probability that it is three o’clock to 0.95. Suppose further that this is enough 
to know that it is three o’clock and that this knowledge is now your evidence 
that your watch is accurate. Presumably, since this latter proposition is im-
plied by what you know, its probability is no less than 0.95. Now if you re-
ceive some weak evidence suggesting that the watch is malfunctioning, we 
do not say that since you have stronger evidence that the watch is accurate 
you know this. We do not weigh the new evidence against p. The belief that 
the watch is accurate, it seems, requires some independent support in order 
to count as knowledge. The support of p does not aid q if the latter is not 
itself supported by the evidence. But now if, as we have seen is possible, e 
provides no support for q (and assuming there’s no other source of evi-
dence), how can the mere presence of p improve one’s overall evidential 
situation?  
A further implausible consequence of the proposal that one’s knowledge 
can serve as evidence is unreasonable inflation of knowledge. Having re-
ceived the final confirmation for my invitation to speak at the departmental 
colloquium next fall, I know I will be presenting a paper in the fall collo-
quium. This knowledge, as the present proposal would have it, can support 
my belief that I will not suffer a fatal disease and die between now and next 
fall. This belief will in turn justify the belief that I will not collect on my life 
insurance this year. Do I now have evidence warranting cancellation of my 
insurance policy?235 Given that I know I will live to present this paper next 
fall (and given that I have to put more work into it if I am to make a success-
ful presentation), would I be warranted in canceling my physical checkup 
scheduled for next week? If you think something funny is happening in such 
cases due to the high stakes involved in them, think of the watch case. See-
ing that the watch shows “3:00” I presumably know that it is three o’clock. It 
follows from this that if my watch is showing “3:00” it is showing the cor-
rect time. It follows further that if your watch shows something other than 
                                                       
235 This example is inspired by Hawthorne (2004a).   
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“3:00” your watch is mistaken. Would it be reasonable of me to instruct you 
to reset your watch if it does not read “3:00”?  
A further problem is that probability 1 seems to rob one of the resources 
to distinguish between logical operations on evidence that are guaranteed to 
preserve a given high level of probability and conjunction introduction that 
does not. If knowledge always has probability 1, then there is no probabilis-
tic difference between knowing each conjunct and knowing a conjunction 
(no matter how many conjuncts we are speaking of). Even those who accept 
closure, may think that surely this cannot be the case. But if closure has to do 
solely with the propositions and not also with the evidential status of the 
propositions, there is no difference between knowledge of a conjunct and a 
conjunction even in domains that are uncontroversially underdetermined.236     
These remarks may seem not to do full justice to Williamson's account, an 
account that proceeds in the direction outlined above. But the remarks are 
not meant to target his account. They are directed as criticism towards those 
who might be tempted to take the known proposition p itself as one’s evi-
dence without making the necessary adjustments. E.g, redefining epistemic 
probabilities, taking prior probabilities to be objective, rejecting fallibilism, 
etcetera. Following an exchange between Williamson and John Hawthorne 
and Maria Lasonen-Aarnio, I will argue that although Williamson makes 
these and other adjustments, other problems should concern the proponent of 
closed knowledge.237  
 
5.3.3. Knowledge as Evidence: Williamson's Account 
Williamson’s account of knowledge in terms of safely true belief is arguably 
one of the most notable accounts of contemporary epistemology. Due to its 
scope and ingenuity it rightfully occupies the center of attention in much of 
the current writing in the field. I present here three central problems for Wil-
liamson’s safe-belief theory of knowledge as well as several more minor 
problems. The central issues are: One, its relation to lottery propositions; 
two, its relation to Lewis’s Principal Principle and to practical deliberation; 
and three, the difficulty of rescuing a substantive sense of fallibilism within 
the framework this theory provides.238 Although I see no plausible way for 
Williamson to solve these problems while remaining loyal to the fundamen-
tals of his account, I do not argue that such solutions are impossible. My 
                                                       
236 Perhaps one would rather claim that p is not evidence but is a reason for believing that q. 
Thus when p becomes known it can be the basis for knowledge but is not evidence. This 
suggestion is in violation with (NED) and so does not address the challenge. Moreover it is 
very close to a blind insistence on closed knowledge.  
237 John Hawthorn and Maria Lasonen Aarnio, (forthcoming) and Williamson (forthcoming) 
238 This last issue is more of a problem for those who want to adopt Williamson’s theory and 
be fallibilists.  
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argument is therefore best understood as specifying a set of challenges for 
Williamsonian epistemology. These challenges might make the open knowl-
edge account seem more attractive. Below after consideration of William-
son’s account I will specify some of the benefits that open knowledge en-
joys. 
 
5.3.3.1. Safety and Chance 
According to the safety theory of knowledge, one knows what one believes 
on the basis of a safely true belief. Since the notion of “safely true belief” is 
closed under known implication, so is knowledge. Focusing on this feature 
of the view, Hawthorne and Lasonen-Aarnio have recently made an impor-
tant contribution to a more comprehensive understanding of the weakness of 
Williamson’s theory of knowledge. After presenting their insightful argu-
ment, I will assess Williamson’s response and show that it leads to further 
complications. The following is a formulation of the argument adapted from 
Williamson’s response to their argument:239 
 
(1) p1, …, pn are true propositions about the future. 
(2) Each of p1, …, pn has the same high chance (objective probability) 
less than 1. 
(3) p1, …, pn are probabilistically independent of each other (in the 
sense of chance). 
(4) The chance of p1 ∧…∧ pn is low [for large n]. [from 2, 3, 4] 
(5) One believes p1 ∧…∧ pn on the basis of competent deduction from 
the premises p1, …, pn. 
(6) One knows each of p1, …, pn. 
(7) If one believes a conclusion on the basis of competent deduction 
from a set of premises one knows, one knows the conclusion (‘multi-
premise closure’). 
(8) One knows something only if it has a high chance. 
 
Treat (1)-(5) as an uncontentious description of the example. Relative to 
them, (6)-(8) form an inconsistent triad: 
 
(9) One knows p1∧…∧ pn.  [from 5, 6, 7] 
(10) One does not know p1∧…∧pn.  [from 4, 8] 
 
Which of (6)-(8) should we give up? 
One might be tempted to reject (7) in light of this argument. The reason 
for this rejection – similar to the one considered in Chapter 1 – might be the 
                                                       
239 The problem has obvious affinities with the preface paradox and relates to issues discussed 
in Chapter 1. For the original statement of the paradox see Makinson (1965).  
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connection between knowledge and justification. Take any threshold of justi-
fication and assume that in order to be justified in believing a proposition p, 
one’s total evidence e must sufficiently support p. Trivially, one might be 
(evidentially) justified in believing q since Pr(q|e)>r (where r is the threshold 
of justification in the unit interval which falls short of 1) and might also be 
justified in believing q’, since it too surpasses the threshold: Pr(q’|e)>r. And 
yet, as the case may be, Pr(q’∧q|e)<r. Hence one will not be justified in be-
lieving what one competently deduces from one’s (evidentially) justified 
beliefs (by conjunction introduction) on one’s total evidence. If one thinks, 
that what holds for justification holds for knowledge, the natural reaction to 
the (1)-(10) contradiction, is to reject (7). 
A similar situation holds for single-premise closure240 even within the 
Williamsonian framework. Suppose one is evidentially justified in believing 
p (where one’s total evidence is e). So Pr(p|e) is very high but less than 1. 
Suppose further that evidence is so construed (as it is on Williamson’s ac-
count) that necessarily if e is evidence for p then Pr(p|e)>Pr(p) (where 
“Pr(•)” is one’s initial rational epistemic probability function). Now, for 
every proposition p, if Pr(p|e)<1, there is a proposition q that follows from p 
such that Pr(q|e)<Pr(q).241 Hence, although (by assumption) one has evidence 
for p, one will not have evidence for a proposition that logically follows 
from it (assuming Williamson’s own principle of evidence). What this means 
is that justification is not closed under competent single premise deductions, 
or alternatively, one might say that one is justified without having evi-
dence.242,243  
                                                       
240 The distinction between multi- and single-premise closure is considered thoroughly with 
respect to knowledge in (Hawthorne, 2004a, 33). He there explores (without endorsing) the 
possibility of holding on to the single-premise version while discarding the multi-premise 
closure principle (e.g. Hawthorne, 2004, 141, 146, 154, 185-6). Maria Lasonen-Aarnio ques-
tions this distinction with regard to knowledge in her (2008) paper. See Chapter 1.3 for a 
related discussion.     
241 See proof in p. 98.  
242 Since on Williamson's view knowledge=evidence, in cases where one does not know but is 
merely justified, one can lack evidence. For instance, suppose my plane will stop in Chicago 
and although I believe it and have good evidence (it says so on the airport monitor) I fail to 
know it since my belief is not safe (suppose some of the monitors were not accurate though 
the one I was looking at is). I now have no evidence that my plane will not crash on the way 
to Chicago, but if I do know this by the very same evidence (supposing the monitors were all 
accurate), I do count on Williamson's view as knowing that my plane will not crash on the 
way to Chicago. So here, it seems to me, we get the worst result. Justification is not closed, 
and I know things that on the face of it seem that I couldn't. Airport monitors are not as in-
formative in telling us which plane has better prospects for reaching its destination.           
243 Perhaps Williamson would claim that justification is a matter of passing a threshold on 
one's total evidence. This would allow him to say that in a sense single premise justification 
closure is preserved on his account. Some of his comments suggest this, e.g. (2000: 9). Yet 
given his view this would mean that prior probabilities confer justification, which he denies 
since he claims that the regress of justification ends with knowledge (Ibid). Or even worse, 
one can be justified in believing p even though one's total evidence relative to the prior (epis-
temic) probability of p, counts as a whole against p. Moreover, one is still not justified by 
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One might have (evidential) justification for believing that p, deduce q 
competently from p while retaining one’s justified belief in p, and have no 
evidential justification for believing that q. This will follow for every view 
that does not commit itself to the claim that justification is a matter purely of 
passing a threshold, that is, that it demands that justification be tied to having 
evidence for a given proposition (as Williamson’s account is). Moreover, as 
I have argued, this will follow even if one does not view evidence as prob-
abilistic. Williamson’s view, then, is already committed to a substantive 
separation of evidential justification from knowledge. 
Notice that the proposition p that is justified but not known cannot be 
taken as evidence on Williamson’s account without a breach of the E=K 
principle. Interestingly, many theorists take justification closure to be just as 
intuitive as knowledge closure. For them, Williamson’s account will seem 
problematical. The principle of single-premise justification closure is re-
garded by epistemologists to be of great prominence.244 Gettier, in his fa-
mous article, proceeds on the assumption that justification closure is a settled 
issue. In the Williamsonian framework, Gettier's claim is simply false:  
[F]or any proposition P, if S is justified in believing P, and P entails Q, and S 
deduces Q from P and accepts Q as a result of this deduction, then S is justi-
fied in believing Q. (Gettier, 1963)  
 
Yet, for Williamson there is a crucial difference between what holds for 
one’s justified beliefs and what holds for knowledge. On his account, one’s 
evidence is one’s total knowledge (E=K), so the probability of anything that 
is known is 1 (since p is included in K – which is all that is known, for any 
known p, Pr(p|E)=Pr(p|K)=Pr(p|p∧K)=1 by Standard Conditionalization). 
The principles governing justification, therefore, diverge significantly from 
the principles governing knowledge. No matter how many conjuncts one 
adds in the process of competent deduction, as long as the premises are 
                                                                                                                                
making a deduction from a justified premise (something that is made explicit in some formu-
lations of closure), but rather by one's other knowledge. It is clear, then, that Williamson does 
not preserve much of the features that appeal to many epistemologists. (See main text below 
for some examples.) 
Williamson claims that only evidence can justify belief: “One's evidence justifies belief in 
the hypothesis if and only if one's knowledge justifies that belief.” (2000: 9). Similar remarks 
are made can be found in many places in the book, e.g.  (2000: 208). At the very least, then, 
Williamson needs to modify his view in order preserve single premise justification closure. 
Multi premise justification closure seems to be a bad idea regardless of whether it is intuitive 
or not. I suppose that Williamson would not want to defend it.       
244 Besides Gettier (see quote in the main text) and many other theorist, Feldman (1995: 487) 
thinks that “the idea that no version of this principle is true strikes me, and many other phi-
losophers, as one of the least plausible ideas to come down the philosophical pike in recent 
years”. Many commentators who express sympathy with Feldman's attitude miss the fact that 
Feldman's claim is about justification closure not knowledge closure (though I suspect that he 
would make similar remarks about knowledge closure).     
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known, the conclusion will have the same probability as the premises, 
namely, 1.      
The epistemic probability that Williamson appeals to is by no means 
standard. Particularly, prior probabilities receive a characterization in 
Knowledge and its Limits, which can, and I think, should, be questioned.245 
But assuming for present purposes that there is no problem with the prior 
probabilities as such, a consequence of Williamson’s knowledge-evidence 
equation is that since the posterior probability of what is known is 1, the 
natural reaction to the puzzle – rejection of (7) – is not available. Even theo-
rists who do not question single premise knowledge closure would be 
tempted to reject multi premise closure. But, since adding known conjuncts 
by a deductive process of conjunction introduction will on Williamson’s 
account always leave the probability of the conjunction unscathed (Pr(q)=1), 
this natural line of reasoning is blocked for Williamson. For him, multi and 
single premise knowledge closure stand or fall together.246  
So, rather than a rejection of (7), it is not surprising to find that William-
son rejects (8). This he achieves by drawing a distinction between objective 
chance (henceforth simply chance) and epistemic probability (henceforth 
probability), a distinction with quite far reaching consequences. The claim is 
that although the chance that the conjunction is true is low and is known to 
be low, its probability can be high, in fact in many cases it will be 1. 
 
5.3.3.2. Lottery Propositions 
How does Williamson justify the sharp distinction between chance and 
probability? After all, it was more or less obvious to Lewis that there is a 
tight connection between the two. Lewis famously claimed that objective 
chances should equal one’s (admissibly) informed credence (Lewis, 1986, 
1999). 
Williamson’s idea (which Hawthorne and Lasonen-Aarnio anticipate) is 
that what is objectively probable, i.e. chance, need not be represented in 
terms of close possible worlds. Suppose we represent a future event’s chance 
of taking place as a branching out of a common history. When there is a 
chance that a different event, such as a quantum blip, will occur, no matter 
how slim the chance, there is a branch extending into the future from the 
                                                       
245 There seem to me to be problems with Williamson’s characterization of prior (epistemic) 
probabilities.  He states that “P” (which is similar to a prior probability function in Bayesian 
terms) “measures something like the intrinsic plausibility of hypotheses prior to investigation” 
(2000: 113) which can vary, he says, with context. My suspicion is that there are problems 
with assuming that a context will determine one unique value for each hypotheses, though 
Williamson says that “P(p) is taken to be defined for all propositions.” (Ibid). This, as well as 
related issues (such as the Bertrand Paradox), are beyond the scope of this manuscript.    
246 For reasons discussed in Chapter 1, Williamson’s theory has the advantage of being sup-
ported by the intuition that one can expand one’s knowledge to the conclusion of a modus 
ponens inference if one knows the premises.  
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actual world to one in which the other event is the one that takes place. Sup-
pose we represent the conjunction p1∧…∧pn in the above argument as a fi-
nite set of worlds with a common history up to a time t. We then have many 
branches extending from the set to worlds in which one of the events does 
not take place. Williamson’s idea is that branching worlds are not necessar-
ily close, where closeness is the central notion he employs to cash out his 
safety requirement (Williamson, 2000: 123-130). Since on his account S 
knows that q only if S’s true belief is safe from error, there can be no close 
worlds in which q does not hold no matter how slim the chance is of q being 
true. This is how radical a divorce Williamson is advocating between objec-
tive chance and epistemic probabilities.247   
Yet this account of knowledge runs into trouble with knowledge of what 
we can call quantum conjunctions (that is, conjunctions of very many propo-
sitions each having very high chance of being true adding up to low chance 
for the conjunction). To see how, let us slightly modify a case presented by 
Hawthorne and Lasonen-Aarnio: 
Consider extremely unlikely and bizarre ‘quantum’ events such as the event 
that a marble I drop tunnels through the whole house and lands on the ground 
underneath, leaving the matter it penetrates intact. (Hawthorne and Lasonen-
Aarnio, forthcoming: 3) 
 
Let us imagine that we have a large yet finite amount of such marbles, say 
all currently existing marbles, such that on our best theories, it is quite likely 
(though not definite) that if all are dropped, at least one of them will in fact 
tunnel through the floor. As a matter of contingent fact, when we do drop 
them in some future time none of the marbles tunnel. Now the question I 
want to ask is this: Given that one has all and only information pertaining to 
the chances, does one know that none of the marbles will tunnel? On our 
assumption that as a matter of fact none of the marbles will tunnel, does one 
know that: 
  
(11)  For all existing marbles x, if x is dropped to the floor, x will not 
tunnel?   
 
Whether he denies knowledge of (11) or allows such knowledge, Wil-
liamson’s theory, it seems, is in trouble. I will begin with the option of deny-
ing knowledge of (11). In Williamsonian terms, if it is not known this must 
be due to the fact that the basis for knowing (11) is not adequately safe. This 
                                                       
247 To what extent can known chance and probability diverge? Can the known chance be 0 
while the known probability is 1? As this question quickly gets entangled with issues that 
would take me far afield, I will leave it as an open question for further deliberation. My guess 
is that on Williamson’s view knowledge that p is compatible with p having 0 chance of being 
true but whether there is a way to extend this to knowledge of the chances is a complicated 
questions.  
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would mean that if we represent (11) as a long conjunction of propositions 
about dropped marbles tunneling, there is at least one conjunct that is not 
safely believed. But which? There is no forthcoming answer. It seems im-
plausible that one would not know (11) on the basis of reasoning that every 
marble has extremely high chances of not tunneling (and assuming that all 
will in fact not tunnel). Moreover, it is apparently false that there is some 
marble about which the belief that it will not tunnel is not safe.248 Neverthe-
less, Williamson might use this reasoning in the opposite direction conclud-
ing that some of the beliefs are not safe since the belief in the conjunction is 
not safe. The unsafe beliefs are determined by modal reality.249    
But there are further difficulties with denying knowledge of (11). If (11) 
is, under the circumstances, unknown, then, it would seem, so must be (12): 
 
(12)  If this marble is dropped, it will not tunnel through the floor. 
 
Assuming that we know a particular marble M will be dropped over a 
floor, does one know that the following is true?  
 
(13)  If M is dropped over this floor, M will not tunnel. 
     
To avoid skepticism about future contingents Williamson must allow 
knowledge of (13). But if (11)-(12) are not known, it seems hard to explain 
how (13) could be.250,251  
                                                       
248 If conjunctions of the form of (5) and (9) are known, it seems that (11) should be too, by 
the same sort of reasoning. Suppose we lay out the marbles and form a belief regarding each 
one (that it will not tunnel) and then add them up into a long conjunction from which (11) 
trivially follows.  
249 Thanks here to Professor Pagin for noting this possible reply on behalf of Williamson.  
250 I wish to note in this context (but the point has already been made generally) that there is a 
difference between cases of perception or memory on the one-hand and knowledge of future 
contingents and knowledge by induction on the other. The former cases can be accounted for 
by an appeal to a form of epistemic externalism: if the evidence for there being a table in the 
room is seeing the table in the room, there is no mystery. When the fact itself is part of the 
evidence it is clear why the probability is 1. (Whether this form of externalism is plausible or 
defensible is another matter.) In the case of future contingents and induction it is clear that the 
evidence does not entail the known proposition. Supposing, as Williamson does, that one 
theory can account for these two sorts of knowledge is, perhaps, the heart of the matter. The 
epistemic situation seems to be very different when a proposition is entailed by the evidence 
(in which case assigning it epistemic probability 1 makes sense) and when it is not. There 
would be no need for induction if the inductive base entailed the known proposition. The idea 
that Pr(p|e)=1 when e does not entail p, to which Williamson is committed, seems to be the 
root of many of the problems. There is room then for bifurcating one’s account of knowledge 
so that mathematical, perceptual, and knowledge based on memory is explained Williamson’s 
way, while inductive knowledge, for example, is explained by a more Lewisian conception of 
evidence. Some remarks by Williamson suggest that he may be more sympathetic to this kind 
of bifurcation than one might think:  
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But even disregarding the behavior of epistemic probabilities, it seems 
very strange to set the knowledge anywhere between (11) and (13), either all 
are knowable, or none are. Knowing none is skepticism, knowing all means 
knowing lottery propositions. Or so I will subsequently argue. 
I have argued that preserving knowledge of claims about particulars while 
denying knowledge of related general claims is problematic on Williamson’s 
view. A similar problem arises for knowledge by induction. I observe several 
ravens and note that they all appear black. Suppose that all ravens are black, 
and that at some point in the sequence of observations I come to know this 
(assuming induction is a method for obtaining knowledge). So at this point, I 
go from having a true belief that the probability of all ravens being black, 
such that Pr(For all x (if x is a raven, x is black))<1, to a state in which the 
probability equals 1. Although the transition from non-knowledge to knowl-
edge is problematic on any account (Hume famously questions the very jus-
tification of induction), there is an added mystery in Williamson’s account. 
My prior conditional probability of all ravens being black on my observing 
the next raven to be black was less than 1 and it increased steadily as evi-
dence came in. But what is it about actually observing the next raven that 
changes the probabilities of all ravens being black to 1? Presumably, all 
theories of inductive knowledge will have to explain how before observing 
the raven I didn’t know that all ravens are black, and now, after observing 
the relevant raven, I do. But for Williamson there is another difficulty stem-
ming from the shift in probabilities. We are faced with the situation where 
we know that the proposition arrived at inductively does not follow from the 
evidence. The prior conditional probability of the hypothesis on the evidence 
is less than 1 (and we may even know this). Yet by receiving the evidence 
                                                                                                                                
On the view above of evidence, when they constitute knowledge, they are part of our evidence. 
Moreover, they may constitute knowledge simply because perceiving counts as a way of know-
ing; that would fit the role of knowledge as evidence…I certainly did not perceive that your 
ticket did not win. There is no valid argument from the denial of knowledge in the lottery case to 
its denial in perceptual and other cases in which we ordinarily take ourselves to know. (William-
son, 2000, 252) 
 
251 Of all the options the knowability of only (13), seems to be the worst. The relevant infor-
mation about M being dropped should, if anything, lower its probability, since the information 
verifies its antecedent (making it more probable (and on Williamson’s view, raising it to 
probability 1)). Call the antecedent of (13) e and its consequent p. The probability of if e then 
p, is lower given e, than the unconditional probability of if e then p. On a standard Bayesian 
picture, Pr[(¬(e→p)|e]=Pr(e∧¬p)∧e)/Pr(e) =Pr(e∧¬p)/Pr(e)≥Pr(e∧¬p)=Pr[¬(e→p)] and hence, 
Pr[(e→p|e)≤Pr(e→p). Given these standard assumptions Pr[(e→ p)|e)<Pr(e→p). Williamson 
rejects these assumptions, but given the case above this is to count against this rejection not 
against the standard assumptions. His rejection depends on counting Pr((e→p)|e), as having 
probability 1 once e becomes known. 
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(which we know does not entail the proposition) we somehow arrive at 
probability 1 for that proposition.252 
Leaving aside the issue of induction, the idea that propositions like (13) 
are not known seems to be entangled with too many problems. It seems, 
then, that Williamson’s theory would incline him to treat universal state-
ments such as (11) in the same way he treats conjunctions of future contin-
gents, namely as cases where, although chances are low, the epistemic prob-
ability is 1. 
But suppose now that we have a lottery drawing in which 1 of a billion 
tickets will be drawn. Suppose further that all but one ticket have been sold 
and, coincidently, it will be the one unsold ticket that will be the winner of 
the draw. So, for each of the sold tickets it is true both that its chances of 
losing are very high and that it will in fact lose. Is the belief that one of these 
tickets will lose safe? Williamson, like most epistemologists, thinks that 
lottery propositions are not known.253 This is required for his explanation of 
the unassertability of lottery propositions in terms of their unknowability 
(Williamson, 2000, 224-229).254 Merely having probabilistic reasons that a 
losing ticket in a large lottery will lose does not allow me to know, no matter 
how good my information is about the chances, that the ticket will not win. 
On Williamson’s conception of safety, if belief in a conjunction is not safe, 
                                                       
252 For some, this territory is already familiar - it is a version of the consequence endorsed in 
Knowledge and its Limits, namely the rejection of van Fraassen’s Reflection Principle: if x is 
one’s current rational credence in the truth of a proposition A at some later time t, then the 
current rational probability for (A) should be x; Pr(A|Prt(A)=x)=x. (Van Fraassen, 1984). In 
later writings van Fraassen articulates the principle differently (1995, 1999), but the differ-
ences do not concern the current discussion.   
In the main text Reflection was not assumed. With respect to a specific case of induction 
suppose I know I am going to see a raven, call him Max, and as a matter of fact this raven will 
be the last in a long line of observations resulting in knowledge of B (=all ravens are black) 
but I am unaware of this fact (I don’t know that I will know). What should my current cre-
dence be conditional on Max being black? Answer: on Williamson’s (and most everyone 
else’s view except Karl Popper’s perhaps) it should be high but less than 1. What about after I 
view black Max? Answer: on Williamson’s view, the probability is now 1. But what hap-
pened? Why?  
Having probability 1 that all ravens are black, I also can know that there is a chance that 
they are not all black assuming I know that there is an objective chance of there being (past, 
present or future) e.g. non-black raven mutations. So again, I know that there are no non-black 
ravens but I also know that there is a chance that there are (perhaps even a high chance). Read 
in any way one wants (epistemic or metaphysic), it sounds very odd to say that I know that 
there are no non-black ravens and I know that there very well might be.    
253 “[H]owever unlikely one's ticket was to win the lottery, one did not know that it would not 
win, even if it did not … No probability short of 1 turns true belief into knowledge.” (Wil-
liamson, 2000: 117) 
254 On page 255, Williamson (2000) connects the case of lotteries to the unassertability of the 
belief that one will not be knocked down by a bus tomorrow. It is hard to see how Williamson 
would separate this belief from beliefs about the non-occurrence of quantum events. If you 
don’t know that you will not be knocked down by a bus, how can you know that a quantum 
blip will not happen in this instance?        
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there must be at least one conjunct belief in which is not safe.255 But as all 
conjuncts in this case are on a par, if belief in one is not safe, belief in any 
isn’t. Thus, this would commit Williamson to a substantive distinction be-
tween quantum propositions – which are known, and lottery propositions – 
which are not. But what could be the difference? If I cannot know that a 
lottery ticket is a loser, how can I know that a quantum blip will not occur, 
let alone know that the negation of a long disjunction about quantum events 
is true? If beliefs regarding falling marbles are safe, why not lottery beliefs?  
To make the connection even tighter, assume we match each of the lottery 
tickets to a marble-dropping event (suppose we write the numbers of the 
tickets on marbles which are then dropped, and the winner is the holder of 
the ticket whose number is on the marble that tunnels through).256 It does not 
seem plausible in this case to say that although I know the marbles will not 
tunnel, I don’t know my ticket is a loser.  
There are two possibilities here: either knowledge is lost by when a con-
nection is made between the marbles and the lottery, or knowledge of the 
lottery propositions is gained by this connection. If it is gained, then one can 
know by closure that the unsold ticket will win. Loss of knowledge is 
equally dubious. Why would the fact that the quantum events are used as 
lottery mechanisms make them unknowable, if other quantum conjunctions 
are known?  
In general, it is hard to see why the world in which I win the lottery 
should be regarded more similar to those in which I lose, than the worlds in 
which a marble tunnels is to those in which none tunnel. The lack of clarity 
regarding the similarity (or closeness) relation at play in his account is re-
lated to a further lacuna in Williamson’s presentation. Not often does Wil-
                                                       
255 Advocating what he calls the ordinary conception of safety, he claims: 
Suppose that I am not safe from being shot. On the ordinary conception, it follows that there is 
someone x such that I am not safe from being shot by x (assume that if I am shot, I am shot by 
someone). On the high chance conception of safety, that is a non sequitur. For each individual x, 
the chance of my being shot by x may be low enough for me to count as safe from being shot by 
x, even though the chance of my being shot by someone or other may be too high for me to count 
as safe from being shot.   (Williamson, forthcoming: 23-4) 
 
Besides the problems as outlined in the main text for Williamson’s theory that this safety 
conception generates, I agree here with Maria Lasonen-Aarnio that this it is not the ordinary 
conception of safety. Let me take this opportunity to thank Maria Lasonen-Aarnio for helpful 
conversations concerning this as well as many other matters related to closure.     
256 How is this possible? After all, we might have more than one tunneling. One answer is that 
we might suppose that we have one possible winner that is selected by the first marble to 
tunnel. To equal the chances the first will be the one that appears first on a list the order of 
which is hidden from the lottery players. This way each ticket has the same chance of winning 
and there is only one possible winner. One who knows that no marble will tunnel will be in a 
position to know that no one will win the lottery. This is Professor Hawthorne’s suggestion. I 
am indebted to him for many helpful conversations on this and related topics.   
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liamson specify concrete instances of what by his lights would amount to 
knowledge. Can we know things by induction, or is the scenario in which 
they fail to be true too similar for such propositions to ever have probability 
1? What can we know about the future? If he is not to slide too far on the 
way to skepticism, Williamson must allow that at least some knowledge of 
these sorts is possible. But then what could be the constraints on the similar-
ity relations such that we get only the “good” cases and none of the “bad”? 
A simple statement of the challenge is this: Are lottery propositions 
known or not? If they are, this would create problems for Williamson’s the-
sis that knowledge is the norm of assertion (Williamson, 2000: 224-229) and 
commit Williamson to what is widely considered an unfavorable position 
(together with multi-premise closure this would mean that one would know 
beforehand which ticket is a winner if one made the right choice of deduc-
tion). If lottery propositions are not known, what is the relevant difference 
between them and quantum propositions? Specifically, if the lottery mecha-
nism is just the quantum events, how can the latter be known while the for-
mer are not?  
 
5.3.3.3. The Principal Principle and Practical Deliberation  
The divorce of epistemic probability from chance is intuitively problematic. 
The following is one way to give this intuition some substance. Since the 
chances are known, in place of Williamson’s (9), we might just as well have: 
 
(9’)  One knows that the objective chance of p1∧…∧pn is low.  
 
Is knowledge that the chance that some proposition is true is extremely 
low compatible with knowledge of that proposition? The answer to this 
question depends on the validity of a weakened version of Williamson’s (8):  
  
(8’)  If one knows that the objective chance of a proposition q is low, one 
does not know q.  
 
Williamson must reject (8’). Yet its rejection entails the truth of Moore-
type future sentences of the form (for ease of exposition I use a higher order 
form):  
 
(14) I know that (the chance that q is true is low, but it will happen).257  
 
Given Williamson’s knowledge account of assertion, the following in-
stance of (14) is assertable: the chance that my book contains no mistakes is 
very low, but it doesn’t!. Strictly speaking, there is no contradiction in (14) 
                                                       
257 Parentheses here are for avoiding scope ambiguity.   
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or in any of its instances, just as there is no contradiction (at least no trivial 
contradiction) in any of the Moore-type sentences (many Moore sentences 
are true). With a further seemingly plausible principle, we can derive other 
variants of Moore sentences from (14) that sound equally odd.  
 
(15) If S knows that the objective chance of a future event is very low, 
then S knows that the future event might not take place.258 
 
From (15) we can derive: 
 
(16)  S knows that (q might not be true but it is). 
 
Note how odd that sounds in the case of future contingents: “I know it 
might not rain tomorrow, but I know it will.” Obviously Williamson would 
prefer to regard (16) as unassertable. But since he is committed to the as-
sertability of (14) this would mean he must take (15) to be false. The point of 
raising this issue (aside from the difficulties associated with rejecting (15) 
and (8’)), is to shed more light on the radical rift Williamson is imposing 
between chances and epistemic probabilities.  
Beyond intuition, however, there is a theoretical strain here. The sharp 
split between chance and epistemic probability conflicts – if not in letter, 
certainly in spirit – with the central idea motivating Lewis’s Principal Prin-
ciple which says: 
Take some particular time – I’ll call it “the present”, but in fact it could be 
any time. Let C be a rational credence function for someone whose evidence 
is limited to the past and present – that is, for anyone who doesn’t have any 
access to some very remarkable channels of information. Let P be the func-
tion that gives the present chances of all propositions. Let A be any proposi-
tion. Let E be any proposition that satisfies two conditions. First, it specifies 
the present chance of A, in accordance with the function P. Second, it con-
tains no “inadmissible” evidence about future history; that is, it does not give 
any information about how chance events in the present and future will turn 
out. …Then the Principal Principle is the equation: C(A|E)=P(A) (Lewis, 
1999: 238) 
 
                                                       
258 It’s hard to see how (15) could be false. Suppose I know that the chance for rain tomorrow 
is very low. Does it not seem adequate to say, at least, that I know that it might not rain to-
morrow? 
Compare this claim to Hawthorne's Objective Chance Principle: “If at t, S knows that 
there is a nonzero objective chance that p at t (where p supervenes on the intrinsic facts about 
the future relative to t), then, at t, there is nonzero epistemic probability for S that p.” 
(Hawthorne 2004a: 92). He then notes that if the principle is incorrect there should be an 
epistemic reading of the conclusion “according to which the inference is faulty. But no such 
reading occurs to us.” (Hawthorne, Ibid.) The inference I am appealing to here is weaker since 
it only pertains to knowledge of high chance, but I agree with Hawthorne that it should hold 
for low chances as well.       
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According to this principle one’s credence in conjunctions with low 
chances should be just as low. Yet Williamson – along with others that ap-
peal to the same defense of epistemic closure – is committed to the claim 
that one knows them. To know a proposition one must, presumably, believe 
it, which means that one must assign the proposition sufficiently high cre-
dence. It seems then that Williamson’s desired conclusion requires abandon-
ing the Principal Principle.  
Williamson’s response is to preserve the principle by allowing updating 
one’s credences on evidence that Lewis regards “inadmissible.”259 Specifi-
cally, by conditionalizing on the future contingents comprising the conjunc-
tion, which one is assumed to know, one’s credence in the conjunction will 
be 1. Since for Lewis future contingents do not count as evidence such 
knowledge is inadmissible and is therefore not part of the formulation of the 
Principal Principle, which, as Williamson says, “is logically neutral as to the 
results of conditionalizing on inadmissible evidence, despite the forbidding 
connotations of the word “inadmissible”.”260 For Williamson, all knowledge 
counts as evidence, including knowledge of the future. So one can condi-
tionalize on this knowledge and update the credence assignments in accor-
dance with the epistemic consequences of closure and the Principal Principle 
remains unviolated.261   
To the extent that Williamson’s idea of Standard Conditionalizing on all 
knowledge succeeds, it is a technical victory at best. Surely, even if William-
son manages to avoid violating the letter of Lewis’s principle, he still un-
dermines its spirit. The rationale behind the Principal Principle is that one 
should apportion one’s credence in a proposition to what one (rationally) 
believes are the chances that that proposition is true.  
...we have some very firm and definite opinions concerning reasonable cre-
dence about chance. These opinions seem to me to afford the best grip we 
have on the concept of chance. Indeed, I am led to wonder whether anyone 
but a subjectivist is in a position to understand objective chance! (Lewis, 
1986: 84)     
 
Thus, although Lewis’s formulation of the Principal Principle is silent re-
garding inadmissible evidence, it is clear that its point is to articulate a tight 
connection between credence and chance. Williamson’s position runs 
counter to this idea.  
                                                       
259 Williamson, forthcoming: 16. 
260 Williamson, forthcoming: 16. 
261 I must admit that I am not sure how exactly to understand the relation between rational 
credence and epistemic probability on Williamson’s view. It seems to me that he is committed 
to the idea that there are three kinds of probability: epistemic probability, chance, and cre-
dence. His presentation, however, makes it look as if there are only two: chance and epistemic 
probability.    
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To make the point more explicit: in his reply to Hawthorne and Lasonen-
Aarnio, Williamson goes to great lengths to show that his view does not 
commit him to any implausible principle. But there is at least one highly 
plausible principle he seems to be forced to reject, call it the Weak Low 
Chance Principle: 
 
(WLC)  If in w, at time t, S knows that p has a low chance of being true, S 
does not know p in t at w.262  
 
Given Williamson’s divorce of epistemic probability from chance, he 
cannot endorse (WLC). According to the safety theory of knowledge, one 
knows conjunctions of future contingents, for example, even when one 
knows their chances of being true are very slim.263  
To see just how problematic this is, consider the practical consequences 
of this commitment. Suppose the truth of some long conjunction of proposi-
tions is of crucial importance for you – if it is true you must ϕ and if false 
you must not. Now suppose you know each of the conjuncts is highly prob-
able and believe it to be true. Assuming that this belief is safely true, accord-
ing to Williamson’s theory you know the conjunction. But you also know 
that there is very high chance that the conjunction is false. Should you, or 
should you not ϕ? Assuming knowledge is a rational basis for action, that it 
warrants taking something as a premise in practical deliberation (Hawthorne, 
2004a, 29), it seems that Williamson’s theory would entail that you ought to 
ϕ, despite the fact that you know there is very high chance that the conjunc-
tion is false. The reason for this, according to the theory is that although the 
chance that the conjunction is true is (and is known to be) low, since it is true 
and since you know this, you should act on this knowledge. But one can 
always turn the table on this argument. If you know that a proposition has 
high chance of being false you ought not act on it. After all, this too is 
knowledge. And acting on it is what the Principal Principle seems to suggest, 
again, if not by strict letter, than by spirit. Viewed from this perspective, a 
theory of knowledge that has consequences inconsistent with WLC is so 
much the worse for it, not the better. But even if it is discarded, we still face 
                                                       
262 Compare this principle to Hawthorne’s and Lasonen-Aarnio’s Low Chance principle 
(forthcoming, 5) modified by Williamson (forthcoming: 17). I note that I am not advancing 
this as the most informative connection between chance and epistemic possibility but rather as 
one we could feel sure of. Thanks here to Professor Hawthorne.      
263 I think that the situation would be bad enough for Williamson’s theory even if one’s induc-
tive general evidence counted in favor of the chance being very slim and yet one did not take 
this evidence into account. We might, imagine that we have a quantum physicist who looks at 
the chances as apposed to an epistemologist who looks at the events. The point is that these 
two might be the same rational person, while in the case of past events we would have to have 
two people since the evidence set could not be the same. The difference is that regarding the 
past the evidence disqualifies the inductive evidence being applied for the same rational indi-
vidual. I am indebted here to Professor Hawthorne.       
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the problem of how one ought rationally to act when one has two incompati-
ble directives stemming from one’s knowledge. The point is not merely that 
we might not know what to take as a premise in practical deliberation be-
cause we don’t know that we know. The point is that even if we do know 
that we know, we don’t know what to take as our premise.264 
At this stage I think it would be fair to say that the problems associated 
with taking knowledge as having probability 1 – the idea that one can stan-
dard conditionalize on all known propositions – are formidable. The prob-
ability 1 account does address the challenge set by the open knowledge ac-
count by treating knowledge as if it were always based on conclusive evi-
dence. This in turn leads to the inability to separate knowledge closure from 
multi-premise knowledge closure and leads in cases where the evidence 
clearly does not entail the known propositions to substantial theoretical ma-




The problems we saw Williamson’s theory of knowledge faces – the di-
lemma regarding lottery propositions and the relation between chance and 
credence – both seem to arise from the same feature of this theory, namely 
the attempt to treat human knowledge as infallible in all domains. While the 
precise formulation of epistemic fallibilism is a matter of contention, most 
epistemologists agree that human knowledge is, in some sense, fallible. 
Since the conception of knowledge as safely true belief has the consequence 
that what is known has an epistemic probability of 1, it is hard to see how 
any notion of fallibility can apply to knowledge under this conception (spe-
cifically if evidence is identified with knowledge). Consider some of the 
leading formulations.  
“Fallibilism is the doctrine that someone can know that p, even though 
their evidence for p is logically consistent with the truth of not-p” (Stanley, 
2005, 127). For Williamson, remember, one’s knowledge is one’s evidence, 
so surely fallibilism in this formulation by Jason Stanley is not consistent 
with it. If you know p, then p is now part of your evidence and therefore, the 
evidence you have is inconsistent with the falsity of p.265 If one knows that p, 
one’s evidence is inconsistent with the falsity of p. Stewart Cohen’s formula-
tion is even more directly at odds with Williamson’s theory: “a fallibilist 
                                                       
264 Here as in many other places I am indebted to Assaf Sharon.  
265 Perhaps Stanley (who is sympathetic to the idea that knowledge has probability 1 – See 
Hawthorne and Stanley, forthcoming, 10) could change the formulation thus: Fallibilism is 
the doctrine that someone can know that p, even though the evidence one had for p and by 
which one came to know that p, is logically consistent with the truth of not-p. If this is true, it 
will cause other trouble for the view. It would be better if he were to decide on whether he 
prefers fallibilism or the Williamsonian view.  
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theory allows that S can know q on the basis of r where r only makes q 
probable” (Cohen 1988: 91). Clearly, according to Williamson, this is false. 
Jim Pryor says: “a fallibilist is someone who believes that we can have 
knowledge on the basis of defeasible justification, justification that does not 
guarantee that our beliefs are correct” (Pryor 2000: 518). The notion of de-
feasibility employed here requires clarification. Nevertheless, it is clear that 
under any plausible theory, justification will be defeasible in the sense that 
future evidence can undermine it. Anything else would be an objectionable 
form of dogmatism.266 The defeasibility associated with fallibilism must be 
something to do with the inconclusive nature of that on which ordinary 
knowledge is based. This, presumably, is what Pryor means when he speaks 
of “justification that does not guarantee that our beliefs are correct.” Feld-
man articulated this idea more explicitly. Fallibilism, he says, is the view 
that “it is possible for S to know that p even if S does not have logically con-
clusive evidence to justify believing that p” (Feldman 1981: 266). As he 
explains, this amounts to the claim that knowledge can be had based on less 
than deductive inference, that one’s evidence need not entail what is known. 
But if knowledge is safely true belief, belief that has epistemic probability 1 
on one’s evidence, then it is guaranteed – evidence is conclusive and entails 
what is known (at least epistemically).  
There is, perhaps one kind of fallibilism that is compatible with William-
son’s safety theory of knowledge. Since epistemic probabilities are for Wil-
liamson divorced from objective chances, it is consistent with his theory that 
one can know things which have less than perfect chance of being true. In-
deed, as we have seen, this is a desiderata of his theory. It may be claimed 
therefore that epistemic fallibilism consists in the fact that we can know 
propositions which – objectively speaking – have some chance of being 
false. For one thing, it is not clear how this conception can be applied to 
propositions not about the future (which, if true, presumably have objective 
probability of 1). The important thing to notice about this proposal, however, 
is that it allays the epistemic bite of fallibilism. As the attempts to define 
fallibilism all indicate, the idea that knowledge is fallible is supposed to cap-
ture something about the relation between knowledge and the evidence or 
justification on which it is (or can be) based. This is lost in the kind of falli-
bilism compatible with Williamson’s theory. With this definition all that the 
fallibility of knowledge comes to is the uninteresting claim that we can know 
truths that have some chance of being false, although they aren’t, and our 
evidence guarantees that they aren’t. If this is as robust a notion of falli-
bilism as Williamson can endorse then those convinced by the idea that 
                                                       
266 The kind of dogmatism that is dealt with quite easily in chapter 3 by an open knowledge 
account, not dogmatism in Pryor’s (2000) sense.  
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knowledge is fallible should be left unsatisfied and the problems discussed in 
previous sections remain intact.267 
Moreover, consider the consequences of this infallibilism for belief revi-
sion. Surely there are psychological facts about a subject that might under-
mine knowledge of p such as ceasing to believe it. But loss of knowledge 
and change of belief is also sometimes rationally required, specifically, when 
proper counter-evidence presents itself. On Williamson’s account, once 
something is known such change is not rationally mandated. This is because 
one can always take one’s knowledge p as evidence ruling out any evidence 
to the contrary. To illustrate this point consider Williamson’s own example: 
 I put exactly one red ball and one black ball into an empty bag, and will 
make draws with replacement. Let h be the proposition that I put a black ball 
into the bag, and e the proposition that the first ten thousand draws are all 
red. I know h by standard combination of perception and memory, because I 
saw that the ball was black and I put it into the bag a moment ago. Neverthe-
less, if after ten thousand draws I learn e, I shall have ceased to know h, be-
cause the evidence which I shall then have will make it too likely that I was 
somehow confused about the colours of the balls. (Williamson 2000, 205) 
 
This surely seems to be the rational way to go. But e is never simply 
given. After ten thousand draws one is faced with two inconsistent pieces of 
information, h and e. If h is known and therefore has probability 1, it would 
be just as reasonable to question one’s memory, which, presumably, is the 
basis of one’s belief in e. One can always conditionalize on one’s knowledge 
(evidence) that there is a black ball in the bag and conclude that one is con-
fused about e (Pr(e|h)=1/210,000), not about h. This is a further sense in which 
knowledge must be fallible in a more substantial way than Williamson’s 
view allows. 
In sum, then, and relating back to Chapter 1, a position that considers 
knowledge to be incompatible with any rational measure of epistemic doubt 
can support the idea that basic inference patterns such as modus ponens are 
closed. This is a significant advantage that makes room for a true extension 
of knowledge through valid inference. It blocks the accumulation of epis-
temic doubt and thus by knowing the premises of a modus ponens inference 
one will know, by proper inference, its conclusion. The idea that inference is 
a general way to extend one’s knowledge, perhaps mistakenly, is considered 
by many to be a central motivation for the view that knowledge as closed. 
However, it is this feature that leads to considerable difficulties precisely 
when we have independent means, e.g. by our knowledge of chances, to 
establish a gap between evidence and knowledge. This gap, which the infal-
libilist denies, runs into trouble with induction, future contingencies, 
chances, practical reasoning, justification closure, lottery propositions, quan-
                                                       
267 Here too thanks to Assaf Sharon.  
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tum events, and the like. The trouble for the infallibilist is more vivid when 
items of knowledge are conjoined to form would be knowledge that runs into 
conflict with our knowledge of chances. Thus, for instance, when we con-
nect knowledge of a long conjunction to a lottery setting, it becomes evident 
that an unreasonable expansion of knowledge is being postulated that does 
not take into account the accumulation of epistemic doubt – the gap between 
our evidence and our knowledge.  
 
5.3.4. Knowledge as Evidence: Conclusion 
I have claimed that avoiding the Open Knowledge Argument can take the 
form of denying that (NED) is applicable with regard to the pertinent cases. 
New knowledge of a proposition p changes the evidential situation so that 
now there is good evidence for a proposition that is known to follow from p, 
namely, the new evidence that consists of p itself. One way of spelling out 
this suggestion does not work for the purposes of closed knowledge (Jeffrey 
Conditionalization) another way does avoid the argument. The latter is Wil-
liamson’s view.     
To be sure, I have said nothing to conclusively refute Williamson’s theory 
of knowledge. Choosing between competing theories in such matters is more 
often a matter of balancing costs against benefits than of conclusive refuta-
tion and proof. The suggestion that knowledge is open has intuitive costs of 
its own. Yet in trying to avoid it by taking the proposition known as one's 
evidence and treating it like certain knowledge, I have argued that one needs 
to redefine epistemic probability; face preface and lottery paradox type chal-
lenges with regard to knowledge; rejecting most, if not all, of the more plau-
sible characterizations of fallibilism; reject van Frassen’s reflection principle 
and face a formidable problem of knowledge by induction; reject Lewis’ 
Principal Principle (at least in spirit); face problems of practical reasoning 
(that several adherents of this view would find troubling); reject justification 
closure; face one problem if it is accepted that lottery propositions are 
known; and another if they are unknown. Surely, even Williamson would 
admit that these are formidable costs. The question is whether these costs are 
worth paying in order to avoid the consequences of open knowledge or for 
any other reason short of necessity. To my mind, the most problematic fea-
ture of Williamson's account (or any account which takes knowledge to have 
probability 1) is the idea which is exemplified in the preface paradox for 
knowledge, e.g., that one can know that a book contains no mistakes and yet 
know that it is highly probable that this book does contain mistakes. It is the 
idea that knowledge always has probability 1 that is at the root of this conse-
quence, yet I think it is the most plausible way to avoid the open knowledge 
conclusion. In this respect, one might be tempted to think of the whole situa-
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tion as a paradox rather than a challenge.268 Yet in light of the simple and 
elegant way in which knowledge openness can deal with many of the current 
challenges of contemporary epistemology, open knowledge seems to be in a 
reasonably good position. 
 
5.4. Evidential Knowledge 
The attempt to provide the Open Knowledge Argument with grounds for 
viewing it as sound, are in effect complete. My defense of open knowledge 
against Hawthorne’s arguments has given rise to reasons for thinking that 
knowledge is open, namely, since evidence is not closed under known en-
tailment. Given even a moderate dependence of knowledge on evidence, I 
have claimed, this conclusion leads to the idea that knowledge too is not 
closed under known entailment, at least knowledge of a disputed domain. 
But where exactly does this argument leave the debate on epistemic closure? 
Advocates of closure might reject (NED) and argue that although the eviden-
tial principles we have considered are not valid, their epistemic counterparts 
are (e.g. (EAD) is invalid but (AD) is). Of course, one does not merely need 
to claim this, one has to show how this claim might be made to work. The 
previous sections of this chapter criticize suggestions of how to defend clo-
sure in light of the Open Knowledge Argument (which is not to say that 
there is no other way I am unaware of that may work). In this section – 5.3 - 
I provide further reasons for thinking such suggestions are not as appealing 
as the open knowledge view.  
I argue for this in two steps. First, I underscore the theoretical advantages 
of knowledge openness. The benefits of epistemic openness reach far beyond 
the foregoing evidential considerations, which I take to be the primary basis 
for epistemic openness, and bear on many of the central issues of contempo-
rary epistemology. Second, I show how this position can accommodate one 
of the main ideas behind closure, i.e. the idea that a belief formed on the 
basis of competent inference from a justified belief is itself justified (i.e. 
single-premise justification closure). I do this by appealing to a distinction 
between two types of justification, one of which is closed but does not facili-
tate knowledge, while the other is knowledge-conducive but not closed.     
 
5.4.1. The Benefits of Epistemic Openness 
The openness of evidence, as I have said, provides the advocate of epistemic 
openness with a reasonable positive account for her position and a defense 
                                                       
268 Professor Ruth Weintraub suggested this to me in conversation.  
 167 
against attacks of the sort mounted by Hawthorne (together with an explana-
tion of why his argument seems so compelling). There is also the argument 
for open knowledge. But, as in urban planning, there are other, environ-
mental reasons for preferring openness to closure. In the case of knowledge 
the relevant environment consists of a host of epistemological problems that 
have seemed quite resilient to proposed solutions, that are easily solved, or 
rather dissolved, once epistemic closure is denied.  
Skepticisms of various sorts rely on the validity of closure. These are not 
merely Cartesian skeptics, i.e. skeptics undermining entire realms of knowl-
edge, but also Mundane and Live skeptics. Skeptics of these brands, as I 
claimed in Chapter 2, argue from the admitted lack of knowledge of an im-
plied proposition to the dismissal of ordinary knowledge claims. It is easy to 
see that this maneuver cannot get off the ground without closure. Epistemic 
Dogmatism is the idea that, since p implies that evidence counter to p is mis-
leading, knowing that p one can also know by mere reflection that any 
counter-evidence is misleading and thereby be – absurdly – warranted in 
disregarding evidence counting against what one believes. Again, if closure 
is denied, the odd knowledge claim is avoided. Similar considerations apply 
to lottery propositions and the Lottery paradox for knowledge. 269 Knowing 
mundane propositions about the future does not commit one to knowledge 
that one’s lottery ticket is a loser or that one will not be one of the unfortu-
nate victims of sudden heart attacks etc. Easy Knowledge (Cohen 2002, 
                                                       
269 As presented in Hawthorne (2004a) .I have not said much in this manuscript about the 
Lottery Paradox for knowledge. One reason is that Hawthorne (2004a) has a presentation that 
is better than any I can offer. I have only one additional thing to say. Lotteries seem to pose a 
difficulty with regard to rationality as they do with knowledge and closure. Suppose that I 
receive two lottery tickets as a present one for the Stockholm lottery that has odds of 
1:1,000,000 of wining, and the New York State Lottery with odds 1:100,000,000. I place both 
tickets on my desk. One week later I read in a local Stockholm newspaper that a ticket with a 
different number than my ticket has won. It seems rational for me to throw away the Stock-
holm ticket even though the probability that there was a mistake in the paper and that I have 
won, may be greater than the probability that I won the New York State Lottery. How are we 
to account for this? It seems irrational to throw away the New York State Lottery ticket before 
receiving news that I have lost yet with better odds of wining it seems rational for me to throw 
away the Stockholm Lottery ticket. 
This is not a mere peripheral problem since, as Avishai Margalit noted in conversation, a 
similar problem arises with regard to legal evidence. Defendants are sometimes convicted on 
the basis of eyewitness reports even though the probability of mistake is greater than when 
using statistical evidence. Suppose we have a defendant accused (among other things, per-
haps,) of participating in a prison-riot that all but a few prisoners participated in. The evidence 
that few of the prisoners did not participate might be as conclusive as we wish yet few courts 
would convict the defendant of this offense on this evidence. Yet, if a prison guard claims he 
saw the defendant participating in the prison-riot, we would expect a conviction even if the 
probability of convicting the innocent on this evidence is greater than on the previous statisti-
cal evidence. 
I am not convinced that the cases are exactly similar. In the prison case, if we had con-
victed all the prisoners we would be sure to have convicted some innocent convicts (innocent 
of rioting, that is). In the case of an eyewitness we have no such guarantee. And if the case is 
such that we do, I think our expectation that there will be convictions will drop considerably.   
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2005) of the reliability of one’s faculties is also blocked once closure is dis-
carded. The correlation between what I believe is true and the deliverances 
of my faculties do not permit the inference that my faculties are reliable. All 
these problems, as well as others I will not rehearse here,270 do not so much 
as arise once closure is given up and they are explained by the failure of 
evidence to support propositions that one knows to follow from what one 
knows (as well as accounting for the hold these problems have on us).  
It should be noted that the evidence account of why closure fails is readily 
applicable to each of these cases. Perception of271 my hand provides me with 
evidence that I have a hand but not that I am not a brain in a vat misled to 
believe that I have a hand. Evidence for p can support my belief that p is 
true, but does not indicate that evidence against p is misleading. My promise 
to meet you at the movies does not make it more probable that I will not fall 
on the way and break my leg, or that my folks will not show up for a surprise 
visit. Equally, experiencing perception of red patches makes it more likely 
that there are red patches before me, but not that my perceptual faculties are 
functioning well. The point is that a single account that both explains and 
dissolves a wide range of what were previously considered detached prob-
lems, is surely very attractive and deserving of serious attention.  
 
5.4.2. Denying Closure: Not as Bad as You Think 
Giving up epistemic closure surely has its costs. Strong intuitions support the 
principle of closure, not least among them is the idea that inference provides 
justified beliefs. Insofar as knowledge requires justification (whether it is 
understood as internalist justification or as externalist reliability) a belief 
formed via proper inference should be a candidate for knowledge. Regard-
less of whether there’s evidence, it would seem, anything properly inferred 
                                                       
270 It also avoids the problems associated with the semantic externalism/first-person access  
(see Brown 2004: 239-42). This is perhaps the place to note that the watch example represents 
a type of case not covered by the standard defense of closure that relies on denying the 
assumption of a known premise as soon as a counter instance is proposed: even those who 
think warrant for believing an animal is not a disguised mule is a necessary precondition for 
knowing that it is a zebra, will, I presume, agree that to know that it is three o’clock one does 
not need to be already know that even if the watch is broken it is showing the right time.  
Another paradox that is avoided is the Knower (Kaplan and Montegue, 1965). I am not 
sure whether closure is the way out, but it should be considered a serious contender given the 
other options. See the exchange between Cross (2001) and Uzquiano (2004). Of course open 
knowledge also avoids difficulties having to do with conjunction introduction (multi-premise 
closure), such as the preface paradox for knowledge. For more on the preface, see 5.3.3.1. 
Other cases which have closure as one of the premises I am not so optimistic about. I do not 
think, for instance, that the key for resolving the surprise examination paradox is rooted in 
epistemic closure. I am also not optimistic about resolving Kripke's belief puzzle (1979) that 
appeals to rational belief closure (though Frances (1999) has claimed that it does).    
271 Assuming that “perception of” is non-factive.  
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from a known belief is justified and hence can be known. In this section I 
claim that epistemic openness need not conflict with this idea. By appealing 
to a distinction between warrant for belief and knowledge-promoting justifi-
cation, epistemic closure can be denied without thereby undermining the 
justificatory capacity of inference. The issues pertaining to epistemic justifi-
cation are copious and convoluted and surely cannot be exhausted here. My 
aim is merely to tease out some intuitions and common conceptions about 
justification that can go some way towards clarifying and supporting the 
distinction between justification for belief – doxastic justification, and 
knowledge-promoting justification – epistemic justification. Given this dis-
tinction, epistemic openness will seem not as alarming as it may appear.  
It is widely accepted that if one has justification for p, but forms the belief 
that p not on the basis of justification, one does not know p. Gettier cases 
demonstrate an additional feature with regard to knowledge. Russell’s ex-
ample, for instance, of forming a correct belief regarding the time of day on 
the basis of a faulty clock illustrates that even if the belief is based on one’s 
justification – and is thus justified – still, it might not amount to knowl-
edge.272 Some philosophers believe that different types of belief require dif-
ferent types of justification. Knowledge of a mathematical theorem’s truth, 
according to these philosophers, requires knowing its proof. While believing 
it, say, on the basis of testimony may be sufficient to justify this belief, it 
cannot provide sufficient grounds for knowledge. But even those who dis-
pute such a distinction between types of beliefs tend to agree that reasons to 
ascribe high probability do not always promote knowledge. Presumably, one 
knows it is highly probable that a lottery ticket will lose, and is thus war-
ranted in believing it will lose, yet we are not inclined to say that one knows 
the ticket is a loser. A belief that is (known to be) highly probable is surely 
justified. But if justification in the sense of reason-to-ascribe-high-
probability could promote knowledge, then lottery propositions would be 
known. Or take the example of believing there is a sheep in the field based 
on seeing a sheep-shaped rock behind which a sheep happens to be grazing. 
Perception of a sheep-shaped object in the field surely raises the probability 
that a sheep is in the field, thus making it reasonable to believe it, and yet 
under the circumstances one would not be said to know as much. Knowing 
my financial state, it would be reasonable of me to believe that, despite my 
life-long dream, I will not buy a classic estate in Provence in the next year. 
But if my long-lost uncle has just tracked me down and is planning to be-
queath me a large sum of money, my belief does not amount to knowledge, 
even if eventually I do not receive the money.273 
                                                       
272 Russell (1948: 154). Russell mentions similar Gettieresque worries about knowledge much 
earlier, see his (1912: 132). 
273 Hawthorne ascribes a similar example to Joseph Raz (Hawthorne 2004a: 65) and Harman 
(1973) presents similar examples. 
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To gain some clarity, we may distinguish between different conceptions 
of justification here. One can be warranted in believing q on the grounds, for 
example, that this is what one must believe in order to retain coherence 
amongst one’s beliefs. Thus, we may have reason to believe that there are 
external objects if we are to maintain coherence without revising a wealth of 
our beliefs. In this sense one can be said to be warranted in believing q. But 
does this entail that q is justified? That there is a consideration telling in 
favor of q’s truth? Not necessarily. The fact that coherence amongst our be-
liefs requires us to believe that the external world is real does not constitute a 
reason telling in favor of it being real. Yet, it does warrant us in believing the 
external world is real.274 Let us call this kind of justification warrant for be-
lieving.275 The notion of warrant for believing is an evaluative notion pertain-
ing to epistemic agents. A second notion of justification – warrant for a 
belief – pertains to beliefs.276 A belief is justified when, for instance, it is 
supported by the evidence or has been formed in the right way (by reliable 
method or whatever). Thus, if one believes something on the basis of a false 
belief, one can be warranted in believing it while the belief itself is unwar-
ranted. Warrant for believing surely does not suffice for knowledge. Even 
those who think justification is a necessary condition for knowledge will 
agree that being warranted in believing something does not always guarantee 
knowledge, even if the belief is true. As lottery and other cases show, even 
warranted true beliefs may not amount to knowledge.277 
What about beliefs justified by inference? Surely, the mere fact that a be-
lief is the product of a valid inference does not suffice for it to count as 
knowledge. The inference has to be from a true and justified belief. But then 
if the justification of the original belief is evidential, and evidence is not 
closed under implication, what reason is there to think that the inferred belief 
is evidentially justified?278 Inference, it seems, is not an independent source 
of justification, if anything, it transmits justification from beliefs to inferred 
                                                       
274 Even coherentists may subscribe to the idea that coherence alone does not suffice for 
knowledge conducive justification. In other words, although coherentists commit to coherence 
being a necessary condition for knowledge, they need not advocate coherence as a sufficient 
condition. Thanks to Mikael Janvid here.  
275 This is not to say that there is no consideration that tells in favor of external objects. What 
it does mean is that in order to be justified in believing that these exist, one does not have to 
base one’s belief on such a consideration.  
276 For a similar distinction see Engel (1992). 
277 The distinction does not relate to the degree of justification. Few of our beliefs are as 
justified, probabilistically speaking, as our beliefs in lottery propositions.  
278 I am assuming that the KK principle (that necessarily if one knows that p, then one is in a 
position to know that one knows that p) is false and that the JJ principle cannot be assumed 
(in a sense it is this principle that is at issue). For a related discussion about necessary condi-
tions of knowledge and their relation to closure see Brueckner (1985, 2004), Murphy (2006) 
and Warfield (2004). 
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beliefs.279 But, as the open evidence argument has shown, at least one type of 
justification, namely evidential justification, does not transmit across infer-
ence. Therefore, to insist that inferring a proposition supplies one with 
knowledge-promoting justification for its truth is, in the present context, to 
beg the question. 
Still, it might be urged, if we know that p is highly probable and that q is 
implied by p, we know that q is highly probable and can therefore know q. 
But the fact that one may have reason to assign a high degree of probability 
to some proposition’s truth, does not suffice for knowing it. We have just 
seen that other reasons to ascribe high probability do not always amount to 
knowledge: I know the probability that my lottery ticket is not the winning 
ticket is extremely high, and yet, it is widely acknowledged that I do not 
know that my ticket will lose.280 Believing with high credence that I have a 
hand, I should assign high probability to there being external objects, yet, 
pace Moore, I do not know this.281 My uncle’s generosity eliminates my jus-
tified belief about my prospects of acquiring French real estate from count-
ing as knowledge. Indeed the claim is hardly novel. The point is that these 
observations support the distinction between the types of justification. Dox-
astic justification (of both brands – warrant for believing and warrant for a 
belief) may not be enough to make true belief count as knowledge. 
 But if doxastic justification is not enough for knowledge what else is 
needed? The following is one proposal that relates to the reflections on evi-
dence and a probabilistic conception of justification. The relation of eviden-
tial support, we might say, has at least three dimensions. The degree of sup-
port, i.e. the conditional probability that a proposition is true given the evi-
dence, is just one. A second dimension can be called the direction of sup-
port, i.e. whether the evidence raises or lowers the probability; and a third 
dimension is the magnitude by which the evidence changes (raises or lowers) 
the proposition’s rational probability assignment.282 In each of the cases of 
                                                       
279 This is shown by the following consideration. Suppose S has justification for p. Forming 
the justified belief that p, S then infers from it that p is true. Surely her inferred belief does not 
enjoy a greater degree of justification than her original belief. Inference does not itself provide 
justification; rather it is supposed to be a mechanism of transmitting justification from prem-
ises to conclusion.  
280 If knowing the odds alone would suffice for knowing that a ticket will lose buying a lottery 
ticket would be not only irrational but downright crazy. Moreover, absurdities of the form “I 
know that p, but I also know that p might be false” would be assertable.  
281 Even those inclined to grant knowledge of this sort may not wish to base their position 
solely on its high probability assignment as entailed by the high probabilities assigned to 
ordinary truths such as that I have hands. Also, they must at least recognize the intuitive cost 
of their position. It is far from clear, in any case, how to account for the probability of such 
propositions. How probable is it that there are external objects? If asked how much to bet, one 
would be warranted in betting the farm. If one loses, one would not really be losing the farm. 
282 There are other dimensions as well. James Joyce (2005) makes a very compelling case for 
what he calls the “weight” of evidence. Roughly, the idea is that if one believes that a coin is 
fair on the basis of 100 coin flips, one would rationally change one's mind if the next 100 flips 
were highly biased towards Heads. Not so if one based one’s belief on 100,000 coin flips. Yet 
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closure failure I have canvassed, the evidence functions properly only along 
the first dimension.283 It is only the first dimension – the degree of support – 
that is preserved through inference. If p implies q, then, necessarily, the 
probability of q is equal to or higher than that of p. The open knowledge 
advocate argues that empirical knowledge (or any type of knowledge under 
dispute) requires that the second dimension of support also be satisfied, i.e. 
that the probability that the proposition is true be raised by one’s evidence.284  
The following example I find instructive. Suppose a scientist is wonder-
ing whether to invest money in an experiment that, if successful, will support 
the hypothesis that p. Suppose further that the scientist is not interested in p 
but rather in q that is entailed by p, the probability of which will be lowered 
if the experiment is successful (supporting p). Now imagine the scientist 
reasons as follows: “I am well aware that if the experiment turns out the 
results I expect it will lower the probability that q is true. So I know I will 
not gain evidence for q. Nevertheless I will have evidence for p, and will 
then infer q from p and thus acquire justification for believing q. So, granted, 
I will have no new evidence for my desired conclusion, but still, who needs 
evidence when there’s justification?” I take it that such reasoning is unten-
able.285   
The example suggests that the point may be more general than the ques-
tion of whether the evidence raises or lowers the probability of some propo-
sition; that knowledge requires something qualitatively different from what 
justifies belief. This is reflected in some of our most entrenched linguistic 
                                                                                                                                
the initial credence might be the same and so would be the posterior probability after the 100 
flips in the fist case, and the 100,000 in the second.      
283 I think that an account which takes the raising of probability as part of a sufficient condi-
tion for knowledge, is ultimately unworkable. Suppose I bought a ticket to a 100,000 ticket 
lottery, only to discover that there has been a change and the winning ticket will be randomly 
selected from one million tickets. Although this evidence raises the probability that my ticket 
is a loser, I do not know that my ticket is a loser.  
In conversation Professor Hawthorne proposed the following case related to the idea that 
probability raising evidence and truth can be part of a sufficient for knowledge. Suppose there 
are two tribes A and B. A has a tribe member that is shorter than 5 feet but all the rest (per-
haps many tribe members) are over 8 feet tall, while the other tribe - B - has tribe members 
that are all between 6 and 7 feet. I learn that an A tribe’s member, call him/her a, has been 
selected for a special ceremony. If this evidence is good enough for knowledge that a is more 
than 8 feet tall, I would know that the tribe member selected for this ceremony taller than all 
the members of tribe B. However, since the probability that a is shorter than 5 feet has grown, 
I would know that a is over 8 feet tall but not that s/he is not shorter than 5 feet tall.  
The open knowledge advocate can either say that this is in fact the case. I.e. that one can, 
in fact, know that a is over 8 feet tall but not know that a is not shorter than 5 feet. The expla-
nation would be that the evidential situation is what makes for this odd result. Perhaps, how-
ever, this case is too similar to the lottery case to count as knowledge and is just one more 
instance where probability-raising evidence is insufficient for knowledge. I am not sure. 
Thanks to Professor Hawthorne for suggesting this example. 
284 Or at least that the evidence on which it is based (or which supports the proposition from 
which it is derived) not lower the probability that one’s belief is true.  
285 The example is inspired by Kaplan (1996: 45).  
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practices regarding knowledge and belief. While questioning, “how do you 
know?” is perfectly natural and intelligible, the question “how do you be-
lieve?” is hardly either of these. Conversely, the question “why do you be-
lieve that p?” is commonplace, whereas the question “why do you know that 
p?” is unheard of (besides some contexts where it is assumed that you were 
not supposed to know that p). Notice that both questions pertain to justifica-
tion. When asked why one believes something one is prompted to provide a 
justification for one’s belief. When asked how you know something, like-
wise, you are required to come up with the grounds or justification for your 
knowledge claim. In both cases the question is what it is that supports one’s 
belief/knowledge. And yet the question takes on significantly different forms 
in the context of belief and in the context of knowledge. We use different 
notions of justification in these respective contexts. When referring to beliefs 
we ask for one’s reasons for believing it. Referring to knowledge we ask 
how it is supported. We ask for evidence.    
This suggests that knowledge is governed, among other things, by objec-
tive external constraints (such as evidence), while belief is also sensitive to 
rational constraints such as reasons and coherence with other attitudes. As 
the previous reflections suggest, doxastic justification can be based on agent-
relative reasons such as coherence.286 Being justified in believing something 
depends on how it relates to the rest of one’s attitudes. But this does not 
always suffice for knowledge. That is why if someone were to ask “how do 
you know the external world is real?” answering “well, it follows from the 
fact that I have hands” or “it coheres with many of my beliefs” would hardly 
seem appropriate. When it comes to knowledge, it matters how the belief is 
justified.287 Epistemic justification, we might say, is backtracking – it tracks 
how the justification was acquired or based.  
                                                       
286 My use of this notion is akin to Parfit’s, despite the obvious difference in context. As Parfit 
says, agent-relative reasons “are reasons only for the agent…When I call some reason agent-
relative, I am not claiming that this reason cannot be a reason for other agents. All that I am 
claiming is that it may not be” Parfit (1986: 143). The fact that p coheres with my beliefs may 
be a reason for me to believe it, but might not be a reason for you if your doxastic repertoire is 
different from mine. It is interesting to note that in the cases above whether one’s evidence 
supports p, and thus provides reason for believing q, depends on one’s belief states. Since the 
evidence in each case supports both p and not-q (e.g. that I have a hand or that I am experi-
encing vat hands), whether it counts as a reason for believing q or not, depends on whether 
one believes that p is true. In general epistemologists neglect the fact that there are those who 
hold such things as true. Gnostics, for instance, believed that our world is governed by an evil 
deity while the benevolent God is in exile. Berkeley believed that there are no external mate-
rial objects. Taking these and other positions more seriously would perhaps facilitate greater 
appreciation of the kind of justification I am trying to demarcate. While you might be justified 
in believing that there are material external objects, Berkeley might not have been. But this 
does not mean you have better evidence then he did.  
287 The same thought, I take it, is behind some forms of reliabilism and sensitivity theories of 
knowledge – it is not enough that one has reason to believe something is true, or that the 
belief is in itself justified (perhaps it is not even necessary), one must stand in a certain epis-
temic relation to it. 
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To explicate the notion of backtracking consider the following scenario. If 
asked why he believes the world was created in six days, a believer in God 
and in the truth of all that is asserted in the bible can present the biblical 
creation story as his justification. In fact, had he professed his religious be-
liefs while denying that the world was created in less than a week, he would 
probably be deemed irrational – failing to appreciate what his beliefs commit 
him to (assuming the person is familiar with the biblical myth of creation). 
But claiming to know this, invoking the biblical myth would hardly seem 
appropriate. The credibility of his source will immediately be questioned.  
In the same way, seeing your car in the driveway justifies your belief that 
it has not been stolen. Remembering where you parked it warrants the belief 
that it is where it was parked and this belief in turn warrants the belief that it 
hasn’t been stolen. Knowing that your plane will land in Chicago, requires a 
belief that it will not crash on the way to Chicago. But none of them epis-
temically justifies this latter belief. For this it matters how the justification 
was received. If – backtracking your justification – we find that your belief 
is based on your looking at your car, we would not question your knowing 
that it has not been stolen. But if it was based on memory of parking the car, 
or in the second case looking at the flight schedule on an airport monitor, we 
do not ascribe to you such knowledge. To doxastically justify q, suffice it 
that p stand in the appropriate logical relation to q. To justify it epistemi-
cally, the way in which p was evidentially established must be taken into 
account as well. The point is a simple one. Just as there can be practical rea-
sons for believing something, which provide practical, but not doxastic, jus-
tification for one’s belief, so too there may be reasons providing doxastic 
warrant (that is justification for believing), but not epistemic justification 
(the kind needed for knowledge). Epistemic justification is backtracking – 
sensitive to the ways in which it was formed or acquired. Therefore, when 
one’s belief is based on evidence lowering the probability that it is true, the 
belief may be warranted (if the probability is high enough), but one does not 
know it.  
Surely, a lot more than I am able to provide here needs to be said about 
the details of the distinction.288 What I have tried to show, however, is merely 
that with the aid of a reasonable distinction between doxastic warrant and 
epistemic justification – a distinction that is in line with intuition – the idea 
that knowledge is open can be sustained, providing its many epistemological 
benefits without sacrificing the idea that a belief properly inferred from 
knowledge is justified. The proposal is that an account of epistemic openness 
can be given while retaining (at least some version of) closure of justifica-
                                                       
288 I will have more to say in the Appendix.  
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tion.289 Other proposals on behalf of knowledge openness are surely possible 
and perhaps some of them will turn out to be more appealing. 
 
Chapter Summary  
The current state of the debate suggests that any position regarding the valid-
ity of epistemic closure must pay some intuitive cost. I have therefore tried 
to steer the debate about closure away from the battleground of intuitions 
and counter-intuitions and into the realm of theoretical considerations (as 
much as I could). Traditionally, such reasons for rejecting closure were ad-
vanced by externalist epistemologies. Philosophers such as Dretske and 
Nozick are famous (or infamous) for having argued against closure not on 
the basis of its unintuitive consequences, but rather substantive epistemo-
logical positions.290 In contrast to this traditional setting of the debate, the 
argument suggested here on behalf of the open knowledge advocate is that 
the logic of evidence supplies the most favorable grounds for epistemic 
openness. Rejections of closure grounded in the subjunctive nature of 
knowledge, do not stand up to Hawthorne’s charges of inconsistency. Fur-
thermore, such positions, fail to appreciate the evidential nature of knowl-
edge and the backtracking structure of epistemic justification. It is these fea-
tures of knowledge, the open knowledge advocate argues, that give rise to 
and explain its openness. The open knowledge position advanced here thus 
provides a unified, simple and elegant account of the failure of various seem-
ingly intuitive epistemic principles and offers a systematic foundation for 
reaping the numerous theoretical fruits of epistemic openness.  
The open knowledge advocate must admit that the denial of closure has 
its costs. Yet at least some of its unintuitive consequences are grounded in 
the unintuitive logic of evidence which all must accept, and can be (at least 
partially) accommodated by distinguishing between doxastic and epistemic 
justification. Since belief is governed by rationality, most prominently by 
(probabilistic) coherence, believing that p and that p implies q, one ought to 
believe q. Knowledge on the other hand, depends on justification and, in the 
case of empirical knowledge, on evidential justification. If the evidence one 
has lowers the probability that something is true, one does not know it. This 
oft-conflated disparity can explain the inclination to dismiss epistemic open-
ness. Whether one ought to believe something depends on its relation to 
other things one takes to be true and thus on the inferences one makes. But 
                                                       
289 I have argued that Williamson trades justification for knowledge closure. Similarly, I am 
saying that the trade might be a good one, only that what should be kept is justification not 
knowledge closure.  
290 See Chapter 1.5.2 and 1.5.3. 
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this should not be confused with the question of whether what one has de-
rived enjoys evidential support requisite for the status of knowledge.  
The arguments for open knowledge do not depend on the contentious 
definition of evidence by purely probabilistic notions. Rather, I have only 
assumed that evidence does not lower the probability of that which it is evi-
dence for. Even this modest assumption is not needed. By accepting that 
there are cases of (weak) underdetermination, we are already committed to 
the rejection of evidence closure, addition (EAD) and distribution (EDIS). 
What counts as evidence for what and to what degree, is an extremely com-
plicated issue, perhaps no less complex than reasoning itself and no less 
elusive than the ingenuity of our multifarious attempts at reaching truth. This 
should not deter us from illuminating some aspects of evidential support by 
identifying and drawing out connections between evidence and principles of 
probability of which, arguably, we have clearer understanding. The idea has 
been that without pretending to know what evidence ultimately amounts to, 
we can show something about the logic of evidence and use it to draw con-
clusions about knowledge and the principles it is governed by. The evidence-
knowledge link (NED) provides good ground for being suspicious of princi-
ples that do not coalesce with the features of evidence on which, presuma-
bly, some knowledge depends. This suspicion can be formulated as a chal-
lenge. If evidence is not closed under implication, how can empirical knowl-
edge be so closed? What allows knowledge to break free from that which it 
is based on? How can inference provide what the evidence enabling it can-
not? 
In the course of this argument I have also provided an analysis of why 
evidence fails to be closed under different logical operations. The basic idea 
was that although the conditional probability of the implied proposition 
given the evidence is not low (not lower than that of the proposition sup-
ported by the evidence), given high initial probability (relative to the known 
proposition) the evidence can, and often does, lower the probability that the 
proposition is true. Thus, the evidence may change what we might call the 
“direction” of support. Evidence is basically directional, it points in favor of 
the truth of some proposition or against it. Evidence pointing in favor of one 
proposition may point against a proposition it entails.  
Using this characterization of evidence, I have claimed on behalf of open 
knowledge that various epistemological issues that are often considered dis-
tinct are, at bottom, one and the same phenomenon, namely, the openness of 
evidence. The puzzle of dogmatism, “lottery propositions”, the problem of 
easy knowledge, purported knowledge of “heavyweight propositions” or 
intuitively implausible knowledge of “lightweight” propositions, are differ-
ent manifestations of the queer structure of knowledge owing to the open-
ness of evidential support. The implausible ramifications of epistemic clo-
sure in the different types of cases discussed in the literature are all one and 
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the same. They all share a common feature, namely, exceeding the scope of 
the evidence on which the propositions from which they are derived is based.  
The basic argument of knowledge openness has been this. If knowledge 
in any domain is underdetermined, e.g. propositions known about future 
events, inductive propositions, or even propositions about objects and events 
in one's immediate perceptually accessible surrounding, then this knowledge 
will entail propositions that are not supported by the available evidence on 
the basis of which knowledge was acquired. This claim was based on an 
argument showing that for any proposition that is underdetermined by a 
body of evidence, there will be propositions such that those propositions 
follow from the propositions that are not supported by the body of evidence. 
Now if we accept that one cannot go from not knowing to knowing without 
having evidence (or even that this is at least sometimes impossible), then we 
have a prima facie reason to doubt closure of knowledge.  
Without pretending to have covered the entire spectrum of possible re-
sponses, two main strategies were considered for countering the challenge to 
closed knowledge. One was to view the inference itself as adding justifica-
tion to the inferred consequences of known propositions. Second, that when-
ever a proposition is known it changes the evidential situation. Now that the 
proposition is known it can be taken as evidence and hence will support its 
properly inferred consequences. The first option is gravely flawed, since if 
anything, inference transfers warrant, it does not create any new warrant that 
was not there to begin with. The second option for countering the openness 
argument was further divided into two. The first way is congenial to open 
knowledge, it appeals to Jeffrey Conditionalization and was shown not to 
support any defense of closure against the open knowledge argument. The 
second way, Williamson's way, is to use Standard Conditionalization with 
the understanding that anything that is known is evidence. Since propositions 
trivially follow from themselves, all knowledge must have probability 1. 
This suggestion involved a non-standard understanding of prior probabilities 
to allow promotion of known propositions to epistemic probability 1 while 
chances are clearly lower (perhaps even very close to 0). This promotion of 
probabilities (relative to the prior conditional probability) in turn leads to 
several unhappy consequences that in light of the benefits open knowledge 
can offer, reveals its many shortcomings. As far as I can see, Williamson's 
knowledge account is as plausible regarding a domain of interest as the plau-
sibility of regarding this domain as infallible. Where a domain is infallible, 
Williamson's theory seems to deliver the right results, but when it is clear 
that evidence does not entail known propositions in a given domain (like in 
the case of future events, induction, car parking knowledge and the like) the 
problems associated with the rule of conjunction introduction come to haunt 
the theory.                  
Our conception of knowledge includes the following ideas. First, that we 
have knowledge of truths. Second that we gain such knowledge by way of 
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evidence that more often than not, is not conclusive (the evidence is com-
patible with the falsity of what we know by it). Third, that we do not know 
certain empirical truths that are implied by what we do know (either because 
given our epistemic limitations we cannot know them as in the case of 
heavyweight propositions, or because the grounds we have do not suffice for 
knowing them, as in the case of ordinary propositions exemplified by the 
watch, zebra and car cases). And fourth, that knowledge can always be ex-
tended by deduction. Combined, these ideas generate a contradiction giving 
rise to a host of problems and examples that amount to what is perhaps of the 
most pertinent problems of contemporary epistemology.  
Various ways have been proposed of how to modify or deny each of the 
above stated ideas. Skepticism opts for denial of the claim that we have 
knowledge even of the most mundane sort. Infallibilists deny that knowledge 
can be had on the basis of inconclusive reasons. Others claim that we have a 
priori knowledge of heavyweight propositions and perhaps even of non-
heavyweight implications of what we know, or that by having knowledge of 
ordinary truths we ipso facto gain knowledge of their implications. The costs 
and shortcomings of each of these proposals are by now familiar.  I have 
tried to show that the variety of problems arising from our ideas about 
knowledge are owed to the unintuitive features of evidence and that a proper 
understanding of these features supports the resolution of these problems by 
rejecting epistemic closure. By sustaining a distinction between doxastic and 
epistemic justification the open knowledge advocate is able to account (at 
least partially) for the intuitive pull of closure – believing that p and that p 
implies q one is normally justified in believing q. Yet beliefs justified in this 
way might not amount to knowledge. 
 I, of course, do not pretend to have any way of getting behind the epis-
temic scenes to check and see if knowledge is closed or open. To be sure, 
many epistemologists viewing certain closure-friendly features of knowledge 
as the most central, will remain unconvinced. My purpose is not to make a 
case that would convince them; I am not sure if I am convinced myself. Yet I 
think that the case made in this chapter for open knowledge is an improve-
ment on those I am familiar with and is a strong one at that.  
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Chapter 6: Concluding Remarks 
To cast additional light on the basic line of reasoning of this manuscript I 
will utilize these concluding remarks without trying to improve or alter the 
arguments themselves. Rather, placing them in a different order with change 
of emphasis might facilitate a better understanding of how they relate.  
In trying to systematize thinking about knowledge, a good place to start is 
with our intuitions regarding the principles that govern this notion. We think 
intuitively that knowledge entails truth; that it entails rational belief; that it 
must rely on evidence or reasons; that besides special cases it does not re-
quire the evidence or reasons to be conclusive; that deductive valid infer-
ences are a general way in which knowledge is extended; and more. Yet 
upon closer inspection we find that there are tensions between these intui-
tions. Specifically in light of the idea that we have non-conclusive knowl-
edge, the intuitions regarding the extension of knowledge by inference and 
that one cannot know a belief that one is rationally required to disbelieve, are 
in tension. Rational doubt or uncertainty can accumulate, as we have seen 
(Chapter 1), and so valid inferences can have as their conclusion beliefs that 
we are required by rationality to doubt. Thus we are forced to either abandon 
the idea that knowledge can be fallible and tie knowledge to epistemic cer-
tainty, or jettison the idea that inference from knowledge is a general way of 
extending knowledge. Pagin’s argument of Chapter 1 shows that the persis-
tent intuition that basic modus ponens inferences are immune to the kind of 
trouble we face in Preface paradox type cases is deeply flawed. We must 
either give up the extension of knowledge by proper inference or give up 
epistemic uncertainty.        
 To my awareness the best attempt at the latter idea is Timothy William-
son’s safety account of knowledge. By eliminating epistemic uncertainty it 
succeeds in preserving the role of valid inference in extending knowledge. 
This solution has a heavy cost, however, the cost of an infallibilist episte-
mology. Besides the problem of giving up the idea of fallibilism itself, infal-
liblism leads to further formidable difficulties (as we saw in Chapter 5.3.3). 
One problem is directly connected to the rift between knowledge and ra-
tional uncertain belief. Following Williamson’s proposal entails accepting 
the possibility that one will know that a long conjunction is true and yet 
know for certain that its chance of being true is minute. Not only is this a 
formidable problem in its own right, it also shows that this view does not 
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connect practical reasoning with knowledge as one might have hoped.291 A 
further (though related) problem arises with respect to knowledge of lottery 
propositions. The infallibilist has two alternatives: The first is to admit that 
one can know that a ticket of a large future lottery has a very good chance of 
winning (by inferring this from knowledge that other tickets will lose).292 The 
second alternative is to accept equally implausible consequences, for in-
stance, that knowledge of a long conjunction is destroyed simply because the 
events described by this conjunction will be used as a mechanism for select-
ing a winner of a prize among many tickets.293  
These and other problems, which were the subject of Chapter 5.3.3, 
should persuade us to look for a fallibilist notion of knowledge, one that will 
avoid these theoretical difficulties. But if knowledge is fallibile, rational 
doubt can accumulate over valid inferences. There seems to be no other 
choice but to forfeit closure of valid inference altogether or to limit closure 
to inferences from single items of knowledge, i.e. valid inferences from what 
falls within the scope of one knowledge operator. Both of these paths en-
counter difficulties. The first – open knowledge – requires giving up one of 
the basic intuitive ideas we started out with: how can one know that p is true 
and competently infer q from p and yet fail to know that q? After all, the 
subject seems to have the best kind of epistemic standing with respect to q. 
She believes that q by properly inferring it from knowledge. The second 
path, which is a limited form of knowledge closure, leads to a host of prob-
lems that have been the main concern of this manuscript. But before rehears-
ing those, it must be made clear that this limited closed knowledge sugges-
tion shares the difficulty faced by the first option. Anyone who accepts this 
option (as do many contemporary epistemologists) must admit that one can 
know that p, know that q follows from p, and yet fail to know that q. The 
reason is simple: knowledge that q in this case is based on an inference from 
two premises. So the popular strategy of restricting epistemic closure to in-
ferences from a single premise fares no better with respect to the basic idea 
that proper modes of inference such as modus ponens always serve to extend 
knowledge. 
As noted, accepting the restriction of closure to a single premise together 
with the thesis of fallible (underdetermined) knowledge that is compatible 
                                                       
291 For several adherents of Williamson’s view, e.g. Hawthorne and Stanley, this is a diffi-
culty.  
292 Other examples are: inferring and coming to know that one’s ticket is a loser on the 
grounds that one knows that one will not have money to go on Safari (Hawthorne: 2004a); 
inferring that I will not suffer a fatal heart attack today from my knowledge that I will see a 
certain movie tomorrow, inferring and coming to know from my knowledge that my plane has 
a layover in Chicago that it will not crash on the way (Cohen 1999: 58); etc.  
293 Here I am referring to the idea that one will know that many quantum events that have a 
very high chance of taking place (such as the tunneling through the floor of one among many 
marbles) will not take place, and will lose this knowledge once these events are used for 
selecting a lottery winner. See 5.3.3.2 for further detail.  
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with some measure of epistemic doubt, leads to several problems that consti-
tute the main concern of this manuscript. These problems can be described 
more generally as two types of challenges. The first type is the challenge of 
how to respond to implications of closed knowledge. How to respond to 
Cartesian Skeptical implications, to the implication of Mundane Skepticism 
of Live Skepticism, Dogmatism, Bootstrapping, Easy Knowledge and other 
Epistemic Ascent implications. The second type of challenge to closed 
knowledge is the theoretical difficulties that come from the logic of evidence 
and its relation to knowledge.  
Chapter 2 focused on the first type of challenge: Skeptical implications of 
closure. The most notorious of these is Cartesian Skepticism and it received 
a more systematic treatment than did the other skeptical challenges. In brief 
the problem was here analyzed as one where the Cartesian skeptic has a way 
to show that her opponent has no evidence against the possibilities she 
raises. Worse, she has an argument showing that one’s evidence counts in 
favor of such possibilities relative to any initial probability one chooses. The 
Cartesian Skeptic has a systematic way of generating such propositions that 
intuitively and on very modest assumptions are not known. She can then use 
closure for a reductio argument discrediting the opponent’s claim to know 
propositions of a disputed domain (e.g. knowledge of past events). A second 
skeptical argument – Mundane Skepticism – ensues on the basis of a non-
systematic ability. Its main virtue is that it appeals to possibilities that in 
contrast to the Cartesian far-fetched scenarios, are quite mundane. The con-
trast is not accidental, the Cartesian Skeptic relies on cases that are not pres-
ently known to be false by all subjects, e.g. that the world was not created 
five minutes ago. Mundane Skepticism appeals to cases that are only beyond 
the evidence of a specific epistemic agent in a certain context. For instance, 
one does not know that one will lose tomorrow’s lottery. A third type of 
skepticism appeals to modesty regarding scientific/philosophical theories 
that are not regarded as prominent and yet have some chance of becoming 
the received view. This is Live Skepticism advanced by Frances (2004). It 
relies (despite his claim to the contrary) on closure. When successful it tar-
gets a subject’s everyday knowledge by appealing to the fact that we don’t 
(at present) know such theories to be false. Claiming otherwise is not only 
immodest (especially if experts despite believing that they are false do not 
think they know them to be false), it also seems false. Our present evidence 
(evidence that the non-standard theorists are aware of) is not good enough 
for us to know that these non-standard theories are false. These three skepti-
cisms pose a challenge to those who both believe that knowledge is fallible 
and closed.  
A second type of problematic implications for closed knowledge falls un-
der the heading of Epistemic Ascent. We saw in Chapter 3 that Kripke’s 
Dogmatism remains a formidable problem for those who assume closed 
knowledge since one who fallibly knows that a proposition p is true can de-
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duce (and by closure come to know) that any evidence that counts against p 
will be misleading. Not only does this knowledge sound dubious under the 
circumstances (as some closure advocates candidly admit), but there are 
Gettier type considerations that urge the conclusion that in fact these are not 
cases of knowledge. For instance Hawthorne’s (2004a: 73) Manchester 
United example is one where a false belief is necessary in maintaining the 
belief that is known if closure holds.294  
The similarity between the different kinds of Epistemic Ascent is not ac-
cidental. Kripke’s puzzle relates to the inference that if p is true, any coun-
terevidence to p will be misleading. Vogel’s Bootstrapping argument, for 
instance, is an inversion of the consequent – the evidence I have for p is not 
misleading.295 The same kind of reasoning is exemplified in Cohen’s Easy 
Knowledge example (I know that this table is not a white table lit by a red 
light to look red) and in analogous cases of belief (I know that my belief that 
Churchill was born November 1974 is not mistaken). Under the heading of 
Epistemic Ascent these cases were further analyzed as propositions regard-
ing one’s own epistemic state that are inferred from a known proposition and 
are not supported by one’s evidence. The ascent is made purely by reflection 
and supposedly improves one’s epistemic standing regarding the relation 
between one’s epistemic subjective state and the world. Intuitively, these are 
not ways in which knowledge can be gained and yet closure tells otherwise.  
The second type of challenge, the theoretical challenge, was the main fo-
cus of Chapters 4 and 5. Chapter 4 started by substantiating the claim that 
evidence is open, i.e. if e supports p to any degree short of an absolute guar-
                                                       
294 I note a contrast between the Dogmatism Puzzle (and cases of Epistemic Ascent more 
generally) and Cartesian Skepticism. The skeptic invokes propositions that are alternative 
explanations of one’s evidence. For instance, that your evidence that you have hands (what-
ever it is) is explained by your being a brain in a vat that is fed sensory stimulations as if you 
had hands. That these possibilities are alternatives allows a response to Skepticism that is not 
available as a response to the Dogmatism puzzle. This is the idea that if an alternative propo-
sition becomes salient to the epistemic subject (or to a knowledge ascriber), the standards of 
knowledge alter and if the evidence does not rule-out these alternatives, knowledge is lost (or 
the knowledge predicate can no longer truly be ascribed to the subject-proposition pair). The 
dogmatism case is not one that lends itself to this tactic. That there is evidence that I have not 
encountered counting against the proposition I know, is not an alternative explanation of my 
evidence. Thus, besides the fact that in some cases of dogmatic inference error becomes sali-
ent, this need not be the case and so the above tactic is not enough to accommodate lack of 
evidence with closure. Moreover, some Epistemic Ascent share an important feature exempli-
fied in Kripke’s Dogmatism puzzle. There is no intuitive inclination to claim that one does not 
know the proposition from which the questionable knowledge was inferred. Thus, even if one 
thinks that intuition and linguistic practice should convince us that I don’t know that there is a 
zebra in the pen if I don’t know that there is no disguised mule in the pen, one will have to 
find a different reason for maintaining closure in face of these Epistemic Ascent cases. There 
is no intuitive inclination to question one’s knowledge that p, if one does not know that any 
future counterevidence to p will be misleading. 
295 It was shown in Chapter 3 that one does not need to know what one’s evidence is in order 
to infer the kind of objectionable knowledge that is at the heart of Vogel’s Bootstrapping 
argument.  
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antee, e will not support all the propositions that follow from p. This fact (at 
least since Carnap and Hempel see Chapter 4.3.4) has been noted by many 
theorists but I suspect that its potential as a threat to knowledge closure has 
been underestimated.296 Weaker principles than evidence closure were found 
to be false, such as the idea that if p is supported non-conclusively by e, e 
will support p-or-q. The watch case was proven (within a falliblist frame-
work) to be a case where one has good evidence for the time being 3:00 and 
yet one does not gain any evidence for the claim that either my watch is not 
showing “3:00” or it is showing the correct time. Whether or not one thinks 
that the evidence that allows one to know that the time is 3:00 (i.e. the watch 
showing “3:00”) intuitively supports this disjunction, this evidence does not 
in fact support it. And yet, closure entails that it is known as long as it is 
know that the time is 3:00. If it is in fact known, then one must have known 
this beforehand since the added evidence – the evidence that allowed one to 
know that it is 3:00 - if anything, counts against this proposition that follows 
from the time being 3:00.  
The argument for open knowledge in Chapter 4 spells out the challenge 
(page 97). Roughly the theoretical challenge was this. If one comes to know 
that p on the basis of evidence e, no matter how high the probability of p is 
on this evidence, as long as the conditional probability of p on e is less than 
1, there will be propositions that follow from p that will not be supported by 
this evidence. Looking at the situation as a whole, closure entails that one 
can go from ignorance to knowledge without evidence (and in the face of 
counterevidence) or that our a priori knowledge is much more extensive 
than we have supposed. As stated, the theoretical challenge can be used to 
analyze the first type of challenge, problematic implications of closure – 
Skepticisms and Epistemic Ascents – in terms of the principles of evidence 
and/or its probabilistic properties. Cartesian Skepticism (2.2.2), Mundane 
Skepticism (2.3), Live Skepticism (2.4), Dogmatism (3.1), Bootstrapping 
(3.2.1), Easy Knowledge (3.2.1) and other Epistemic Ascent cases (3.2) are 
all instances of inferring propositions from knowledge that the evidence for 
this knowledge does not support. Thus, the challenges combine into a com-
prehensive argument against closed knowledge and an analysis of its failure.     
Two ways to avoid the argument are wrongheaded. One is to claim that 
evidence is not analyzable probabilistically, two is to claim that there are 
items of evidence that count in favor of propositions that have their probabil-
ity lowered by those items. The Underdetermination Argument (page 104) 
was introduced as a way to counter these ways of responding to the Open 
Knowledge Argument. It shows – without appeal to probabilities – that valid 
                                                       
296 White (2006), in a sense, is an exception. His argument makes use of evidence openness 
on (Bayesian) considerations similar to the probabilistic argument advanced here. His target, 
however, is limited to the Dogmatism account of justification closure. Justification closure in 
the sense endorsed in that paper, by the way, is compatible with open knowledge. See 5.4 and 
the Appendix for more detail on probabilistic coherence.   
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inference does not universally preserve evidence. This conclusion holds for 
very intuitive principles that are weaker than closure. Moreover, it also 
shows that an open knowledge account that is based on open evidence is 
successful where other open knowledge accounts (Nozick’s and Dretske’s – 
Chapter 1.5.2-1.5.3) fail (i.e. in responding to Hawthorne’s arguments 1.5.1). 
It shows this by emulating principles with respect to evidence that 
Hawthorne appeals to with respect to knowledge. Not only does it show that 
these principles that are weaker than evidence closure fail, but it can also be 
used to explain why despite appearances to the contrary their epistemic 
counterparts (the principles that are weaker than knowledge closure) are 
invalid. Why, that is, despite their falsity they seem extremely compelling. 
Just as it might seem initially inevitable that one’s evidence for p-and-q must 
at least count either in favor of p or in favor of q, this thought is mistaken. 
Also, one’s evidence for p might not count in favor of p-or-q despite the 
initial thought that it must. It is these (as well as similar) mistaken inclina-
tions that an open knowledge advocate might use to explain our mistaken 
thought to endorse closure either within or across contexts of knowledge 
ascription (or practical environment).  
For both fallibilist and infallibilist closure advocates a significant chal-
lenge stems from more basic assumptions than closure. Moreover open 
knowledge has significant advantages. Not only can it meet the theoretical 
challenge and avoid the problematic implications of Epistemic Ascent and 
Skepticisms, the Lottery Paradox, The Preface Paradox, etc, some of its in-
tuitive costs can be mitigated by a distinction between epistemic and doxas-
tic justification. Compatible with open knowledge is the idea that doxastic 
justification is (single-premise) closed. If one has justification for believing 
that p and properly infers q from p, one is justified in believing q. And yet, 
one will not always have a justification for believing that q  (at least not an 
evidential justification).  
I conclude, then, first, that it can be shown on both probabilistic and non-
probabilistic assumptions that evidence is in fact open. Second, the depend-
ence of knowledge (or at least some knowledge) on evidence (as expressed 
by (NED) (p. 126) is a compelling defensible idea. Third, that it can be 
shown that for every fallibly known propositions that are many propositions 
that follow from it that are not supported by its evidence. Fourth, that this 
last claim together with the dependence relation of knowledge on evidence 
gives reason – in light of the latter’s openness – to view knowledge as open 
as well. Fifth, that open knowledge resolves many central epistemological 
problems that do not seem to be solved by any other single account. Sixth, 
that it is immune to the kind of arguments launched against other forms of 
open knowledge. Seventh, that open knowledge is compatible with doxastic 
justification closure. Eighth, that some of its unintuitive costs can be ex-
plained by the intuitive costs that we have to pay anyhow with regard to 
evidence and its un-intuitiveness can help explain why the problems it re-
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solves have such a hold on us. Finally, then, evidence openness provides a 
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